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The multifaceted effects of armed conflict on children are well-documented. Systematic monitoring and 
reporting on human rights violations committed against children aim to mitigate these impacts by better 
informing programmatic response and analyzing trends to prevent future violations. Through personal field 
research, the aim of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the UN Monitoring and Reporting 
Mechanism (MRM) as implemented in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), with a particular 
emphasis on attacks on schools. The research sought to address the following questions: 1) What are the 
current challenges in effectively implementing the MRM in the DRC? 2) Is the MRM effective in linking 
monitoring to response for the grave violation of attacks on schools? 3) Is the MRM accountable to children 
in situations of armed conflict? Results of qualitative Nvivo analysis of key informant interviews indicated 
that several challenges remain, with two major findings warranting further discussion. First, attacks on 
schools are relegated by other violations. Second, there is a bifurcation in accountability approaches 
between local grassroots groups excluded from the MRM (i.e. victim-focused and ‘downward’ 
accountability, building capacity) and UN bodies and international organizations on the MRM Task Force 
(i.e. perpetrator-focused and ‘upward’ accountability, favoring weak penal measures). Additional 
examination revealed that the latter strategy is often unsuccessful in its approach, highlighting the need for 
the MRM to be part of a broader effort, engaging with a more diverse set of actors including local 
representation. The challenges highlighted in this study have significant implications on whether the MRM 
can be used to prevent future violations and inform effective programmatic responses. Additionally, results 
call into question whether the UN’s use of punitive measures are merely ‘empty threats’ that do not set a 
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 Several studies,1 beginning with the ground-breaking 1996 Graça Machel study on the impact of 
armed conflict on children, have garnered international attention to the grave human rights violations 
children are exposed to in armed conflict settings. Greater knowledge of these complex, multifaceted and 
long-term child protection concerns has prompted various efforts to better protect children in such 
environments. Systematic monitoring and reporting on human rights violations committed against 
children aim to mitigate the impacts of armed conflict by gaining a more nuanced understanding of trends 
and patterns to better inform effective programmatic response, and ultimately prevent future violations.  
 The United Nations’ (UN) Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM), most notably initiated 
by Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1612 (2005),2 is one of such efforts and has been acclaimed for 
its explicit mandate in carrying out the arduous task of monitoring and reporting the situation of children 
in armed conflict settings. The MRM monitors and reports on six grave violations committed against 
children, including the following: recruitment and use of children by armed forces, killing and maiming 
of children, abduction of children, rape and other forms of sexual violence against children, attacks 
against schools and hospitals, and denial of humanitarian access. Despite explicit prohibitions in 
international law, there has been an observable increase in both the scope and scale of attacks on schools 
across the globe as an intentional strategy of war. However, this grave violation amounting to a war crime 
is typically overlooked, often eclipsed by the overwhelming international attention paid to child soldiers 
and more recently, sexual violence.  
                                                 
1  Particularly, the following studies: Hick, 2001; UNESCO, 2011; UNICEF, 2009; United Nations, 1996; 
Van Bueren, 1994; Wessells, 1998; Williamson, 2007 
2 However, the need for a system to monitor and report human rights violations against children in armed 
conflict settings has been called for in several preceding Security Council Resolutions, including UNSCR 
1379 (2001), 1460 (2003), and 1539 (2004).  
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 While the MRM signifies the Security Council’s transformative thematic focus on the impact of 
armed conflict on children, challenges remain in meaningfully implementing the MRM’s ambitious 
rhetoric on the ground in conflict settings. The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was initially 
selected as the pilot site for the MRM’s launch in 2005, and has since forth been active in the DRC for 
over a decade. Additionally, the DRC was the first country situation to receive a report by the United 
Nations Secretary-General on the six grave violations. Serving as a benchmark for the quality of future 
MRM implementation, the DRC is therefore a valuable case study that merits detailed investigation.  
 While several studies3 have evaluated the impact of the MRM (many of which including a 
particular attention paid to the DRC context), this existing evidence-base is problematic as these studies 
are quite outdated and do not focus on the grave violation of attacks on schools, a frequently under-
prioritized phenomenon that receives scant academic attention. In addition, while several organizations, 
such as The Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), Human Rights Watch (HRW), 
and The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), have collected 
comprehensive data on the global issue of attacks on schools and the military use of schools, a dearth of 
scholarly literature and academic analysis on the phenomenon persists. This study aims to address this 
critical knowledge gap by describing, evaluating, and analyzing the current use of the MRM at the 
national level in the DRC, with particular emphasis on the grave violation of attacks on schools. Through 
personal field research conducted in Kinshasa in 2015 and the use of qualitative data analysis of open-
ended interviews with key informants involved in monitoring and reporting human rights violations 
against children, this study seeks to answer the following research questions: 1) What are the current 
challenges in effectively implementing the MRM at the national level in the DRC 2) Is the MRM 
                                                 
3 Most notably, Barnett and Jefferys’ 2008 report Full of Promise: How the UN’s Monitoring and 
Reporting Mechanism can better protect children and Watchlists’s 2009 study UN Security Council 
Resolution 1612 and Beyond: Strengthening Protection for Children in Armed Conflict as well as 
Watchlists’ country-specific study Getting it Done and Doing it Right: Implementing the Monitoring and 
Reporting Mechanism on Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
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effective in linking monitoring to response for the grave violation of attacks on school?, and finally, 
3) Is the MRM accountable to children in situations of armed conflict?  
 Results of qualitative Nvivo analysis of key informant interviews indicated that several 
challenges exist, with two major findings warranting further discussion. First, attacks on schools are 
relegated by other violations. Second, there is a bifurcation in accountability approaches between local 
grassroots groups excluded from the MRM and UN bodies and international organizations on the MRM 
Task Force. While the former utilized a more ‘victim-focused’ approach to ‘downward’ accountability by 
building capacity and fostering empowerment, the latter embraced a more perpetrator-focused approach, 
favouring weak penal measures and ‘upward’ accountability to trustees. Additional examination revealed 
that the latter strategy adopted by MRM Task Force members is often unsuccessful, highlighting the need 
for the MRM to be part of a broader effort, engaging with a more diverse set of actors, including local 
representation. The challenges highlighted in this study have significant implications on whether the 
MRM can be used to prevent future violations and inform effective programmatic responses to maximally 
protect children in armed conflict settings. Additionally, it is called into question whether the UN’s use of 
punitive measures are merely ‘empty threats’ that do not set a strong precedent to deter future perpetrators 
of grave violations against children. 
 This paper begins by providing the necessary background context to better understand the need 
for the MRM and the grave violation of attacks on schools. Such background information covers the 
following: i) The persisting impacts of armed conflict on children as a result of the changing nature of 
war; ii) the right to education as a transformative right enabling the realization of other rights, and how it 
is undermined by conflict. This subsection also explores how education is a paradoxical right with “two 
faces”4 that can either promote peace or exacerbate grievances that prompt war, and finally; iii) the 
persisting global phenomenon of attacks on education and the military use of schools is described in 
further detail.  
                                                 
4 Bush, Kenneth D., and Diana Saltarelli. The two faces of education in ethnic conflict: Towards a 
peacebuilding education for children. No. 00/7. 2000. 
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 Chapter 2 outlines the objectives of the research study and provides a brief description of the 
methodology used, as well as the potential biases and limitations. Chapter 3 includes the results of this 
research study, structured according to the study’s three objectives: 1) A literature review is provided on 
(a) the evolution of the Security Council’s agenda and thematic focus on Children and Armed Conflict 
(CAAC), and (b) recent reporting on attacks on schools in the DRC, comparing the reporting of the UN-
led MRM with an alternative surveillance initiative; 2) A description of this study’s sample characteristics 
is provided, followed by the results from qualitative data analysis of interview content using Nvivo to 
guide the thematic analysis and an analysis of relationships; 3) recommendations, as articulated by key 
informants, are listed. 
 Following the results, Chapter 4 includes a discussion on the study’s two main findings. First, the 
under-prioritization of the grave violation of attacks on schools relative to child soldiers and sexual 
violence is further explored. Second, the MRM’s accountability mechanism is examined in detail, 
comparing two complementary yet parallel channels of monitoring and reporting (i.e. by the MRM and by 
local NGOs) and their corresponding approach to accountability (i.e. upward or perpetrator-focused 
versus downward or victim-focused, respectively). Finally, key conclusions, the implications of this 
study’s findings, and possible next steps for future research are provided.   
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Chapter 1: Background 
  
I. The Shift in War Strategies and the Protection of Civilians: Children at the Frontline of 
Conflict 
 
A) The Changing Nature of War and the Changing Nature of Response: 
 As purported in Kaldor’s groundbreaking ‘new wars’ theory, a significant shift has taken place in 
the methods, goals, actors and impacts of warfare.5 The last few decades characterized by dramatic 
changes in the world’s political economy (e.g. the spread of neoliberalism, a widening gap between rich 
and poor countries, forced structural adjustment, direct foreign transnational corporate investment 
especially in resources like oil, gold and diamonds) has contributed to the creation of the conditions for a 
radical shift in the nature of conflict.6 In a post-colonial world that is coupled with increasing levels of 
urbanization, violent conflicts are exacerbated by the stresses of poverty, uneven development, the 
competition for coveted resources and internal dissent.7 Contemporary conflicts are increasingly 
characterized by intra-state strife,8 rather than the inter-state far-removed battlefields of the  past; 
contemporary warfare is no longer about capturing territory and state-building initiatives, but are instead 
waged on political, social and economic grounds in attempts to further weaken and even dismantle the 
nation-state.9  
                                                 
5 Kaldor, Mary. "In defence of new wars." Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 
2.1 (2013); Newman, Edward. "The ‘new wars’ debate: a historical perspective is needed." Security 
dialogue 35.2 (2004): 173-189. 
6 Hick, Steven. "The political economy of war-affected children." The ANNALS of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science 575.1 (2001): 106-121. 
7 Ibid. 
8 It is important to note that much semantic debate surrounds the use of the terms conflict, civil war and 
armed conflict. While I acknowledge that they all pertain to different situations, the terms conflict and 
armed conflict will be used interchangeably in this paper for purposes of simplicity to refer to intra-state 
conflict.  
9 Kaldor, “In defence of new wars.”  
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 These changes, captured in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s 
(ICISS) statement that “the most marked security phenomenon since the end of the Cold War has been the 
proliferation of armed conflicts within states,”10 has overwhelmingly placed civilians at the frontline of 
conflict, strategically implicating and specifically targeting them. Consequentially, civilians are 
increasingly bearing the brunt of the multifaceted effects of conflict rather than militants or combatants. 
This is further evidenced by the alarming 1996 statistic that the proportion of victims of war that were 
civilians as compared to combatants rose dramatically from five percent in World War I to over 90 
percent in the last few decades.11 
 This observed changing nature of war has been paralleled by a concurrent shift in the nature of 
response to war. While both have been catalyzed by changing geopolitical landscapes after the end of the 
Cold War in the early 1990s, the increasing prevalence of intra-state armed conflict has placed excessive 
demands on an already fragile state to respond to the protection needs of its civilians. As a result, 
especially in consideration of the possible threat to international peace and security, there was an 
increasing need for foreign intervention from the international community, through efforts such as 
Chapter VII under the UN Charter and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), to help address grave human 
rights violations and put a halt to genocides, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In 
responding to these new complex threats to a nation, R2P redefined international norms to one 
characterized by international obligation, commitment, or ‘responsibility’ to intervene in mass atrocity 
crimes across the globe.12  
 The changing nature of war demanded a corresponding shift in intervention such that when a state 
is unwilling or unable to uphold its responsibility to protect its civilians from the impact of war, then the 
                                                 
10 International Commission on Intervention, State Sovereignty, and International Development Research 
Centre (Canada). The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary 
Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. Idrc, 2001: 
4 
11 Machel, Graça. Impact of armed conflict on children. UN, 1996. 
12 Evans, Gareth. The responsibility to protect: ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all. Brookings 
Institution Press, 2009. 
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responsibility must shift to the international community to respond. After the witnessing of repeated 
international failures to respond to humanitarian crises and systematic and widespread human rights 
abuses, key issues of state sovereignty were increasingly brought under question, as encapsulated by Kofi 
Annan’s remark that "if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how 
should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica — to gross and systematic violations of human rights 
that offend every precept of our common humanity?”13 
B) The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children: 
 Overwhelmingly, this transformation in the nature of war in contemporary conflicts has posed a 
marked and disproportionate increase in complex threats to children, making them a particularly 
vulnerable group who are affected by conflict in new ways.14 Children are impacted both as a cause and 
consequence of conflict, immediately and in the aftermath, with these effects manifesting in profound 
long-term repercussions on their physical (e.g. health, nutrition, increased mortality rates, traumatic 
injuries such as sexual violence and maiming) and psychosocial (e.g. accumulated stress, trauma, social 
isolation, separation from family, risk-taking behaviour, substance abuse, disruption in education, 
dislocation from communities) development and well-being.15 As recorded in 1998, an estimated 1 billion 
children, or a sixth of the total global population, live in countries affected by armed conflict, with 300 
million of these children being under the age of five.16 A more recent figure stated in a 2015 UNICEF 
                                                 
13 Annan, Kofi A. Secretary-General’s speech to the 54th session of the General Assembly, 20 September 
1999, SG/SM/7136 GA/9596, in Evans, Gareth, and Mohamed Sahnoun. “Intervention and State 
Sovereignty: Breaking New Ground”. Global Governance 7.2 (2001): 119. 
14 Hick, The Political Economy of War-Affected Children; Machel, The Impact of Armed Conflict on 
Children; UNICEF., United Nations. Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Children, and Armed Conflict. Machel study 10-year strategic review: Children and conflict in a changing 
world. UNICEF, 2009; Van Bueren, Geraldine. "The international legal protection of children in armed 
conflicts." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43.04 (1994): 809-826.; Wessells, Michael G. 
"Children, armed conflict, and peace." Journal of Peace Research 35.5 (1998): 635-646;  
15 Wessells, Children, Armed Conflict, and Peace.  
16 UNICEF, Machel Study 10 Year Strategic Review; ECHO. Children in Conflict: ECHO Fact Sheet. 
ECHO, 2014.   
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press release reveals that over 60 million children are directly at risk in this “new generation of crises,” 
with “more than 1 in 10 children living in countries and areas affected by armed conflict.”17  
 Appointed by the Secretary-General as an independent expert to examine the effect of war on 
children, Graça Machel (1996) produced a seminal study on the impact of armed conflict on children in 
1996, shedding light on this previously hidden issue “the impact of armed conflict on children’s lives 
remains invisible,” due to the challenges in ascertaining and measuring the impacts on children, as 
conflict-related data does not typically disaggregate for children.18 Machel’s comprehensive study 
revealed that children increasingly represent an unprecedented number of victims of conflict, and are 
affected by conflict in multifaceted ways. Machel’s study reported the disconcerting statistic that in the 
decade prior to the report’s publication, two million children were killed due to armed conflict, with the 
number of children seriously maimed or disabled threefold that figure.  
 The targeted and recurrent ‘attack on children’ manifests in a myriad of ways; children are 
affected directly in both physically and sexually abusive forms of violence, as well as indirectly through 
massive disruptions in routine livelihoods and basic services, resulting in substantive deprivations that 
could produce mass starvation and disease, as well as hindering development and the potential 
achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).19 Contemporary tactics of warfare have 
expanded the scale and scope of intra-state security threats and civil unrest, frequently deliberately 
targeting civilians in “traditional safe havens” like schools and hospitals.20 Twenty-eight and a half 
million children have been forced to leave primary school due to conflict.21 These unbridled attacks on 
children have generated mass displacements of entire communities in frequently chaotic attempts to 
                                                 
17 UNICEF, UNICEF United States Fund, http://www.unicefusa.org/press/releases/unicef-more-1-10-
children-living-countries-and-areas-affected-armed-conflict/21551  
18 Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children:10-11; Wessells, Children, Armed Conflict and Peace.  
19 The Sustainable Development Goals are the updated set of goals for the post 2015 development agenda, 
and were built upon the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
20 United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict: Changing Nature of Conflict  https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/effects-of-conflict/the-
changing-nature-of-conflict/; Hick, The Political Economy of War-Affected Children.  
21 ECHO, Children in Conflict: Fact Sheet. 
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escape conflict zones and seek safety in often precarious environments. Over 20 million children are 
displaced either internally or externally in refugee or IDP camps, and Machel’s study illustrates that of the 
millions of people uprooted by conflict, an estimated 80 percent are children.22 More currently, the UN 
Refugee Agency found in 2013 that seven million children are refugees and between 11.2 and 13.7 
million children are internally displaced due to armed conflict.23 
 Linked with massive waves of globalization, the spread of technological advancements in 
weaponry combined with the poorly regulated international arms trade have resulted in the widespread 
proliferation of readily available and cheap weapons (e.g. 55 million AK-47s have been sold globally and 
cost as little as USD$6 each).24 Due to these advancements in weaponry (i.e. lighter and less complex) in 
conjunction with the relative ease to condition children to obey as compared to adults, small arms have 
increasingly found themselves in the hands of child soldiers as a strategy of armed groups. In 2008, the 
Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers identified 24 countries with armed groups that recruit 
children.25 Efforts to measure the scale of this issue were continued by the UN in 2010, documenting 57 
groups recruiting children as soldiers in their study on 15 countries.26 In the case of child soldiers it is 
important to note, “whether they are forcibly recruited, join in order to escape poverty or hunger, or enlist 
to actively support a cause, the first loss is their childhood.”27 According to data disseminated by the 
Control Arms Campaign, USD$22 billion is spent annually on weapons in Africa, Latin America, Asia 
and the Middle East.28 Machel’s study highlights the need for a shift in expenditure from arms and 
military to human and social development, in order to reorient countries to meet the Millennium 
                                                 
22 Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children. 
23 ECHO, Children in Conflict: Fact Sheet.  
24 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 1995, in Hick, The Political Economy of 
War-Affected Children. 
25 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, in UNESCO. The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict and 
Education. UNESCO, 2011. 
26 UNESCO, The Hidden Crisis. 





Development Goals, such as achieving a reduction in infant and maternal mortality, which would cost 
comparatively only USD$12 billion a year.29 Even though there have been several official efforts to 
disarm, demobilize and reintegrate (DDR) child soldiers, DDR programs “often fall short of needs,”30 
particularly with regards to limited opportunities for secondary education and employment, both of which 
are critical elements for attaining a sustainable livelihood, consequentially rendering them particularly 
vulnerable for re-recruitment.31 This demonstrates that DDR, and the protection of children in conflict 
settings more generally, is a long-term process that goes beyond the reach of traditional short-term 
humanitarian assistance and demands a greater bridge between the traditional ‘humanitarian-development 
divide.’  
 UNICEF’s 10-year follow up on Machel’s report exhibited findings consistent, if not intensified, 
with those originally noted, thereby demonstrating the persistence of this issue.32 This Strategic Review 
following up on the Machel 1996 datasets notes that “armed conflicts may yield fewer military battle 
deaths, but they exact a high human cost: Unarmed civilians are victimized, basic services deteriorate, 
societal divisions deepen and local economies decline.”33 Children increasingly represent an 
unprecedented number of these victims. Children are not only affected by deliberate attacks on innocent 
civilians, but are an explicitly targeted group as part of a calculated instrument of warfare, such as in the 
militarization of schools and the recruitment of children as soldiers for sexual exploitation or for forced 
labor. This radical change in the nature of conflict has thus had profound implications on children, with 
war “violat[ing] every right of the child” in more brutal ways than ever before.34 
                                                 
29 UNICEF, Machel study 10-year strategic review. 
30 Child Soldiers International. “DDR.” http://www.child-soldiers.org/theme_reader.php?id=6  
31 Williamson, Roger. "Children and armed conflict: Towards a policy consensus and future agenda–ten 
years after the Machel study." A Report based on Wilton Park Conference. 2007. 
32 UNICEF, Machel study 10-year strategic review: 8 
33 Ibid.  
34 Ibid: 3. 
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 Conflict has all-encompassing effects on a child’s physical, emotional, moral and cultural well-
being, affecting virtually every sphere of their lives (e.g. home, school, community, health system, 
religious and cultural institutions) and violating every right of a child as conceptualized by the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The CRC illustrates the interdependence of children’s 
rights, thereby necessitating a holistic approach that draws on the expertise of various actors at multiple 
levels. The CRC was “the most rapidly and widely ratified international human rights treaty in history,”35 
with now practically universal ratification with the sole exception of the United States, “but for millions 
of children, the promise of the Convention has not been fulfilled: their rights brutally violated; their hopes 
and dreams for a better life destroyed. Nowhere is this harsh reality more starkly apparent than in the lives 
of children caught up in humanitarian crises.”36 Despite these pervasive global ideational norms relating 
to children’s rights, there has been repeated difficulties in “transform[ing] universal ratification of this 
Convention into universal reality.”37 
 Although the parameters and landscape of conflict have indeed changed and are continuously 
changing, “what has remained constant is the vulnerability of children.”38 In light of the prevailing 
evidence on both the deliberate and collateral victimization of children, the General Assembly of the 
United Nations has urged in several recommendations, specifically in the adoption of resolution 48/157 
(“Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflicts”), the need for child protection efforts to take a top 
priority in both responding to the impacts of armed conflict on children and their reintegration and 
rehabilitation.39 
 
II. The Right to Education: A Transformative Right Undermined by Conflict 
                                                 
35 UNICEF. “Convention on the Rights of the Child.” http://www.unicef.org/crc/  
36 UNICEF. Humanitarian Action for Children 2015: Overview. UNICEF, 2015: 1 
37 Machel, Impact of Armed Conflict on Children:10.  
38 UNICEF, Machel study 10-year strategic review: 15 
39 United Nations. Protection of children by armed conflicts: Resolution 48/157. A/RES/48/157. 





A) The Transformative Right to Education  
 The universal claim to education is a pivotal entitlement captured in Article 26 of the most basic 
international human rights corpus: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted in 1948. 
Various additional instruments of international law via multilateral treaties provide the ‘backbone’ or 
normative basis for this right: The right to education is guaranteed under Article 13 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966), as well as specifically protected for 
vulnerable groups such as: children under Article 28 of the CRC (1989), persons with disabilities under 
Article 24 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD, 2006), girls and women 
under Article 10 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW, 1979), and migrant workers under Article 30 of the International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICMW,1990).  Please see Table 
1.1 “International Human Rights Law Protecting the Right to Education” for the specific Article excerpts 
for each respective international human rights instrument.  
Table 1.1: International Human Rights Law Protecting the Right to Education 
Human Rights 
Instrument 
Article No. Excerpt  
UDHR (1948) Article 26 “1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, 
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary 
education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional 
education shall be made generally available and higher 
education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit. 
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the 
human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial 
or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace. 
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that 





Article No. Excerpt  
ICESCR (1966) Article 13 “1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right 
of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be 
directed to the full development of the human personality and 
the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that 
education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a 
free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship 
among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance 
of peace.” 
… 
CRC (1989) Article 28 “1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to education, 
and with a view to achieving this right progressively and on the 
basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary 
education, including general and vocational education, make 
them available and accessible to every child, and take 
appropriate measures such as the introduction of free education 
and offering financial assistance in case of need; 
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of 
capacity by every appropriate means; 
(d) Make educational and vocational information and guidance 
available and accessible to all children; 
(e) Take measures to encourage regular attendance at schools 
and the reduction of drop-out rates.” 
… 
CPRD (2006) Article 24 “1. States Parties recognize the right of persons with disabilities 
to education. With a view to realizing this right without 
discrimination and on the basis of equal opportunity, States 
Parties shall ensure an inclusive education system at all levels 
and life long learning directed to: 
(a) The full development of human potential and sense of dignity 
and self-worth, and the strengthening of respect for human 
rights, fundamental freedoms and human diversity; 
(b) The development by persons with disabilities of their 
personality, talents and creativity, as well as their mental and 
physical abilities, to their fullest potential; 
(c) Enabling persons with disabilities to participate effectively in 






Article No. Excerpt  
CEDAW (1979) Article 10 “States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in order to ensure to them equal 
rights with men in the field of education and in particular to 
ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:” 
… 
ICMW (1990) Article 30 “Each child of a migrant worker shall have the basic right of 
access to education on the basis of equality of treatment with 
nationals of the State concerned. Access to public pre-school 
educational institutions or schools shall not be refused or limited 
by reason of the irregular situation with respect to stay or 
employment of either parent or by reason of the irregularity of 
the child's stay in the State of employment.” 
 
 
 Although human rights are not hierarchical, the right to education is arguably one of the most 
transformative of rights, as it ‘unlocks’ a plethora of other fundamental freedoms and rights that are vital 
to human survival, well-being and development. The right to education is envisioned as a multiplier of 
rights, serving as a vehicle to both enable and empower an individual to realize other significant 
economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights and freedoms. This is further supported by General 
Comment No. 13 of the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,40 which 
states that “education is both a human right in itself and an indispensable means of realizing other human 
rights. As an empowerment right, education is the primary vehicle by which economically and socially 
marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate 
fully in their communities.”41 
 Education is understood as a critical catalyst for the alleviation of the intergenerational self-
perpetuating transmission of poverty. Education can be transformative, as it produces vital contributions 
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to wider social goals, such as: strengthening democratic institutions, empowering women, protecting the 
environment, and reducing preventable child deaths.42 Additionally, education can also help achieve 
broader development objectives including reducing poverty, increasing job opportunities and employment 
prospects, narrowing wage gaps, propelling economic growth, and improving health.43 However, 
“education’s unique potential to boost wider development goals can only be fully realized if education is 
equitable (e.g. to all genders, ethnicities, classes, races, religions), which means making special efforts to 
ensure that the marginalized can benefit equally from its transformative power.”44 
 In addition to the aforementioned legalistic formulations based in international law, several other 
non-legally binding measures possessing strong moral force, significantly reflect aspirations of the 
international community and national governments to safeguard the fundamental right to education for 
all.45 These efforts can be observed in the 1979 International Conference on Education aiming to extend 
more widely the right to education, the 2000 World Education Forum, the Education For All goals, the 
2000 Millennium Declaration and the corresponding set of objectives to dramatically reduce poverty 
contained in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),46 in which achieving universal primary 
education is MDG 2.47 
 Despite these optimistic narratives of education with global leaders often pegging education as 
the ‘magic bullet’ for global issues, much of the world’s educational systems experience significant 
systemic barriers that ultimately hinder the possibility of education either unlocking these other rights and 
opportunities or placing children securely on the path to development and empowerment. These obstacles 
                                                 
42 UNESCO, EFA. "Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 Teaching and Learning: 
Achieving Quality for All." (2013). 
43 Ibid.  
44 UNESCO, EFA. "Education for All Global Monitoring Report 2013/4 Teaching and Learning: 
Achieving Quality for All." (2013):143.  
45 The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Education: 
Standards and Norms. http://www.unesco.org/new/en/education/standards-and-norms/ 
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are exponentially further exacerbated in conflict and refugee/IDP settings. Conflict not only damages 
educational infrastructure and forces massive population displacements into areas lacking quality 
education systems, but more recent conflicts have increasingly been characterized by the militarization of 
schools or the direct targeting of education as a specific strategy of warfare. As evidenced by Save the 
Children’s The Future is Now report, more than half of the 72 million children out of primary school 
worldwide are living in countries afflicted by armed conflict.48 This is further evidenced by the alarming 
statistic that one in three children living in conflict-affected fragile states does not go to school as 
compared to one in eleven children in low-income countries not characterized by conflict.49 
Paradoxically, conflict settings are the sites where education can offer the greatest opportunities for 
resolution, with the potential for profound impacts on reconciliation and eventual peacebuilding. 
B. Shortcomings in Implementing the Right to Education: Conflict as the Biggest Barrier 
 Although there has been a consistent decreasing trend in the number of children out of school 
since the start of the millennium, global progress in achieving universal primary education has effectively 
halted since 2007 and progressively slipped lower and lower down the global agenda.50 An examination 
of the 2011 Education for All Global Monitoring report, The Hidden Crisis: Armed Conflict,51 
demonstrates that substantial international discrepancies exist in implementing the right to education, 
especially so between conflict-affected and not-affected countries (See Figure 3). Armed conflict serves 
as one of the biggest barriers to implementing educational goals, with 28 million of children (or 42% of 
the world’s children) out of school in conflict-affected countries. Additionally, the Dakar Framework for 
Action in 2000 similarly identified conflict as a major obstacle in achieving education for all.52 Conflict 
has been repeatedly described as “development in reverse,” not only thwarting previous developmental 
                                                 
48 Save The Children, 2010, in Coursen-Neff, Zama, and Bede Sheppard. "Schools as Battlegrounds, 
Protecting Students, Teachers and Schools from Attack." Human Rights Watch (2011). 
49 Save The Children. “The Future is Now: Education for Children in Countries Affected by Conflict.” 
(2010). 
50 UNESCO, EFA Global Monitoring Report.  
51 Ibid. 
52 UNESCO, Paris. "The Dakar framework for action." The World Declaration on Education (2000). 
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achievements, but oftentimes inverting their direction entirely.53 Despite international efforts 
predominantly focusing on immediate life-or-death needs, little attention is paid to the lasting and 
somewhat ‘hidden’ effects of conflict, such as education; “nowhere are those costs and legacies more 
evident than in education,” damaging educational infrastructure, crushing educational hope and dreams 
and having profound long-term implications on children.54 Conflict-ridden countries are increasingly 
lagging behind non-conflict affected countries in multiple educational indicators, demonstrating the heavy 
burden of conflict on education.55  
 Conflict settings typically force people to flee from danger, resulting in mass exoduses that either 
take the form of internally displaced people (IDP) or influxes of refugees to neighbouring countries. 
Refugee and IDP camps pose a multitude of additional caveats to education including over-stretched 
demands weakening already fragile neighbouring systems due to massive influx, increasing gender-based 
violence, makeshift classrooms drawing in untrained teachers, difficulties in access, lack of official status 
or documentation, gender inequalities, wasted schooling or having to repeat grades after returning home, 
as well as challenges in realizing educational opportunities outside of the classroom. Once IDP and 
refugee children’s education has been interrupted by a drastic and disruptive move, these children are 
highly unlikely to ever make-up for the lost time. Often, refugee and IDP education systems set up in 
camps are designed under the assumption of a short-term duration, however in reality, refugee or 
displaced status has been known to extend well beyond the temporary emergency provisions. Refugee 
settings, and conflict more generally, radically transforms household economies and traditional livelihood 
strategies, often dramatically changing the roles of children and their responsibilities to contribute in the 
form of both paid and unpaid labor (e.g. domestic tasks, childcare) to the family or community unit, 
which can contribute to their absence from school.56  
                                                 
53 Collier, 2007, in UNESCO, The Hidden Crisis: 131.  
54 UNESCO, Hidden Crisis: 131.  
55 Ibid. 
56 Boothby, Neil. "Political violence and development: an ecologic approach to children in war zones." 
Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America 17.3 (2008): 497-514. 
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 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) Education Strategy for 2012-
2016 recognizes the limited and uneven provision of refugee education and urges the need for a dramatic 
shift in policy to ensure that refugee and IDP children have improved quality, security and access to 
school in displaced settings and to ensure that refugee education is incorporated into humanitarian 
responses, “not as a peripheral stand-alone service but as a core component of UNHCR’s protection and 
durable solutions mandate.”57 Refugee settings also elevate the risk of contagion of infectious disorders 
substantially, resulting in the rapid transmission of diseases, which inevitably impairs children’s health 
and thus consequentially their ability to consistently attend school.  
 Despite the overwhelming cost of conflict on education, education is relegated as a low priority in 
humanitarian assistance given to conflict-affected countries, accounting for a mere 2% of humanitarian 
aid, even less so in the DRC at 1%, and with only 38% of education appeals met in emergency aid 
requests.58 Armed conflict results in a substantial diversion of resources from education and other 
productive investments in human capital to military spending, which is a substantial drain on state 
resources.59 This diversion is dovetailed with major shortcomings in international humanitarian responses, 
reflecting a misappropriation and misalignment of donor priorities. A total of USD$1.029 trillion is spent 
annually on military hardware by rich countries, compared to the relatively dismal amount (USD$16 
billion) needed to close the Education for All finance gap.60 In humanitarian responses to conflict zones, 
only 1.4% of humanitarian aid directly goes to education (as compared to the 4% mandated by the UN 
Secretary-General’s Global Education First Initiative) and only 38% of emergency aid appeals for 
education are actually met.61 The Hidden Crisis report identifies 21 countries where military spending 
exceeds national spending on primary education, including the DRC, who spends 2.1% of its GDP on the 
                                                 
57 UNHCR, Division of International Protection. “2012-2016 Educational Strategy: Summary.”(2012): 7 
58 UNESCO, The Hidden Crisis 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid.:150.  
61 UNESCO, The Hidden Crisis 
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military.62 The report argues that if the 12 sub-Saharan countries in Africa spending more on military 
expenditures than primary schooling were to cut military spending by just 10%, this could effectively 
place 2.7 million more children in school.63 Oftentimes, lucrative natural resource industries (frequently 
acting at the behest of consumers from developed countries) finance conflict, as was the case in the 
classic example of ‘blood diamonds’ and their intrinsic implication in the financing of the civil wars in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.64 
C. Education: How does it Measure up in the DRC? 
 The resurgence of conflict in the DRC has adversely affected the nation’s ability to reach multiple 
educational goals. A World at School estimates that more than 228,000 children in the DRC are affected 
by the more recent renewal of conflict in the East. Due to insecurity and the military occupation of 
schools, many parents are keeping their children at home to minimize risk. UNICEF reports that there has 
been a decline in school enrolment rates, with over 4.4. million children (or half of the country’s school-
aged population) out-of-school, 2.5 million of which are girls and 400,000 of which are displaced 
children.65 A 2013 National Survey on the situation of out-of-school children (OOSC) and adolescents 
reports an even greater figure, revealing that the number of 5-17 year-olds out-of-school reaches as high 
as 7,375,875, with “the number of OOSC…greatest in the compulsory schooling age group (6-11 years), 
which accounts for 47.6% of all OOSC.”66 The National survey similarly attests to a steady decline, 
beginning in 2007. Unsurprisingly, due to the amount of conflict afflicting the region, the province of 
                                                 
62 Ibid.:147 
63 Ibid.  
64 Ibid.  
65 UNICEF. Democratic Republic of Congo. http://www.unicef.org/wcaro/Countries_1749.html  
66 The Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Vocational Education (DRC), UNICEF and UNESCO. 
National Survey on the Situation of Out-of-School Children and Adolescents: The Democratic Republic 
of Congo. (2013): 9 
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North Kivu has the highest proportion of OOSC at 43.9%,67 demonstrating that it is for “those hit by 
recurrent conflict that the scale of the phenomenon is the greatest.”68  
 Despite the 2010 state initiative of making primary education free, access to basic education 
remains chronically low, as many parents still bear the brunt of school fees due to delays in releasing the 
funds for free education.69 In fact, the major “determinants of exclusion from school are socio-cultural 
and economic in nature.”70 This challenge of financing education is evidenced by the National Survey’s 
examination of the profiles of OOSC, which reveals that 64.3% of OOSC in the 6-11 years age group are 
from the poorest households.71 Socio-cultural reasons for exclusion include matrimonial practices, early 
marriage and early pregnancy, parental death, child fostering, and parental educational capital.72 Projected 
estimates assert that more than 40%, and in some areas as high as 70%, of children who enrolled in 
primary school in the DRC will drop out before the end of school. This statistic is even grimmer for girls, 
with as many as 77% of girls not completing primary school.73 
 At the political level, educational attainment is challenged by the lack of institutional and human 
capacity in the education sector. Low levels of public funding are allocated to education, with “less than 1 
percent of the national budget is allocated to education, according to UNICEF,”74 which puts increasing 
pressures on household incomes to support education expense. Teachers are severely underpaid, 
averaging between USD$1 and USD$15 per month in rural areas and USD$15 and USD$30 in urban 
areas, with 1995 marking the last year of state-provided salaries and since then it has become the 
                                                 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.: 54 
69 Ornelie Lelo, communications officer for SOS Kinshasa, in IRIN News. “Millions miss out on basic 
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71 Ibid. 
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74 Watchlist. “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).” 
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responsibility of each school to collect sufficient money to cover teachers’ salaries, among other costs.75 
The case of the DRC is an example of how the pre-existing struggle to guarantee the right to education in 
peacetime is further exacerbated in times of conflict, impacting the quality and quantity of education and 
placing severe, and often irreversible, disruptions to the education system. This relationship between 
education and conflict is particularly distressing, as “the provision of education is a means of providing 
protection, a ‘normal’ life, social support and opportunities for the future,”76 which can play an 
instrumental role in both buffering the effects of conflict as well as reducing the inclination for conflict to 
erupt.  
D. The ‘Two Faces’ of Education: Education and its Potentially Constructive Role in Conflict Settings: 
 Education is conceptualized as a productive investment in human capital that accrues not only 
individual benefits, but peace dividends or broader societal benefits that help yield or maintain peace. As 
part of the persisting effects of globalization, nations are increasingly multicultural and have an increasing 
need to do the following: 
“there is a need to move away from the idea that a particular ethnic 
group, perhaps claiming descent from a common ancestor, is the only 
legitimate holder of state power and towards ideas of nations as multi-
cultural entities, though with a distinctive cultural profile. The 
objective…is to create a shared understanding of, and connection to, the 
state through an expanding process of inclusion rather than exclusion.”77  
In supporting these lofty goals, education can serve as a primary vehicle for the establishment of a shared 
bond over a cohesive national identity that bridges possible ethnic, racial and religious divides amongst 
its citizens and facilitates integration and national stability. Education systems aim to produce linguistic, 
cultural and political homogeneity, without being overly assimilationist into the dominant culture, in 
order to assuage and minimize inter-group hostilities that are frequently the root causes of civil war;78 
                                                 
75 Watchlist, The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children in the DRC. 
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instead, education systems seek to engender tolerance, deference for difference and civic loyalty. It is 
these educational qualities that are thought to decrease intrastate tensions, therefore marking education as 
a “bridge-building initiative” that creates an “ethnically tolerant climate,” therefore serving as a possible 
mechanism of preventing future conflict.79  
 Affirmative action programs act to enhance access through regulation to educational 
opportunities, inclusive integration and just representation of different marginalized groups that have 
typically been disenfranchised by the education system. In the new USAID’s Education Strategy (2012), 
the third goal aims to increase equitable access to education in conflict-affected countries for 15 million 
learners by 2015 “so that we can curb inequality that fuels tension.”80 These efforts to make education 
more equitable for all and to rectify prevailing inequalities can conceivably prevent group tensions from 
escalating into enflamed civil strife. UNICEF, in its report on the ‘two faces’ of education, recognizes that 
physical integration is not enough to generate genuine attitude change of tolerance, stating that “just as 
Frantz Fanon recognized the need to decolonize the minds of formerly colonized peoples, so it is essential 
that we recognize the need to de-segregate the minds of formerly segregated peoples.”81 The pivotal role 
of education is noted in instilling durable attitudinal changes by producing a critical mass of people that 
are interested in producing systemic transformations. This kind of ‘de-segregation education’ can result in 
the transcending of factional divisions and the alleviation of inter-group conflict. 
 Curricular content and pedagogy that promotes tolerance and critical thinking can effectively 
promote a new generation that is capable of peacefully reconciling conflicting interests without resorting 
to violent means, which can ultimately prevent the eruption of armed conflict. This has been observed in 
education reform efforts in Rwanda towards changing singular historical narratives that reflect a 
particular ethnic group’s account in order to appease and justify particular political motives.82 Singular 
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historical narratives can become self-fulfilling prophecies; tell a Tutsi their people are historically and 
inherently violent, and they will become a violent people, or tell two races that historically they have 
never gotten along, and they will continue to not get along. Education reforms that ‘disarm history’ 
effectively challenge ingrained ethnically-based presumptions of history as a rigid unchallengeable 
concept and instead empowers children to become active agents in the telling of their own stories, 
encouraging them to challenge ‘facts’ rather than accept them at face value. UNICEF contends that: 
“critical historiographic skills are essential if young people are to be able 
to identify the intersection between their personal stories and larger 
collective histories. Only when young people realize that histories are 
constructed rather than given, can they even begin to contemplate 
challenging and changing the behaviour that poisons inter-group 
relations.”83  
In order to effectively nurture a climate that is conducive to peace, curriculum must illuminate the 
fallacies of stereotypes and prejudice that are so commonplace in textbook historical representations so 
that students can become aware of their own deeply rooted propensities to resort to stereotypes.84   
 “Research suggests that teaching methods can be as important as what is taught.”85 ‘Education for 
Peace Programmes’ (or ‘conflict-sensitive education’86) help cultivate and strengthen local peace-building 
capacities through a shift in pedagogy.  By switching teaching methods from one that is top-down, 
teacher-centred and encourages learning by rote memorization to one that emphasizes instead negotiation 
and cooperation through group activities that encourage debate and problem-solving in reconciling 
divergent opinions, one can ultimately change a student’s cognitive framework from one that is 
conformist and unquestioning to one that involves critical thinking, questioning and accepting the 
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importance of dialogue. In this context, UNICEF’s Peacebuilding, Education and Advocacy Programme 
called Learning for Peace aims “to strengthen resilience, social cohesion and human security in conflict-
affected contexts, including countries at risk for—or experiencing and recovering from—conflict.”87 
E. Education and its Potentially Exacerbating Effect on Grievances that Drive Conflict  
 Despite the prevailing optimistic rhetoric on the wide array of plausible benefits education can 
offer to society in it’s alleviation and prevention of conflict, particularly ethnically-based conflict, 
UNICEF’s Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict report “challenges [this] widely-held assumption—
that education is inevitably a force of good.”88 If education has the ability to shape prevailing ideas and 
attitudes for the better, education is equally capable of influencing ideas and attitudes for the worse. 
However, the negative face of education is frequently ignored by policy makers in their consideration of 
educational interventions in conflict settings. This obverse side of education’s coin is best captured in the 
following statement: “education systems do not cause wars. But under certain conditions they can 
exacerbate the wider grievances, social tensions and inequalities that drive societies in the direction of 
violent conflict.”89 
 Perhaps the most significant negative consequence of poorly designed educational programs is 
the systematic unequal distribution of access to education. The EFA Global Monitoring Report found that 
“perceived unfairness can reinforce disillusionment” in their observation of inequality, resulting in greater 
than a twofold increase in the probability of conflict (from 3.8 to 9.5%).90 This negative consequence of 
educational disparity has been regularly observed in various historical cases as a significant contributor to 
conflict, especially ethnic conflict. Denial of, or exclusion from, access to education entails eventual 
exclusion from full participation in the opportunities provided by education, such as employment and 
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attaining a sustainable livelihood.91 With education as a highly coveted commodity, “its unequal 
allocation has been a serious source of friction that has frequently led to confrontation.”92 If access to 
schooling in stratified societies is differentiated along particular ethnic, racial, religious, cultural or 
linguistic lines, it can act as a powerful concrete symbol of the state’s underlying political agenda to 
advance the interests of a particular group at the expense of another.93 Ultimately, “education systems that 
fail to equip young people with the skills they need to achieve a sustainable livelihood help to provide a 
pool of potential recruits for armed groups.”94 
  Education can also be used as a weapon of cultural repression. Policy efforts to de-segregate 
schools can indirectly result in the erosion of cultural identities, traditions, values languages and 
institutions.95 However, these policies could also reflect deliberate and calculated strategies to strengthen 
the dominant identity and marginalize subordinate groups in order to maintain political control and 
reproduce the system inter-generationally, thereby entrenching a preferential hierarchy.96 Policies aimed 
at enforcing a particular language as the language of instruction are particularly repressive to cultural 
identities as “languages are related to thought processes and to the way the members of a certain linguistic 
group perceive nature, the universe and society.”97 In post-colonial societies, this was observed in decades 
of missionary schools and Western-centred education that completely negated the existence of deeply 
rooted local cultures.  
 Curriculum, and in particular the historical narratives presented, have frequently been subject to 
manipulation for particular strategic political purposes. History can be a vulnerable curricular subject for 
deformation, as “‘history’ is a process by which certain stories and events are highlighted while others are 
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minimized or ignored. One particular set of facts (or ‘lies’) is agreed upon tactically and given social 
sanction and the political seal of approval.”98 History is often framed as a singular narrative that 
superimposes all other alternative versions and interpretations. Curriculum can be strategically 
manipulated to present a particular group as inherently inferior or inhuman, or presenting heterogeneity as 
a threat to national unity. Textbooks can be manipulated to propagate prejudice and stereotypes, as well as 
naturalize militarization, which can result in violence being normalized as a solution to conflicting 
interests or as a legitimate articulation of political power.99 Xenophobic curriculum can also foster self-
hate among members of repeatedly negatively stereotyped groups.100 Students can internalize the negative 
portrayals they are repeatedly exposed to and begin to believe it themselves and question their own self-
worth. Majority group students may employ the same stereotypes in their personal relationships (e.g. 
bullying, discrimination, inferior treatment by the professor), frequently resulting in further 
marginalization, ostracism and perhaps violent confrontation.  
F. The ‘Essential Link’ between Education and the Protection of Children in Armed Conflict Settings: 
 Attacks on schools undermine the ability for education to provide the protective environment, 
thereby severing ‘the essential link,’ that children are in desperate need of during times of conflict. With 
armed conflict often pegged as a “crisis of hope,”101 guaranteeing education is increasingly important 
during this time of heightened vulnerability to minimize risk and foster resilience, as education is 
forward-looking and a key source of the acquisition of key livelihood skills, and thus highly symbolic of 
future employment and attainment. Although education may not be interpreted as a high priority life-
saving initiative in times of crisis, it is critical to ensure safe access to schools even during times of war as 
schools are conceptualized as a ‘safe space’ that fosters a reassuring sense of normalcy, security, stability 
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and routine,102 as well as a means of strengthening resilience and mitigating grievances that might drive 
further conflict.103 Schools as supportive environments can help foster the necessary building blocks for 
healthy child development, which has been proven through research to have a significant effect on 
enabling children with “the capacity to bounce back in adverse settings”104 and help with the healing 
process for children affected by conflict. 
 Schools, along with other fundamental social structures, contribute to the protective environment 
of children, or alternatively are thought of as providing a ‘protective shield’ to children in times of 
conflict.105 Schools can shield children from the insecurity of conflict, with Save the Children attesting 
that “the longer we wait for education to be restored [in conflict settings], the more vulnerable children 
become to recruitment by armed actors, trafficking or other risks to their personal safety.106 In times of 
war, schools are often sites where life-saving information (e.g. mine-awareness, HIV prevention, 
nutrition) and services (e.g. feeding programs, psychosocial services) are provided, as schools are 
advantageous locations for expanding the reach of assistance.107 Effectively, literate children are better 
able to comprehend life-saving information on signs, newspapers, and brochures disseminated during a 
crisis.  
 Schools, as settings of assembled children, can also be helpful sites for identifying children that 
are particularly at-risk for referral for specialized interventions;108 alternatively children that fail to attend 
school are more readily identified as needing to be reached as susceptible to violence, exploitation or 
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recruitment. Education is critical in laying the foundation for children’s intellectual competencies, which 
has been found to be essential for child and youth development and particularly advantageous in conflict 
settings as “children and youth who are good problem-solvers are better able to respond in a constructive 
manner to the protection threats they face.”109 Focusing on fostering resilience through strengthening the 
protective role of schools adopts a less patronizing approach of children as passive victims, and instead 
reinforces children’s active role as agents in their own protection.110  
 Lastly, schooling can have broader benefits beyond the child in conflict settings, with real 
benefits for adults and the community at large as well. With children back in school routines, parents, 
siblings and other relatives are relieved from care-giving duties and can focus on their own personal 
coping and restoring their livelihoods, valuable sources of income and agency. Schooling can also 
decrease social isolation and instead encourage community engagement by providing a communal space 
and possibly support community-based child protection mechanisms, which can all facilitate post-conflict 
recovery.111 
 Education is considered to be a pivotal component of protection, especially in countries affected 
by armed conflict,112 and therefore it is a priority that educational environments be protected in order to 
protect children’s wellbeing.113 It is critical that humanitarian assistance includes education as a 
component of child protection as “even if children’s physical survival needs are being met through short-
term relief efforts, displacement, losses and insecurity interrupt optimal child development.”114 In fact, an 
increasing amount of humanitarian workers are acknowledging education as “the fourth pillar”115 of 
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humanitarian response.116 This increasing importance has been further instituted with its inclusion in the 
UN Cluster Approach (i.e. the Global Education Cluster). In addition, multiple UN Security Council 
resolutions 1261 (1999), 1314 (2000) and 1379 (2001) all emphasized the essential link between 
education and protection in armed conflict settings by stressing that education be incorporated into 
international efforts to protect children in conflict. 
III. Attacks on Education: The ABC’s 
A. Attacks on Schools and the Military Use of Schools: Defining the Issue 
 Perhaps the most direct effect of conflict on education, one that merits its own consideration, is 
the increasing trend and proliferation of deliberate attacks on schools, and other key symbols of 
education, as a military strategy. The captivating story of 15-year-old activist and now Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate Malala Yousafzai fighting against the persistence of attacks on schools in Pakistan to champion 
her right to education has helped garner international attention on the issue of attacks on schools and 
education. However despite this increased global attention, much confusion and inaction remains over the 
issue. The EFA Global Monitoring Report on this ‘Hidden Crisis’ emphasizes that children, teachers and 
schools are overwhelmingly at the frontline of armed conflict. The Office of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict notes that deliberate attacks on education and 
schools and the systematic targeting of students are both significant characteristics of new tactics of 
warfare that have heightened children’s vulnerability, however, “attacks on education can take a number 
of forms,”117 making the umbrella term and it’s multifarious definitions a challenging concept to grapple 
with.  
 International attention catalyzed by Graça Machel’s report and the 10-year follow up review by 
UNICEF both served as a significant impetus for the formulation of the Security Council Working Group 
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on Children and Armed Conflict (SCWG-CAAC), which was established by Security Council Resolution 
1612 in 2005 (S/Res/1612, 2005). These efforts in conjunction with other Security Council Resolutions118 
resulted in a targeted strategy to address the most egregious of children’s rights violations in contexts 
characterized by armed conflict. This strategy focuses on The Six Grave Violations Against Children 
During Armed Conflict, which comprises the following: 1) Recruitment and use of children 2) killing or 
maiming of children 3) sexual violence against children 4) attacks against schools or hospitals 5) 
abduction of children, and 6) denial of humanitarian access.119  
 Initially, triggers or criteria for parties to conflict to be listed in the Security Council’s Annexe of 
Perpetrators were restricted to child recruitment and sexual violence, but was expanded in 2011 with 
Security Council Resolution 1998 to include attacks (or the threat of attacks) on schools as a trigger in the 
naming and shaming of perpetrators in the Annexes of the Secretary-General’s Annual Report on 
Children and Armed Conflict. Security Council Resolution 1998 specifically addresses the grave violation 
of attacks on education, calling upon all parties to undertake greater targeted action on this specific issue. 
Resolution 1998 cites the need for greater observation of various applicable international law instruments 
without continued impunity, “expressing deep concern about attacks as well as threats of attacks in 
contravention of applicable international law against schools.”120 In addition, Resolution 1998 makes 
explicit reference to the corresponding Articles121 in the CRC to protect the child’s right to education as 
well as their right to life. Resolution 1998 also pushed for the use of ‘naming and shaming’ in providing 
an annexed list of current violators of the applicable international laws. Ultimately, the Resolution 
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highlights various instruments that should be more consistently used in order to take more decisive and 
urgent action to prosecute the perpetrators of this grave violation under international law.122 
 The most widely used and agreed-upon understanding of attacks on schools stems from The 
Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), which defines ‘attacks on schools’ as “any 
intentional threat or use of force—carried out for political, military, ideological, sectarian, ethnic, 
religious or criminal reasons—against students, teachers, and education institutions” by either state or 
non-state actors.123 The GCPEA further elucidates that attacks on education can include any combination, 
of the following:124 killing of teachers or students, abduction and disappearances, forced exile, 
imprisonment, torture, maiming, laying land mines near schools, sexual violence, recruitment of students 
for armed forces, militarization of schools,125 and destruction of educational property (infrastructure and 
learning materials).126 It is important to note that using this definition of attacks on education excludes 
attacks perpetrated by a single armed individuals (e.g. the Sandy Hook shooting in the U.S.) as opposed to 
those executed by state or non-state security or armed forces.127 
 Warranting it’s own designated definitional attention, the militarization of schools, or the military 
use of schools, can be defined as encompassing a broad range of actions whereby military personnel seize 
or partially seize the physical space of an educational institution on either a short- or long-term basis.128 
Actions typically undertaken by military actors in schools include, but are not limited to, using the school 
as a military barrack or base, capitalizing on the existing infrastructure for strategic military positions, 
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storing weapons and ammunition, using the school as a site for interrogating and/or detaining individuals, 
for military training or military drills, as a site for illegal recruitment of child soldiers and forced labor, as 
a position for observation and/or to fire weapons.129 It is important to note that this broad definition does 
not include the presence of military personnel around schools for the purpose of protection in response to 
a particular threat or as standard procedure for when election polling takes place at schools.  
 It has been well documented that schools are increasingly being unlawfully taken over for 
military purposes, due to their central locations, infrastructural assets (such as electricity and solid 
structure) without providing educational alternatives for the displaced students.130 This can continue for 
an extended period of time, not only hindering and interrupting students’ education but causing costly 
damage to the school’s infrastructure and endangering students’ lives when they eventually return to 
school with remnants of military fortifications (e.g. barbed wire, trenches) that may obscure whether 
actual students or combatants are inside.131 At times, armed forces will take over all but a few classrooms, 
so that students may be used as a ‘human shield’ from military attacks from opposing forces. This form of 
‘partial take-over’ can also expose children to immoral behaviour and acts, such as sexual violence 
against girls, torturing detainees and substance abuse.  
B. Attacks on Schools and the Military Use of Schools: Scale and Scope of the Phenomenon 
 At the earlier stages of research and reporting on this issue132, a UNESCO-commissioned report 
in 2010133 revealed that education has been attacked in at least 31 countries in the three year reporting 
period, with several countries dramatically increasing in the number of attacks since their initial report in 
2007.134 For example, the number of attacks in Afghanistan tripled in just one year from 242 in 2007 to 
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670 in 2008,135 which can be compared to the GCPEA’s findings in 2014 that reported 1,110 (or more) 
attacks in Afghanistan.136 In Thailand, the number of attacks quadrupled between 2006 and 2007.137 In 
2013, Save the Children estimates (based on UN data) that over 3,600 separate incidences of attacks on 
education around the world were documented in 2012.138 This number is expected to be much higher now 
with the rise in attacks in recent years.  
 Human Rights Watch’s (HRW) report on Schools as Battlegrounds in 2011 advocates for greater 
empirical investigation into the adverse impacts of attacks on education, arguing for the issue to figure 
more prominently in policy-efforts as well as insisting on the more rigorous implementation of 
international standards protecting students and education.139 The GCPEA’s report, Education Under 
Attack (2014), conducted a global study of this grave violation, providing extensive data on incidents that 
occurred between 2009 and 2013. The report finds that this violation is occurring in at least 70 countries 
around the world, 30 of which are experiencing persisting patterns of attacks, as compared to the 
remaining 40 which encountered isolated occurrences.  
 A recent report on Children and Armed Conflict in 22 country situations overseen by the UN 
Secretary-General in 2013, as gathered by the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism, provides a ‘global 
picture’ of this pervasive phenomenon. The report asserts that there have been 3,643 incidents of attacks 
on education reported in 17 countries, with 90 reported cases of military use or occupation of schools in 
11 countries, and a total of 4 parties to conflict included on the perpetrators’ ‘list of shame.’140 Comparing 
the 2013 report with the one conducted in 2012 reveals that the number of incidents has more than 
doubled, with the number of children killed or injured also nearly doubling. However, it is important to 
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note that these figures “are likely to be underestimates of the real scale of the problem,”141 as only UN-
verified allegations are included in the report.  
C. Attacks on Schools and the Military Use of Schools: Understanding the Issue 
 Although oftentimes “attacks on schools may be classified or reported as collateral damage, or as 
a by-product of a highly intense conflict, they may occur as part of a strategy to undermine the positive 
impact of education.” Therefore, it is essential to understand the motivations behind the strategic use of 
schools in warfare in order to better comprehend the issue and identify patterns to inform prevention 
efforts. In concert, the HRW Report, the UNESCO report142, the GCPEA Report, and the Save the 
Children report, all helped mobilize the issue to be placed higher on the international agenda as a subject 
worthy of targeted attention, ultimately jointly building a stronger case for better protection mechanisms 
for education systems. All four reports cite the following as possible motivations for state and non-state 
armed actors intentionally utilizing attacks on education as a tactical strategy of war:143 a) schools 
represent a significant symbol of the state, government structures and political ideologies (especially so in 
remote areas), and are therefore often targeted by anti-government groups; b) classrooms provide readily 
available pools of recruits that are particularly vulnerable and easily indoctrinated, either to be used as 
child soldiers, forced labor or for sexual exploitation; c) for the purpose of restricting academic freedom 
and teacher trade union activity; d) schools are “high-visibility ‘soft’ targets”144 that garner more media 
attention to an armed group’s plight; e) schools can be potent symbols of an oppressive or ineffectual 
state system145; f) schools can be targeted for their promotion of liberal or ‘western’ ideology due to its 
curricular content or for the education of particular students (such as girls); g) schools often occupy 
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central locations with solid infrastructure and are equipped with valuable electrical and sanitation 
facilities.146 
 To expand on some of the reasons listed above, non-state parties frequently use attacks on 
schools, students and teachers as a method of collective punishment for involvement with state-run 
institutions.147 This motive can extend to provide a rationale for attacks on the educational infrastructure, 
which is perceived as a tangible powerful symbol of state authority. Human Rights Watch explains that 
teachers, students and schools are perceived as ideal high-visibility “soft” targets, as they are easier to 
strike than government security forces and can attract greater media attention that allows the assailants’ 
political agendas to be heard by a wider audience.148  
Ineffective or failed state responses to opposition attacks, weaken the government’s local 
credibility, accountability and legitimacy, ultimately undermining civilian confidence in their government 
that prompts the search for alternatives. Particular curriculums crafted by the state to promote a particular 
ethnic, political or overtly ‘Western’ agenda may also elicit the targeting of schools by opposing forces in 
efforts to manipulate curricular content for indoctrination. Attacks on schools may also comprise part of a 
wider strategy to destabilize society or particular communities.149 Rape and other sexual or gender-based 
violence may occur alongside attacks on schools, which can have a significant and gendered impact on 
education, as girls may disproportionally resist attending school. Schools and classrooms can also become 
a pervasive site of child abduction and recruitment by armed forces for either sexual exploitation, forced 
marriage or the use of child soldiers. 
D. An Ecological Approach: How Attacks on Education Impacts Children 
 Employing an ecological framework can provide a more comprehensive and holistic 
understanding of the myriad of ways that attacks on education can impact the affected child, and to better 
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understand how their protection is undermined, both physically and psychosocially, at the individual, 
communal and national levels, both short-term and long-term. The severity of the effects on children is 
reflected in the statement of Vernor Munoz, the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education, that “these 
attacks have a terrible physical effect150, because they destroy human lives, buildings and spaces for safe 
learning…but they also have a symbolic effect that is devastating in itself,” adding that “attacks on 
educational institutions, students and teachers mean direct and brutal attacks on the human condition.”151  
 At the individual level, students and teachers can suffer debilitating injuries (both mental and 
physical) due to the traumas they experienced. While individual children’s psychosocial reactions may 
vary, reactions can include replicating violence they experienced, the occurrence of traumatic nightmares, 
symbolic avoidance, agitated and aggressive behaviour, social isolation, and depression.152 In addition, 
individuals may experience a decreased likelihood to attend or enroll the following school year, and may 
even dropout of school altogether due to the difficulties they experience in harnessing adequate 
motivation and concentration, as well as feelings of hopelessness that impair their ability to succeed at 
educational achievements.153 Children may associate schools with unsafe spaces or sites of insecurity and 
violence, which can “create potent anxiety that there will be additional attacks and that no place is safe” 
and that no one, even their teachers and other adults, can protect them, creating a perception of the world 
as a dangerous place.154 Students targeted may also struggle with reintegrating back into school, a site of 
trauma, keeping up with their peers in terms of performance and retention, and making up grades and lost 
time. Lost educational opportunities has a profound effect on the individuals’ ability to fully achieve any 
of the promise or positive impacts that education offers, ultimately challenging the individual’s ability to 
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break the intergenerational cycles of poverty and violence and be an active agent in fostering a sustainable 
livelihood for themselves and their family. 
 At the group or community level, school closure of one targeted school might prompt a “ripple 
effect”155 on schools in the region, resulting in massive school closure. This trend was observed in the 
most recent armed conflict in Nigeria, whereby direct targeting of schools for violent attacks in Borno 
state resulted in forced closure in nearly all neighbouring schools between February 2012 and June 2013, 
consequentially resulting in the suspension of educational attainment and the abandonment of progress for 
thousands of children.156 Similarly, Mogadishu experienced the closure of 144 schools spanning across 
five districts due to armed conflict since 2007, with ten schools physically occupied by armed forces.157 
As the Secretary-General Representative for Children and Armed Conflict observed, “the consequence is 
a growing fear among children to attend school, among teachers to give classes, and among parents to 
send their children to school.”158 School records and exam records can easily be lost or destroyed during 
the attacks and can make documentation for qualifications an added challenge.159 At the institutional 
level, education systems struggle to re-open schools of adequate quality due to infrastructural destruction, 
damage to tools and learning materials, as well as difficulty in recruiting qualified teachers.160 Physical 
attacks on teachers make the ever-present issue of shortage of qualified teachers an insurmountable 
challenge, as teachers are “essential actors in children’s learning, and role models.”161  
 Finally, at the societal level, the state suffers long-term setbacks economically in terms of the 
financial cost in repairing the physical damage to educational infrastructure. In addition, the nation 
regresses developmentally in reaching key development indices and global aspirations, such as the 
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MDGs/SDGs and the EFA Goals. Attacks on schools may diminish children’s ability to enter adulthood 
literate and well trained for meaningful employment, which ultimately stunts national economic growth. 
When children are excluded from the education system (either due to fear or anxiety of repeated attacks), 
“he or she may not feel fully empowered to participate in community programmes or civil society,”162 
which can compromise further democratic growth and national post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. 
Attacks on schools introduce major setbacks politically in hindering the emergence of civil society groups 
and political plurality, which consequentially challenges efforts to achieve an environment conducive to 
democracy and nation building163,164. 
 Schools and hospitals are places intended to be off-limits during wartime, functioning as ‘safe 
havens’ that provide a protective shelter during conflict. Schools and hospitals are protected civilian areas 
under the fourth Geneva Convention, in which international humanitarian law characterizes an attack on 
these sites as war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Lucens Guidelines on the military use of 
schools, through clear elucidation of the scope and scale of the problem, demonstrates the need for 
inclusion in explicit domestic legislation.165   
F. Protecting Education from Attack: International Legal Frameworks  
 Protecting education from attack requires an amalgamation of several combined legal efforts: 1) 
at the local level, there’s a need to strengthen community-driven initiatives, such as local legal redress 
mechanisms and civil society groups’ involvement in advocacy and monitoring and reporting 2) at the 
national level, there’s a need for nationally-endorsed regulations, and 3) lastly, at the international level, 
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challenge: “When a scholar is killed or silenced, a lifetime of teaching and learning that could provide 
thousands of hours of education for hundreds of students, with all the benefits that provides for the 
community at large, is lost” (Henry G. Jarecki, 2009, in O’Malley: Education Under Attack: 104).  
164 GCPEA, Education Under Attack; Coursen-Neff and Sheppard, Schools as Battlegrounds. 
165 GCPEA, Education Under Attack.  
 39 
  
with greater action required by the Security Council to ban the use of schools by armed forces and the UN 
to enforce international legal mechanisms, while providing supportive technical and financial resources. 
 As with any human rights violation, it is primarily the government’s responsibility to ensure 
attacks on schools and the military use of schools are criminalized through domestic legislation and 
military doctrine, that all attacks are impartially investigated, and perpetrators are duly prosecuted in 
court.166 Governments are also ultimately responsible for the adoption and implementation of various 
international conventions, declarations and guidelines such as the previously mentioned international 
human rights conventions, the Safe Schools Declaration167 and the Lucens Guidelines.168 However, 
typically in times of conflict, the state is either complexly interwoven with the perpetuation of human 
rights abuses or is severely weakened by the occurrence of conflict within its borders, therefore lacking 
the capacity or political will to intervene. In addition, oftentimes during conflict, local civil society groups 
are repressed and pushed underground, with their right to freedom of expression restricted and their 
opportunities for advocacy and action limited. As such, these challenges undermining local and national 
legal intervention leads us to turn to existing international legal mechanisms and how they can be used as 
frameworks for attacks on schools.  
 A variety of international legal instruments exist in the protection of human rights broadly, as 
well as specifically laws or articles within those instruments that directly relate to the protection of 
education 
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from attack. However, as there is no single clear-cut law being violated by attacks on schools, creative 
interpretation and analysis of multiple sources of international law is required to shed light on which laws 
can be drawn upon as viable strategies for ending impunity on this grave violation. An analysis of the 
spectrum of legal mechanisms can help elucidate the various opportunities for protection, and how to 
maximize the corresponding particular advantages of each instrument, while mitigating the disadvantages. 
Examining and detailing the variety of mechanisms that exist within the realm of international law (i.e. 
international human rights law (IHRL), customary international law (CIL), international humanitarian law 
(IHL), and international criminal law), each with varying degrees of perceived enforcement power, 
provides a more comprehensive scope of the existing legal basis as a foundation for concrete action. 
Ultimately, this can further assist children’s rights advocates to better inform their work in protecting 
children from such egregious breaches of fundamental human rights suchas physical attacks on education, 
and put an end to impunity for these grave violations against children. 
i. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) 
 Based on the promotion and protection of human dignity, international human rights law seeks to 
legally guarantee the human dignity in every sphere of life of every human being simply by virtue of 
being part of a shared human race. International Human Rights Law (IHRL) operates along the following 
key principles such that all human rights enshrined in the various Conventions and Covenants must be: 
universal, inalienable, indivisible, interdependent, interrelated, non-discriminatory, participatory, and 
inclusive. Within the human rights framework, states are the duty-bearers once a state ratifies a human 
rights convention, and its citizens are the rights-holders. Therefore, legal obligation is exclusively 
imposed on the state under IHRL, and thus only states can violate individual’s human rights as stipulated 
in human rights documents. The scope of IHRL covers both positive rights (i.e. action or investment that 
is required on behalf of the state to guarantee the right, for example, the right to education or the right to 
health) and negative rights (i.e. merely requiring for the state to abstain from interference, such as the 
right to life or the right to be free from torture), as well as civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
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rights. At the most basic level, the right to education and the right to life are the two internationally 
recognized legal protections under IHRL that are directly violated by attacks on schools include. 
 With the most rapid ratification rate of all human rights treaties, the CRC represents a massive 
normative shift and international commitment towards the protection of children’s rights. Specific articles 
that directly relate to attacks on education include: 1) Article 19(1) that mandates that “state parties must 
take measures to protect children from all forms of violence, injury or abuse;”169 2) Article 28 which 
broadly refers to the protection of a child’s right to education,170 and super note (e) more specifically 
relating to attacks on education by adding that states must take measures to encourage regular attendance 
and the reduction of drop-out rates; 3) Article 29 specifies on how education of the child should be 
administered, with notes (a) through (e) relevant to the protection of children from education used for 
indoctrination, as a site for recruitment or for the incitement of violence and hatred, instead urging that 
education be directed for the development of respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms171 and in 
the spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance and equality.172   
 Examining the CRC and how it can protect children from attacks on education through a more 
holistic lens reveals that the following articles indirectly relate to this phenomenon. 1) Article 3 refers to 
the “best interest of the child,” and is a principle that must be ensured in the implementation of education, 
its curriculum and the prohibition on military use of schools; 2) Article 24 protects the child’s right to the 
best possible health, which is severely restricted by physical injuries that may result from physical attacks 
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and the right to education in the CRC, as states can ultimately argue that do not have sufficient resources 
to implement this right. However, the Committee explicitly states that this should not be misinterpreted as 
remaining idle due to limited resources, but instead is a flexible means of imposing an obligation to reach 
that goal as expeditiously as possible, and must demonstrate constant efforts to implement and achieve 
those rights progressively. 
171 The Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC.(1989): Article 29(b). 
172 Ibid.: Article 29(d)) 
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on schools and the placement of mines around a school; 3) Article 32, pertaining to the right to protection 
from hazardous work and Article 34 on the right to protection from sexual exploitation and abuse are both 
violated by the act of using schools as a site of recruitment of children for armed forces (both as child 
soldiers and for forced sex or forced marriage); 4) Article 34 is similarly violated by the frequent attacks 
on girls and the sexual abuse they often experience on their way to schools; 5) Articles 13-17 relate to the 
child’s right to freedom of expression, thought, conscience and religion, as well as their right to 
information from a wide variety of sources, which is violated by attacks on education that are driven by 
the underlying motive to prevent Western, liberal or progressive education that support fundamental 
human rights.In a resolution adopted in 2004 on children in armed conflict, the UN Security Council 
among others “strongly condemned certain crimes involving children in armed conflict, including ‘attacks 
against schools and hospitals.’”173 In addition, as part of resolution 2005/44174 on the rights of the child 
adopted in 2005, the UN Commission on Human Rights urged “all parties to armed conflict to end … 
violations against children, including … attacks against schools.”175 
 Although one could argue that several of the aforementioned rights that pertain to the protection 
of children from attacks on education can be derogated in times of declared states of emergency, the 
increasing prevalence of the protracted nature of conflict, as such in the DRC, undermines derogations as 
a justification for the ongoing lack of protection. Under the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, derogations refer to 
temporary limits placed on certain rights in situations of public emergency176 that threaten the life of the 
nation and are for the ultimate purpose of improving national security.177 Specifically, in order to derogate 
                                                 
173 UN Security Council, Resolution 1539. April 22 2004, voting record: 15-0-0. 
174 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/44. April 19 2005, voting record 52-1-0 
175 Ibid. 
176 These “public emergencies” may include, but are not limited to, the following: armed conflicts, civil 
and violent unrest, environmental and natural disasters (http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php)  
177 UN Commission on Human Rights, The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 




from human rights treaties, a state must meet the following criteria: 1) The public emergency meets a 
certain qualitative standard of severity that constitutes a threat to the life of a nation.178 2) A state must 
publicly and officially proclaim179 and notify180 that they are in a declared public emergency as a 
procedural guarantee and for the purpose of national and international supervision.181 3) Derogations are 
limited “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”182 in order to be in line with the 
principle of proportionality. 4) Lastly, derogation measures must meet the principle of consistency, 
meaning the state must still remain in compliance with other obligations under international law, 
including customary international law.183 Ultimately, the interpretations of how derogations may be used 
is informed by the case law of treaty bodies and the interpretations adopted by the supervisory body of the 
treaty, the Human Rights Committee (HRC). However, among the list of non-derogable rights, the right 
to life figures prominently, and it should be noted that “derogations can never authorize acts of genocide 
or crimes against humanity.”184  
ii. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
 International humanitarian law (IHL), which includes alternative terms such as the ‘law of war’ 
(i.e. jus in bello and jus ad bellum) and the ‘law of armed conflict,’ is a set of rules designed to regulate 
                                                 
178 General Comment 29 (72), UN Doc. A/56.40, Vol. I, 202 adopted in July 2001, para. 3. For details on 
what constitutes a state of emergency, please see: http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php 
179 Proclamation is to prevent arbitrary and de facto derogation and as to not legitimate justifications for 
violations of human rights that occur after-the-fact.  
180 Notification, compared to proclamation’s primary purpose being for national supervision, notification 
guarantees supervision by international bodies.  
181 Hartman, Joan F. "Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies--A Critique of 
Implementation by the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations." Harv. Int'l. LJ 22 (1981): 89, supra note 17. 
182 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 29: Article 4: Derogations during 
a State of Emergency, 31 August 2001, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11. 
183 Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project (RULAC). Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in 
Situations of Emergency. http://www.geneva-
academy.ch/RULAC/derogation_from_human_rights_treaties_in_situations_of_emergency.php  
184 General comment no.13 (d), in Ibid.  
 44 
  
the conduct of armed conflict185 and limit the effects and methods of warfare186 used by combatants in 
order to maximally protect civilians187 and minimize human suffering.188 The premise of IHL is based on 
a combination of practicality and humanity, such that “practical reality requires us to accept that wars will 
occur, but our shared humanity demands that we put limits on how they are fought.”189 As an additional 
source of international law, IHL similarly follows Article 38 of the Statue of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and is thus comprised of: treaties or conventions between states, customary international 
humanitarian law, case law and general principles of law. The codified treaty-based sources of IHL 
primarily include all four190 of the universally ratified Geneva Conventions (GC) of 1949, complemented 
by its Additional Protocols (AP) I and II of 1977191, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and the 
1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).192 It is worth noting that several of the 
provisions in the various treaties have achieved customary law status,193 and are therefore legally binding 
on all parties (both state and non-state) to a conflict. The rules enshrined in the various sources of IHL 
provide protection to civilians in both international and non-international194 armed conflict, and those 
                                                 
185 IHL covers both international and non-international armed conflict, as well as those of a mixed nature. 
186 IHL places restrictions on the means of warfare, mostly on the use of particular weapons (e.g. 
chemical and biological weapons, exploding bullets, anti-personnel mines) but also military tactics (e.g. 
pillage, starvation, perfidy), that cause “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law: What is International 
Humanitarian Law? (2014): 3) 
187 The term civilians is used in this paper to describe people that are not actively involved or 
participating, or are no longer involved, in hostilities. Other terms that I will use interchangeably with 
civilians, but defined in the same way include non-combatants andprotected persons. 
188 ICRC,What is International Humanitarian Law? 
189 Planning and Programming Directorate, Office of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-
Missned in UNESCO, Protecting Education from Attack: 149. 
190 Geneva Convention (GC) I covers the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; GCII protects the 
wounded and sick and shipwrecked members of the armed forces at sea; GC III relates to prisoners of 
war; and GC IV protects civilians (e.g. IDPs, women, children, refugees, stateless persons, journalists), 
including civilians in occupied territories.  
191 Additional Protocol (AP) I corresponds to the protection of victims of international armed conflict and 
AP II relates to the protection of victims in non-international armed conflict. 
192 For a complete list of all Conventions included, please see ICRC’s What is IHL: 2. 
193 The Nuremberg War Trials mark a significant exploration of the this issue.  
194 Although a discussion of the differences between international and non-international armed conflict is 
significant, it is beyond the scope of this paper as it is couched in larger debates over the ambiguity in 
distinction between the two normative frameworks.  
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protected are “entitled to respect for their lives, their dignity, and their physical and mental integrity. They 
are also afforded various legal guarantees; they must be protected and treated humanely in all 
circumstances, with no adverse distinction.”195 
 Reflecting the changing nature of war and the increasing protection of civilians in conflict 
settings, IHL governs the conduct of armed conflict along three core principles, with the violation of any 
of the core principles amounting to a war crime196: distinction, proportionality, and precaution. The 
principle of distinction, deemed one of the “cardinal principles”197 of IHL, is particularly relevant in the 
discussion of attacks on education, as the principle demands that all parties to an armed conflict actively 
distinguish between civilians/civilian objects and combatants/military objectives at all times, such that 
attacks must only be directed at the latter, while wholly prohibiting indiscriminate attacks.198 By virtue of 
the principle of distinction, it is forbidden to directly target attacks towards students, educators or 
educational facilities due to their status as civilians/civilian objects. AP I, Article 52(3) states that “in case 
of doubt whether an object which is normally dedicated to civilian purposes, such as a place of worship, a 
house or other dwelling or a school, is being used to make an effective contribution to military action, it 
shall be presumed not to be so used.”199 Therefore, the deliberate targeting of schools, a civilian object, 
can amount to a significant breach of IHL as well as a violation of customary law.200 Additionally, there is 
special emphasis on this distinction in attacks on schools by parties to an armed conflict in the Fourth 
Geneva Convention.201 Article 50 of the same Convention specifically mandates an Occupying Power to 
                                                 
195 ICRC, What is IHL: 3. 
196 This will be further discussed below in the sub-section on international criminal law. 
197 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International Humanitarian Law, 
Geneva and Cambridge, International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press 
(2005): 26. 
198 International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), Protocol I, articles 48, 51(2), and 52; ICRC, 
Protocol II, art. 13. 
199 ICRC, Protocol I, art. 52(3); ICRC, Protocol II art. 9-11, and 18. 
200 ICRC, Customary Rules 10-22 and Geneva IV art. 50, 147 and  AP I Art. 85 in Kolieb, Jonathan. The 
Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation. 2009; For more 
details on the protection of civilian objects against attack (Customary IHL Rule 10), please see: 
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter2_rule10, 
201 GC IV Art. 11, 18; AP I Art. 48. 
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take all necessary steps to support institutions devoted to both the care and the education of children.202 
Articles 24, 94 and 108 all mention the importance of upholding education during armed conflict and 
under occupation and specifically states that education be facilitated under all circumstances.203 The 
principle of precaution also relates to the protection of civilian children from attacks on education by 
mandating that all parties to an armed conflict take deliberate and specific precautions to guarantee that 
the targets are truly combatants.204 
 However, it is important to note that a single exception is made to these principles, where it is 
stated that civilian objects must be protected “unless and for such time as they are military targets;”205 put 
simply, schools that are being used for military purposes transforms schools from a civilian object to a 
legitimate military objective under international law,206 thus serving as a significant way of circumventing 
legal repercussions for attacks on schools, which may provide a possible explanation for why the military 
use of schools has increased as a strategic method of warfare. However, Save the Children notes that 
“while international law contains no general ban on the use of school buildings for military purposes, it 
does prohibit armed forces and armed groups using them at the same time as they are being used by 
students and teachers for education purposes.”207 Ultimately, determining whether civilian objects may be 
transformed into military objectives is based on the principle of ‘military necessity,’ with general 
corollary duties imposed208 in order to try and minimize armed groups “stretching necessity into 
convenience.”209 Despite this weakness in the principle of distinction, even when schools are deemed a 
‘lawful target’ as a military objective, the principle of proportionality must be maintained such that it 
                                                 
202 GC IV Art. 50. 
203 GC IV Art. 24, 94, 108. 
204 ICRC, What is IHL?; International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), The Law of Armed Conflict: 
Basic Knowledge. (2002).  
205 Geneva IV, Art. 147; AP I, Art. 85; ICRC, Customary Rule 10-13; AP I, Art. 52 in ICRC, The Law of 
Armed Conflict. 
206 ICRC, Protocol I, art. 52.  
207 Martinez, Attacks on Education: 10. 
208 For the specifics on these duties, see ICRC Protocol I articles 51(1) and 58(c). 
209 Planning and Programming Directorate, Office of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-
Missned in UNESCO, Protecting Education from Attack: 154. 
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would be considered a war crime to attack it if it might cause an unreasonable, or disproportionate, 
amount of collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects. However, there is no objective test to 
measure whether an attack would be ‘unreasonable,’ but rather this is a subjective judgment;210 “what is a 
reasonable trade-off between competing interests: this much civilian death and destruction is a reasonable 
price to achieve this much of a military advantage,”211such a judgement is highly susceptible to bias when 
determined by the commander of an armed group. An additional legal gap with regard to determining the 
reasonableness of collateral damage is the failure to appreciate that collateral damage extends beyond the 
material value of the loss of the physical building or the loss of individual lives. Disruption of education 
similarly constitutes a grave loss to civilians; as highlighted above, there is are significant long-term and 
cumulative effects of attacks on schools, as well as an essential link between education and protection, 
education and the attainment of other rights and freedoms, and must be considered under the rule of 
collateral damage.212  
 Another critical legal flaw worth highlighting is the gap in the rule of distinction in Protocol II, 
concerning non-international conflicts, which only applies to a selected few civilian objects and does not 
include educational institutions.213 However, this gap is taken up in customary international humanitarian 
law in Rule 7,214 which in Section D,215 entitled Attacks against places of civilian concentration, including 
schools, specifically pertains to protections of this phenomenon and lists the various treaties, military 
manuals, national legislation and other national practices that apply. Rule 7D mentions the statement in 
the 2000 Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict which explicitly condemns 
“the targeting of children in situations of armed conflict and direct attacks on objects protected under 
international law, including places generally having a significant presence of children, such as schools 
                                                 
210 Also referred to as the ‘reasonableness or fair balance test.’ 
211 UNESCO, Protecting Education from Attack: 156. 
212 Ibid.  
213 ICRC, Protocol II, Arts. 15 and 16. 
214 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: 25-29 (Rule 7).  
215 ICRC. Customary IHL Database: Practice Relating to Rule 7. The Principle of Distinction between 
Civilian Objects and Military Objectives. https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule7  
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and hospitals.”216 In addition, if a student or teacher takes on an active role in the hostilities, they no 
longer maintain their protected status as a civilian as long as they are participating in the hostilities; 
worryingly, this includes children who have been forced into participation.217  
 In examining case law, using the DRC as an example, the Kahwa Panga Mandro case held by the 
Military Garrison Court of Ituri at Bunia discussed the war crime of attacks against protected civilian 
objects and the crime against humanity of murder; the court ruled that the perpetrator had indeed intended 
such buildings, including the primary school of Zumbe and the school Buisa Bunyi, which had not been 
military objectives to be the object of attack.218 Therefore, the court “holds as established in fact and in 
law the offence of war crime by attack directed against protected objects the defendant Kahwa Panga 
Mandro is charged with and for this convicts him to 20 years of penal servitude.”219 In addition, in the 
case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case (DRC v. Uganda) in 2005, the ICJ judged 
there was sufficient evidence of adequate quality to support the DRC’s allegation that the Uganda 
Peoples’ Defence Forces “failed to protect the civilian population and to distinguish between combatants 
and non-combatants in the course of fighting against other troops” where 69 schools were shelled (among 
other hostilities aimed at civilians).220 This case indicates the DRC’s position that it is unlawful to attack 
schools, and can therefore be used to further advocate or apply pressure on the DRC to push for the 
prosecution of violators within its own borders. 
 A significant weakness in IHL is that, similar to IHRL, ultimately states are the ones responsible 
for implementing IHL (Article 1 in all four Geneva Conventions). States are required to ensure full 
compliance with IHL and take action against, or implement laws to punish, those that violate IHL, and are 
also responsible for ensuring those participating in armed forces are educated on the rules of conduct. 
                                                 
216 UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/54/263. May 25 2000: Annex I, Preamble. 
217 ICRC, Protocol I, art. 51(3); ICRC, Protocol II, art. 4(1).  
218 ICRC. Customary IHL Database: https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule7  
219 On national practices relating to Rule 38: Attacks against cultural property (which by definition 
includes schools), please see: https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule38  
220 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo Case (DRC v. Uganda), 
Judgement, December 19 2005: 208. 
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However, states are often parties to an armed conflict, either directly or indirectly, and therefore this may 
limit effective implementation and compliance. Some forms of implementation exist at the international 
level, such as the protecting power system, which is the option of resorting to an equity procedure, the 
International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission (Article 90 of Additional Protocol I).221 Lastly, the 
ICC is empowered with jurisdiction to prosecute the most egregious violations of IHL, including war 
crimes, however, as in line with the principle of complementarity, the ICC only has jurisdiction when a 
state is ‘genuinely’222 unable or unwilling to prosecute war criminals in its jurisdiction. In Six Grave 
Violations: A Legal Foundation, it was noted that “the Rome Statute extends the criminal accountability 
for these acts (or “failures to protect”), providing the ICC explicit jurisdiction to prosecute and punish 
those that intentionally target schools or hospitals during armed conflict.”223 In addition to the ICC, 
international tribunals (as was done in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda) or hybrid courts may also 
be established to prosecute crimes committed during armed conflict.  
 Although there is significant overlap between IHRL and IHL, these two sources of international 
law have emerged separately under different conditions and different contexts, with differing scopes in 
applicability, treaty codification, and are subject to different mechanisms for compliance.224 However, 
some might argue that the two concurrent branches produces further fragmentation within international 
law.225 Alternatively, due to their differences, yet overlapping interests, utilizing the two complementing 
sources can provide a more holistic legal foundation for addressing the grave violation of attacks on 
education. 
iii. International Criminal Law 
                                                 
221 ICRC, What is IHL? 
222 Naturally, there is a lot of debate over what ‘genuinely’ unable or unwilling actually entails, how it is 
defined and who defines it.  
223 Rome Statute Article 8(2)(b), 8(2)(e), in Kolieb, The Six Grave Violations: The Legal Foundation: 19. 
224 ICRC, What is IHL? 
225 Koskenniemi, Martti, and Päivi Leino. "Fragmentation of international law? Postmodern anxieties." 
Leiden Journal of International Law 15.03 (2002): 553-579. 
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 The Rome Statute226 is a central tenet of international criminal law and effectually created the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), which authorized its jurisdiction in the investigation and charging of 
four categories of international crimes: Genocide, crimes against humanity, crime of aggression and 
lastly, concerning attacks on schools, war crimes. The Rome Statute was established in 1998 but only 
came into effect in 2002. Violations of any of the core principles of IHL (i.e. distinction, proportionality, 
precaution) constitute a war crime.227 The Rome Statute was designed to globally protect individuals from 
the most egregious and extreme forms of international law violations.  Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute 
stipulates that the ability to charge and prosecute perpetrators of ‘grave breaches’ of international criminal 
law is only applicable in armed conflict settings whereby the crime is a component of a larger ‘plan or 
policy’ or committed on an exceptionally large-scale.228  In addition, only individuals (as opposed to 
group entities) can be charged and prosecuted under the Rome Statute, with a tendency to focus on 
individual members or leaders of both state and non-state military/armed groups that are relatively well-
structured, with a clear chain of command, in order to charge an individual who is maximally responsible 
for the grave decisions made.  
 While previously designated an individual state responsibility to implement and punish 
perpetrators of the four international crimes, this proved to be insufficient and has since evolved to states 
collectively using treaty-law “to assert the right to create a supra-national entity with the powers to 
enforce ‘international criminal law’ in ways that are analogous to national enforcement of criminal 
laws.”229 As part of the creation of the Rome Statue, the ICC, and the Office of the Prosecutor are granted 
the ancillary powers to investigate and charge individuals accused of an international crime. However, 
                                                 
226 United Nations General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9. 
July 171998.  
227 ICRC, Protocol I, arts. 48, 51(2), 52, and 85(3)(a); ICRC, Protocol II, art. 13.  
228 Ibid.  
229 Planning and Programming Directorate, Office of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-
Missned in UNESCO Protecting Education from Attack: 162. 
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state parties to the Statute “have collective authority over the execution of the treaty, and the International 
Court of Justice can determine certain disputes that might arise under the treaty.”230 
 Actions that often occur with attacks on schools which constitute an international crime under the 
Rome Statute are as follows:231 1) deliberately targeting civilians, including students and educators, 2) 
deliberately targeting civilian objects, including schools232 and their use for military purposes while 
civilians are present, 3) using students and teachers as human shields, including the presence of civilians 
in the military occupation of schools and preventing civilians from leaving a school occupied by armed 
groups, and 4) in international armed conflicts, causing disproportionate (i.e. excessive relative to the 
expected military advantage) collateral harm to students and teachers or excessive damage to schools and 
other educational facilities. It is important to note that a critical gap in the Statute exists, such that 
disproportionate collateral damage is not a war crime that is within the jurisdiction of the ICC in non-
international armed conflict settings.233 
 Therefore, the targeting of schools, students and teachers by both state and non-state actors are 
considered war crimes under international criminal law, with the ICC specially designated with the 
authority to enforce these laws and prosecute when they are violated. These powers are a major 
innovation in international law, “because of its powerful potential for bringing the worst perpetrators to 
account and thus deterring other potential war criminals,” ultimately serving as a “special kind of 
                                                 
230 Ibid. 
231 For a concise summary of which international laws are violated with attacks on schools, please see the 
following component of the GCPEA website: http://protectingeducation.org/what-international-laws-are-
violated  
232 In fact, the targeting of a building dedicated to education is specifically mentioned in Article 
8(2)(b)(ix) of the Rome Statute for international armed conflict and Article 8(2)(e)(iv) for non-
international armed conflict.  
233 Interestingly, is important to note that a critical gap in the Statute exists, such that disproportionate 
collateral damage is not a war crime that is within the jurisdiction of the ICC in non-international armed 
conflict settings. However, it would still be considered a violation of customary international 
humanitarian law (rule 18). For more on the rules of customary international humanitarian law, please see 
Henckaerts et al. Customary international humanitarian law. 
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accountability mechanism” for the enforcement of international crimes such as attacks on schools.234  Yet, 
this ‘special accountability mechanism’ can only be used as a ‘back-up’ if a state with jurisdiction over 
the case is either unable or unwilling to investigate, charge or indict an individual.235 
iv. Customary International Law (CIL) 
 As was alluded to above in IHL, customary international law (CIL) is often turned to as a means 
of filling the ‘ratification gap,’ as it does not require a state’s ratification to be in effect. Customary 
international law represents genuinely universal norms (i.e. jus cogens236 or a peremptory norm) thought 
to be connected with principles of natural law, and are legally binding on all nations, regardless of its 
status as a signatory or ratified state party of any treaty or whether it has been codified domestically as it 
does not require formal sovereign consent. Customary law, as stipulated in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ,237 
in order to be universally legally binding must meet both the criteria of the objective element of settled 
state practice and the subjective element of opinio juris. Put simply, it must be demonstrated that states 
have consistently behaved in a way that supports the principle under question and states feel a strong 
sense of legal obligation to follow the particular custom.238  
 Several human rights and humanitarian principles, such the prohibition of the recruitment of child 
soldiers, fall under customary law, and is often considered a primary source of international law.239 
Specific to attacks on education, “the two basic rules for protecting education systems—no targeting of 
civilians or civilian objects, and no excessive collateral damage—are among the most firmly established 
                                                 
234 Planning and Programming Directorate, Office of Her Highness Sheikha Mozah Bint Nasser Al-
Missned in UNESCO Protecting Education from Attack: 163. 
235 Ibid.  
236 Jus cogens, literally translating into “compelling law” represents a peremptory norm include the 
following: prohibition of genocide, piracy, slavery and the slave trade, torture, non-refoulement, wars of 
aggression and territorial aggrandizement (Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "International Crimes:" Jus Cogens" 
and" Obligatio Erga Omnes"." Law and Contemporary Problems 59.4 (1996): 68) 
237 ICJ Statue Article 38(1)(b) describes international custom as “evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law.”  
238 Cornell University Law School: Legal Information Institute. Opinio juris (international law). 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_international_law  
239 For a particularly compelling and landmark case on customary law in the United States, see the 1980 
Filártiga case (Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876). 
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customary norms,”240 guaranteeing legal protection for schools from attack, regardless of whether the 
armed conflict is defined as international or non-international,241 whether the violence meets the three 
threshold tests242 to be classified as armed conflict, and as well as the other gaps in Protocol II as 
highlighted above.243 According to Henckaerts and Doswald-Becks’ detailed description of customary 
international humanitarian law, schools are considered civilian areas according to state practice. It is also 
worth noting that “deliberately targeting schools or hospitals in the absence of military necessity is 
prohibited under the general legal principle that civilian objects must be distinguished from legitimate 
military objectives and protected against the consequences of military operations. This is a customary 
norm of international law, applicable in all conflict situations.”244  
 Derogation or violation of these norms are never to be permitted by any state at any time,245 
thereby granting customary international law slightly more ‘hard’ law status than IHRL despite the fact 
that CIL is not codified into a specific treaty as compared to IHRL.246 Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties states that: “A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law.”247 Although the Vienna Convention does not 
include a detailed list or catalogue of the peremptory norms it protects, violations have been understood to 
                                                 
240 UNESCO, Protecting Education from Attack: 159. 
241 This is due to the fact that several protections under international humanitarian law are not similarly 
covered in Protocol II (as highlighted above).  
242 The three threshold tests are as follows: 1) that the level of violence is sufficient to be labelled an 
armed conflict 2) that the parties to the conflict are organized and control a set area and 3) that the 
perpetrators of violence are a party to an armed conflict. 
243 For example, the targeting of civilian objects is not specifically prohibited and Protocol II does not 
forbid disproportionate collateral damage to civilians/civilian objects.  
244 Office of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
The Six Grave Violations Against Children During Armed Conflict: The Legal Foundation (Working 
Paper No.1, October 2009) in Martinez, Attacks on Education: 6. 
245 For more detailed information on this non-derogable status, see: Prosecutor v. Furundzija, 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 2002, 121 International Law Reports 213 
(2002) as well as the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1923 Wimbledon case. 
246 D'Amato, Anthony. "Human Rights as Part of Customary International Law: A Plea for Change of 
Paradigms." Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 25 (1995): 47. 
247 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, 1969; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 53 May 23 1969. 
1155 U.N.T.S 331, 8 International Legal Materials 679. (1969). 
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constitute: crimes against humanity, war crimes, wars of aggression, piracy, genocide, apartheid, slavery 
and torture.248 
 Specifically applying customary international law to the case of attacks on education, the general 
legal principle of distinction, whereby civilian objects are obliged to be distinguished from military 
objectives as well as protected from the adverse impacts of military operations, constitutes a customary 
norm of international law.249 Therefore, deliberate attacks on schools or the intentional targeting of 
schools for military operations (either by state or non-state actors) amounts to a breach of customary 
international law. In addition, the use of child soldiers is another norm prohibited under customary 
international law, and therefore using schools as a site to recruit child soldiers constitutes a breach of CIL. 
It has also been put forth by Beiter that the right to education has acquired the status of customary 
international law, which is clearly a right that is violated by attacks on schools and students.250  
 A clear criticism of this source of international law arises out of questions on how the peremptory 
norms are established, who establishes them and its lack of state consent which infringes on state 
sovereignty. However, a counterargument to concerns of state sovereignty might stress that despite its 
universal application and non-derogable nature, states still ultimately reserve the right to interpret 
peremptory norms, which is problematic in its use as a strategy for ending impunity for attacks on 
schools.  
  
                                                 
248 Despite the lack of clarity or clearly marked list serves as a limitation on precision, a major strength of 
this strategy is not taking an overly static approach and instead reflects constantly evolving social and 
political attitudes of the international community. Although there is no exhaustive list provided in the 
Vienna Convention, an understanding of what it might constitute arises out of case law.  
249 AP I Art. 48, 52; ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law Vol. 1: Rules, Cambridge 
University Press (2005): 25 (Customary Rule 7); AP I art. 48, 52; AP II art. 13(1). 
250 Beiter, Klaus Dieter. "The Protection of the Right to Education by International Law: Including a 
Systematic Analysis of Article 13 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 




Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
A. Methods: 
 The research project began in January 2015 with regular consultations with various key experts in 
child protection, education in emergencies, human rights, and qualitative research. Key informants 
provided expertise in this topic area in order to: 1) gain a better understanding of current pressing issues 
in the field that demand further research and scholarly attention; 2) more narrowly define the project’s 
research questions and scope, and finally; 3) identify appropriate methodologies for the study. These 
consultations and exchanges took place in many forms, including informal conversations, meetings, email 
exchanges, Skype conferences, and individual appointments with specialist librarians. Concurrently, this 
was complemented by literature reviews to better identify the knowledge gap in existing scholarly 
literature, and identify key secondary sources to be included in this study’s review. Literature was 
selected to be reviewed and included in this study if it touched upon the following areas: the impact of 
armed conflict on children, education in emergencies, attacks on schools, the MRM, evaluations of the 
MRM at both global and national levels, the Security Council and its thematic focus on children and 
armed conflict, and Security Council Resolution 1612. 
 This research study employed mixed methods, combining both field research and a review of 
secondary sources on the topic area. Literature included both peer-reviewed scholarly literature as well as 
grey literature produced by INGOs and global networks. Field work took place over a course of 
approximately two weeks in Kinshasa, DRC from late August until early September 2015. The purpose of 
field research was to gain a better understanding of the various challenges on-the-ground in implementing 
the MRM at the national level in the DRC, with a specific focus on its impact on the grave violation of 
attacks on schools. Details on the specific methodology employed in the field, including a description of 




 Interview participants were first identified through the literature review, which revealed key 
informants working on and knowledgeable of the issue at hand. Initially, participants were selected on the 
basis of their involvement in the MRM country-level Task Force (CTFMR) in the DRC, however when it 
was discovered that involvement in the MRM proved to be minimal, interviewees were additionally 
selected based on their involvement in monitoring, reporting, documenting and responding to violations 
of children’s rights and their protection in conflict settings. Participants were then sent a letter on the 
purpose of the research project and the researcher’s interest in interviewing a representative from their 
organization knowledgeable on the research topic with the intent of setting up an appointment once in the 
field. Once in the field, participants were recruited using snowball sampling, beginning with the 
headquarter offices of the two official Co-Chairs of the DRC’s CTFMR: MONUSCO251 (The United 
Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or “Mission de 
l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République Démocratique du Congo") and 
UNICEF. These two key informants then suggested other organizations that might have knowledge of the 
MRM, as well as NGOs they work in partnership with for children’s rights and child protection in the 
DRC generally. 
 In sum, twelve participants were included in this study who represented a range of organizations 
and agencies, including the following: Multinationals or UN bodies (UNICEF, MONUSCO, including 
both the Joint Human Rights Office and Child Protection Advisors), international NGOs (Save the 
Children, World Vision), and local NGOs (Soprop, Ordre des Avocats, Afia Mama). When possible, 
multiple participants were included from the same organization to reflect a greater diversity of 
                                                 
251 It should be noted that prior to 2010, MONUSCO was formerly known as MONUC (Mission de 
l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo). The name change was to 
represent a new phase in the DRC The peacekeeping force was established in the DRC in 1999 with 
Security Council Resolution 1279 as well as Resolution 1291 (2000) in response to the Second Congo 
War. However, since, MONUSCO has been engaged in monitoring the peace and stabilization process of 




perspectives and experiences that may vary among different positions within an organization. However, it 
is important to note that many organizations were small in size and understaffed, making maximal 
representation and diversity a challenge. Exclusion criteria included organizations that were not 
geographically based in Kinshasa, those that had staff that did not speak French or English, groups 
affiliated with the government (such as the various Ministries), individuals from organizations that were 
not available during the duration of my field visit, and minors under the age of 18.  
ii. Procedure: 
 Participants were informed about the nature and purpose of the research prior to obtaining their 
verbal consent for their involvement in the research project. Participants were consulted on whether or not 
they were comfortable being audio-recorded and were recorded only if and when consent was given. 
Consent was not provided for 3 informants (the two UNICEF staff due to their organization’s policies, 
and the Canadian donor government due to the prohibition of bringing electronic devices into the 
embassy). Interviews were conducted in informants’ language of preference, either French (N=5) and 
English (N=7). It should be noted that limitations exist regarding language, as although the researcher is 
functionally bilingual in English and French, French is not the researcher’s mother tongue and all prior 
research, including the literature review, on the topic had been conducted in English. Detailed notes were 
recorded by hand during the interviews, and interviewer reflections were noted following the interview. 
After completion of the interview, audio recordings were transcribed verbatim, with French transcriptions 
subsequently translated into English to facilitate thematic analysis in one language. This is an important 
potential linguistic limitation, as it is possible that expressions do not readily translate into English and 
some details could have potentially been lost in translation. 
 Interviews were conducted on site in the organization’s office space, which were sometimes 
private spaces, but at other times shared with other staff. Interviews took approximately 30 minutes to one 
hour to complete, with one exceptional interview spanning the length of an hour and a half. At times, 
informal discussion continued after interviews were completed, however some of the information 
gathered during this informal conversation proved to be illuminating and was subsequently noted, coded 
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and included in the results. When informants were not available at the time I was in Kinshasa (UNHCR 
and OCHA), interview guides were left behind for the individual to complete on their own time to be 
submitted to the researcher electronically (0% response rate) or in cases where informants were 
temporarily based in Goma (MONUSCO Child Protection Advisors), were to be completed by phone 
after my return to New York City. One of these informants’ interviews was completed and returned in 
time to be included for data analysis, however, the latter was not returned in time but was used to help 
inform the interpretation of the findings.  
 The primary instrument used was an interview guide (See Annexe for an English and French 
copy of the Interview Guide) formulated prior to arrival and influenced by a preliminary literature review 
to structure questions. Questions were developed in reference to the initial research questions. There were 
some minor modifications made to the interview questions for those with minimal involvement in the 
MRM Taskforce, as research proved that not many are formally or actively involved in the MRM. 
Interview guides consisted of nine semi-structured open-ended questions, with follow-up questions added 
for further clarification as needed, depending on the flow of conversation. Interview guides were 
produced in both English and French, initially written in English and then translated into French. When 
preferred, informants received an electronic copy of the interview guide upon request prior to the 
interview appointment. One of the nine questions (i.e. challenges) was initially posed open-ended but was 
accompanied by a list to use as a prompt if needed. When informants preferred, they were given a copy of 
the interview guide to use as a visual guide to follow along with the questioning. However, it is important 
to note that this could have possibly shaped their responses or even limited their responses to the 
challenges that were listed.  
 In addition to primary data collection through interviews, a review of available data through 
secondary sources recording attacks on schools in the East of the country was conducted as a complement 
to field research. An inclusion of a review of these studies (including the recent results of the MRM in the 
DRC, International NGO reports, and a community-based initiative piloted by research partners) is 
incorporated in an effort to demonstrate the scale and scope of attacks on schools in the DRC and to 
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contrast divergent approaches to monitoring and reporting the phenomenon. 
iii. Study Objectives:  
 There were three primary objectives to this research study: 
1. To review existing literature, both scholarly and grey literature, on the topic of the UN Security 
Council’s Agenda on Children and Armed Conflict and the MRM, as well as attacks on schools in the 
DRC. A particular goal of this review was to highlight the divergent reporting strategies by 
comparing reports produced by UN bodies and those that engaged community groups. 
2. To describe the findings of this research study, which aimed to investigate the implementation of the 
MRM at the national level in the DRC.  
3. To summarize key recommendations, as articulated by field research participants.  
iv. Content Analysis:  
 Primary data collected through field research (i.e. interview transcriptions) were analyzed using 
Nvivo to generate key themes, patterns, as well as matrices. Matrices can be produced by Nvivo software 
in order to examine relationships or intersections between variables, themes, or characteristics. For 
example, a matrix was generated to examine which themes were most emphasized by different 
organization types. Additionally, a matrix was generated to determine which themes intersected most with 
the theme of ‘challenges,’ so as to produce a ranked list of major obstacles. Nvivo is a Computer-Aided 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS) package produced by QSR International. Nvivo is used 
to facilitate organizing, classifying, sorting, arranging and coding text-based unstructured qualitative data, 
such as interview transcriptions, in order to examine relationships and emerging themes. Nvivo can be 
used to identify trends, quantify qualitative findings, and produce visual summaries of data using models, 
word mapping, graphs and tables using a number of query functions in order to be used as a body of 
evidence to answer research questions. 
 Prior to the use of Nvivo for qualitative analysis, interview transcriptions were translated into 
English for uniformity and for simplification, as data is being reporting in English. Therefore, it is 
important to note that many quotations included in the proceeding results section were translations, and 
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therefore some subtle nuances may have been lost in translation. For the purposes of this research project, 
Nvivo was used to code interview transcriptions to explore emerging themes and patterns, and matrices. 
Nvivo was also used to produce visual summaries of data and of queries conducted using the software. 
Nvivo was also used to conduct a word frequency analysis, as this is particularly advantageous in ranking 
challenges or most salient themes and then comparing these across informants and their respective 
organizations. The word cloud presented on the cover page of this study was similarly produced using a 
word frequency query on Nvivo. Lastly, content analysis using Nvivo was used to extract all 
recommendations made by informants, which were then summarized and included as part of Objective III 
of the Results.   
B. Limitations and Biases: 
i. Limitations 
 All research is inherently flawed and biased. A number of potential limitations may have 
restricted the scope of the research project and its results. There were three key limitations: Geographic, 
demographic and linguistic. The geographical expansiveness of the DRC and the exclusive focus on 
Kinshasa, the capital city, may have limited the ability to meet with all possible key informants. 
Specifically, several organization representatives were in Goma or Bukavu (sites of recurrent violence) 
conducting work on the ground during the in-country duration of the study. To counteract this limitation, 
two highly knowledgeable informants were pursued electronically after field research was conducted and 
were asked to complete the interview guide in writing so as to gain insight from their experiences. 
Demographic limitations included the exclusion of children, as it was felt that the topic area could be 
traumatic and potential cause harm to the child’s mental health. Lastly, while the researcher is bilingual 
(English-French), French was not the mother tongue of the researcher and therefore this could have 
impacted the results.  
ii. Biases: 
 Biases may have influenced the prism through which interviews were understood by the 
researcher as well as the lens through which participants responded to interview questions. Specifically, 
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the interviewer was a Western, Caucasian unmarried female with a higher education in human rights. As 
sexual violence against women is a central focus of programming and a widespread phenomenon that 
regularly occurs in the DRC (and frequently came up in interview), being female may have influenced the 
way participants (particularly males) responded and whether or not certain details were withheld. As the 
DRC has been experiencing a very long, protracted conflict that was exacerbated by its particularly brutal 
and extractive colonial legacy, it is possible that local informants had some skepticism regarding a 
Western Caucasian researcher seeking information from them. Being single (i.e. unmarried) is another 
potential source of bias, as one participant (who was unmarried herself and has experienced 
discrimination on the basis of her marital status) explained that due to the patriarchal culture that is firmly 
rooted in the DRC, unmarried women do not receive the same degree of respect; in her words, “we are in 
the culture [where] for a woman to be respected, she needs to be married.”  
 Having a higher education, and in particular, having an education in human rights could have 
influenced the way questions were framed, phrased or worded, with heavy emphasis on rights-based 
language, which could have been perceived as a threat to participants (i.e. that the researcher was 
investigating the human rights violations in their neighbourhood and potentially ‘naming and shaming’ 
their organization or their nation). In addition, having a higher education could have also shaped the way 





Chapter 3: Results 
A. Objective I: Literature Review 
 
I. Security Council Resolution 1612 and the MRM  
A) The Security Council and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General’s 
Thematic Focus on Children and Armed Conflict: An Evolution 
 As “the only truly global decision-making forum with the power and means to enshrine the 
protection of children into [an] internationally accepted and enforceable doctrine,”252 the UN Security 
Council (UNSC), charged with protecting civilians, international peace and security as its central 
mandate, is a central starting point in examining the evolution of the UN’s children and armed conflict 
agenda. The Security Council’s involvement, albeit quite limited at the time, on children in armed conflict 
settings arguably dates back to the 1990s with its work on the situation in Liberia,253 followed by Sierra 
Leone,254 with this topic beginning to feature into some of its presidential statements255 soon there-after. 
The thematic focus of the Security Council on protecting children in conflict settings was a natural 
progression from the UN’s renewed efforts on the protection of civilians that resulted from the changing 
nature of war from inter-state to intra-state conflicts. The prioritization of children in conflict settings was 
similarly enhanced by achievements in international law, such as the adoption of the Convention on the 
                                                 
252 Jefferys, Anna, "Can the Powerful Protect? How the UN Security Council needs to shape up to protect 
children." London: Save the Children (2007): 1. 
253 See S. Resolution 1071. S/RES/1071. August 30 1996  and Security Council Resolution 1083. 
S/RES/1083. November 27 1996. 
254 See Security Council Resolution 1181, S/ RES/1181. July 13, 1998 and Security Council Resolution 
1231, S/RES/1231, Mar. 11, 1999. 
255 These Presidential Statements include the following: S/PRST/ 1999/18, June 29, 1998; 
S/PRST/1999/6, Feb.12, 1999; S/PRST/2000/10, Mar. 23, 2000; S/PRST/2001/21, Aug. 31, 2001; 
S/PRST/2002/6, Mar. 15, 2002; and S/PRST/2002/12, May 7, 2002. 
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Rights of the Child and its Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in armed conflict (2000), the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), the International Labour Organization (ILO), 
the Paris Commitments and Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or 
Armed Groups, among others.256  
 Shortly following the appointment of Graça Machel and her independent study on the impact of 
armed conflict on children published in 1996 that shed light on the particular vulnerabilities of children, 
the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict 
(OSRSG-CAAC) was established and became responsible for producing annual reports on the situation of 
children in conflict settings to the Secretary-General and the UNSC. These steps, dovetailed with the 
Security Council’s increasing recognition that “humanitarian and human rights concerns, including the 
protection of children during and in the aftermath of conflict, were fundamentally linked to international 
peace and security,” galvanized greater attention to the situation of children affected by armed 
conflicts.257 However, it wasn’t until 1999 that the Security Council adopted its first specific thematic 
resolution on the issues relating to children in armed conflict (i.e. UNSC Resolution 1261),258 which 
called upon the Secretary-General to provide recommendations to the Council on the protection of 
children in armed conflict settings, and to systematically report on the implementation of protective 
measures. The formal adoption of this thematic issue by the Security Council is significant, as it 
implicitly attests to the potential substantive effect of children and armed conflict on international peace 
and security, rather than it merely being a humanitarian issue.  
 Although the UNSC has formally adopted a specific agenda on children and armed conflict, its 
actual explicit recognition of the ‘special status’ of children has been criticized by scholars and 
                                                 
256 Nylund, Bo Viktor, and Ida Margarita Hyllested. "Protecting Children Affected by Armed Conflict: 
Accountability for Monitoring, Reporting, and Response." Journal of Human Rights Practice 2.1 (2010) 
257 In fact, in 1998, the President of the Security Council explicitly expressed this in the following 
statement: “The Security Council expresses its intention to pay serious attention to the situation of 
children affected by armed conflicts” (UN, Security Council. Statement by the President of the Security 
Council. June 29 1998. SC/PRST/1998/18.) 
258 Security Council Resolution 1261. S/RES/1261. August 25 1999. 
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international organizations that focus on children's rights and child protection. Jeffereys’ 2007 analysis 
commissioned by Save the Children on the effectiveness of the UNSC reporting structure in protecting 
children in armed conflict settings reveals that while the Security Council has acknowledged the topic as 
an international peace and security issue, challenges persist in translating written resolutions, reports and 
agreements into effective child-focused action.259 In examining the UNSC’s written documents, the report 
found that country-specific statements and resolutions were less successful at focusing on the needs and 
protection concerns of children than more general background reports. As discussed in Chapter One, the 
changing nature of war from inter-state to intra-state since the establishment of the UN has brought into 
question whether the perhaps outdated and static “structure of the UN is ill-suited to meeting today’s child 
protection needs.”260 This is further challenged by the political nature of the UNSC and its members, 
whose decisions are highly influenced by other UN and governmental actors. Ultimately, the Save the 
Children report concludes that the UNSC’s actions on the ground demands a “sharper focus on children” 
that is supported by greater advocacy by policy-makers and practitioners.261  
 The UNSC has been more successful however in bringing greater awareness to the vulnerability 
of children in conflict settings, granting it a higher profile within the Security Council and the UN system 
more generally by allotting a greater prominence to children in their written documents, in both language 
and content. Resolution 1261 was subsequently followed by a number of thematic resolutions (i.e. 
Resolution 1327 in 2001, 1460 in 2003 and 1539 in 2004) each “with increasingly clearer language and 
stronger demands”262 regarding child protection, as well as increasingly targeted and specific content, 
culminating in the establishment of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanisms (MRM) in 2005 and the 
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, whose membership reflects that of the Security 
Council. UNSC written documents aimed to galvanize greater attention on the protection of children in 
                                                 
259 Jeffereys, Can the Powerful Protect? 
260 Ibid.: 2.  
261 Ibid.: 1. 
262 Ibid.: 4 
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conflict settings through mainstreaming (e.g. UNSC reports and resolutions) as well as through the MRM 
in a more focused approach. These efforts are reflected in the Security Council’s relatively recent 
thematic focus on children and armed conflict that call for “an era of application”263 that seeks to move 
beyond “the juridicial task of the elaboration of norms to the political project of ensuring their application 
and respect on the ground,”264 which is a challenge often highlighted. 
 
B) Security Council Resolution 1612 and the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Six Grave 
Violations 
 The UN Security Council has formally recognized the role of armed conflict on children, with 
“The Children and Armed Conflict Agenda.”265 The thematic focus on children and armed conflict has 
often been coupled with an emphasis on monitoring and reporting, beginning with Machel’s 
recommendation for its prioritization in her seminal 1996 report. This was later followed by explicit 
reference to the monitoring and reporting on children in conflict settings in Security Council Resolution 
1379 (2001), however, monitoring efforts were more on a case-by-case basis rather than systematically. 
Resolution 1460 in 2003 further developed the commitments previously articulated, calling upon the 
Secretary-General “to develop specific proposals for monitoring and reporting on the application of 
international norms on children and armed conflict.”266 Building on these preceding resolutions, 
Resolution 1539 (2004) urged for greater partnership between the UN system, national governments, 
NGOs and civil society groups in order to systematically document, monitor and report violations against 
children in armed conflict, prompting the Secretary-General to prepare an Action Plan defining the 
                                                 
263 Report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, 
Protection of children affected by armed conflict. A/54/430. October 1 1999: paras. 29-30. 
http://www.un.org/documents. 
264 Ibid., para. 30. 
 265 Barnett, Katy and Jefferys, Anna. “Full of Promise: How the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting 
Mechanism can better protect children.” Humanitarian Practice Network at ODI. Network Paper Number 
62 (2008): 3. 
266 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1460 (2003). January 30 2003, S/RES/1460 (2003): 
para. 16(c).  
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Establishment of a Monitoring, Reporting and Compliance Mechanism.267 This report (i.e. S/2005/72) 
released by the Secretary-General in 2005 outlines the parameters of a monitoring and reporting 
mechanism.  
 Building on previous Resolutions and Reports, monitoring and reporting on grave violations 
against children in armed conflict situations culminated in Resolution 1612 (2005), which urged the 
immediate establishment of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism that “collect[s] and provide[s] 
timely, objective, accurate and reliable information”268 on six grave violations and abuses committed 
against children affected by armed conflict, as well as established the first and only working group with 
an exclusive focus on a thematic area on the Security Council’s agenda. Resolution 1612 created a 
“concrete and practicable framework for the immediate establishment of a UN-led MRM”269 for 
documenting grave violations against children. UN Security Resolution 1612 was a watershed resolution, 
considered the hallmark of the UN Security Council’s thematic agenda on children and armed conflict 
and “is regarded by many as a groundbreaking step in the protection of children affected by conflict.”270  
 Beyond Security Council Resolution 1612 and efforts thereafter that further strengthened the 
MRM, the legal framework or foundation for the Mechanism is provided by international legal 
instruments such as International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL),271 
the International Labor Organization Convention 182—Worst Forms of Child Labor, and the Capetown 
Commitments and Principles.272 The MRM additionally gets its legal basis in regional instruments and 
                                                 
267 The United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Children’s 
Fund. “Guidelines: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against Children in 
Situations of Armed Conflict.” New York. June 2014.; Nylund and Hyllested, Protecting Children 
Affected by Armed Conflict. 
268 Security Council Resolution 1612. S/RES/1612. July 26 2005, para. 2(a). 
269 Hodgson, Sophie. "Whose Action Plan? An Analysis of the UN Security Council Resolution 1612 
Action Plan and Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism in Nepal." Journal of Human Rights Practice 4.2 
(2012): 168. 
270 Barnett & Jefferys, Full of Promise: How the UN’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism can better 
protect children: 1.  
271 This especially includes the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and its Optional Protocols. 
272 United Nations, Guidelines: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations Against 
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict.  
 67 
  
national legislation. It is highlighted in the official UN MRM Guidelines that the would mechanism be 
continuously guided by the following principles in order to best protect and support children: 1) The ‘best 
interest of the child’ as enshrined in the CRC, 2) impartiality, independence and objectivity, 3) security 
and confidentiality, and 4) accuracy, reliability and timeliness through systematic analysis and 
verification. Interestingly, challenges and gaps in the existing international legal framework as identified 
in Chapter 1 arguably underscore the need for monitoring and reporting systems like the MRM to 
systematically collect data on grave violations against children to provide adequate documentation on 
perpetrators to be held accountable for their violations of international law.  
 The Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism monitors the conduct of all parties to a conflict, 
including both state and non-state groups that are identifiable, particularly through an organized command 
structure, a political agenda and/or control over a specified territory.273 The MRM reviews the following 
‘six grave violations’ of children’s rights, capturing the multifaceted risks that children are exposed to in 
armed conflict settings: 1) killing or maiming of children, 2) recruiting or using child soldiers, 3) attacks 
against schools or hospitals, 4) rape or sexual violence against children, 5) abduction of children, and 6) 
denial of humanitarian access for children.274 In order to encourage consistent application across varied 
contexts, definitions on each of the six grave violations are provided in the UN MRM Field Manual. The 
Mechanism is initiated when ‘triggered’ by a grave violation275 that has been acknowledged by the 
Security Council, whereby the country situation becomes listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General 
                                                 
273 United Nations, Guidelines: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism; For examples of non-state parties 
that are monitored and the types of categories they may fall under, see the MRM Field Manual, 
particularly the section on Monitoring (OSRSG-CAAC, UNICEF, DPKO. “MRM Field Manual: 
Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on Grave Violations Against Children in Situations of 
Armed Conflict.” April 2010: 38). 
274 Interestingly, forced labour and all forms of slavery were initially mentioned as potential grave 
violations in Resolution 1539 in 2004, however, it was subsequently dropped in the Annual Report of the 
Secretary-General on Children and Armed Conflict  
275 It should be noted that for quite some time (eight years), only one of the grave violations (i.e. child 
recruitment) was a trigger for parties to a conflict being listed in the annexes. Subsequently, in 2009 
killing and maiming and sexual violence were added, and then finally in 2011, after several years since 
the establishment of the MRM, was attacks on schools added as a trigger.  
 68 
  
(i.e. Annex I and Annex II). Those listed in Annex I represent UN-verified parties in situations of armed 
conflict that are active in countries that are on the agenda of the Security Council, whereas those listed in 
Annex II are individuals or entities not present in countries on the Security Council’s agenda .276 While 
very few countries listed in Annex II receive the Security Council’s attention or have the MRM 
implemented, as it additionally requires consultation with and consent of the listed country’s government, 
urgent concerns in Annex II countries can be brought forward by the UN Country Team through an 
informal Horizontal Note. However, “there is no obligation for the Council to issue recommendations and 
conclusions” using the informal Horizontal Note mechanism.277 The sheer act of listing of parties on the 
Annexes is perceived as one of the MRM’s key strengths, as it is a significant form of asserting political 
and public pressure to effect change.278 It should be noted that although the MRM now documents all six 
of the grave violations listed, initially, the Mechanism was triggered by only one: recruiting or using child 
soldiers. This “protection gap” was highlighted by child protection practitioners and consequentially, 
Security Council Resolution 1882 (2009) expanded the scope of the reporting trigger to include the killing 
and maiming of children as well as rape and other forms of sexual violence.279 In 2011, this was 
broadened further to include attacks on schools or hospitals with Resolution 1998. 
 Several individuals and entities in the DRC have been listed in the Secretary-General’s Annex I 
Situations since June 13 2006 (i.e. the first year of its report), with several of the same parties as well as 
additional parties maintaining a spot on the Annex in the last report in 2014. For parties to be delisted, 
they must demonstrate progress in the development and implementation of concrete and time-bound 
Action Plans, which are signed by the associated party as a formal commitment to actively desist from 
                                                 
276 Hodgson, Who’s Action Plan? 
277 Barnett and Jefferys, Full of Promise: 4. 
278 The United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and United Nations Children’s 
Fund. “Global Good Practices Study: Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism on Grave Violations against 
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict.” November 2013.  
279 Hodgson, Who’s Action Plan?: 169; United Nations, Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the 
Secretary-General. April 13 2010. A/64/742–S/2010/181. 
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committing grave violations against children.280 According to the SRSG—CAAC, Action Plans are 
“where the promises of protection by the intentional community as expressed in international law and 
resolutions finally become tangible”281 and are a significant way of ensuring parties are held accountable 
as “they provide a tool which the Task Force can then use to monitor progress against stated 
intentions.”282 On October 4 in 2012, an Action Plan was signed between the government of the DRC (on 
behalf of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo, FARDC) and the UN Working 
Group on Children and Armed Conflict, primarily for the grave violation of rape and other forms of 
sexual violence.283 However, this action plan is still under implementation and therefore has not yet been 
delisted as delisting is dependent on the party fulfilling all its outlined commitments and ceasing to 
commit the cited violation for a minimum of one reporting cycle.284 
 The structure and flow of information of the MRM is as follows: Once a trigger has listed a 
country on Annex I, a MRM country task force on monitoring and reporting (CTFMR) is created. It is 
mandated that the CTFMR be “composed of all relevant UN entities, represented at the most senior level 
in-country” and co-chaired by “the highest UN authority in the country,”285 such as the OSRSG-CAAC 
which along with UNICEF frequently undertake a key role, often assuming the position of co-Chair or 
deputy chair.286 The country task force monitors and documents grave violations against children and 
reports to the OSRSG—CAAC, which “serves on behalf of the Secretary-General as the UN system focal 
point for the Security Council-related CAAC agenda and implementation of the MRM.”287 As there is no 
                                                 
280 For a more precise account outlining the details of Action Plans, see the ninth report of the Secretary-
General on children and armed conflict. 
281 UN General Assembly. Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict. August 4 2010. A/65/219. 
282 Barnett & Jefferys: Full of Promise: 8.  
283 For more on the progress of Action Plans in various countries see: 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/action-plans/  
284 UN General Assembly and Security Council, 2010. Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. August 4 2010. A/65/219: 178. 
285 United Nations, MRM Guidelines: 11. 
286 Hodgson, Who’s Action Plan?; United Nations, MRM Guidelines. 
287 United Nations, MRM Guidelines: 9. 
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formal or standardized framework, the participation of local NGOs and civil society groups is highly 
divergent across countries and contexts.288  The OSRSG is responsible for examining, vetting and 
finalizing all the drafts submitted by the country task force which are then considered by the Security 
Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict (SCWG-CAAC). The OSRSG is assisted in 
these tasks by a Steering Committee, or alternatively the MRM Technical Reference Group (MRM TRG).  
The SCWG is comprised of members of the Security Council and meets formally every two months to 
review MRM reports, progress made, as well as make recommendations to the Security Council. The 
Working Group makes decisions based on consensus among its members, using a toolkit for possible 
action that they have developed, which emphasizes dialogue and cooperation.289 The Steering 
Committee/MRM TRG is co-chaired by UNICEF and the OSRSG and works on supporting the MRM’s 
implementation through tools, guidelines and technical support, as well as being charged with ensuring 
that the Task Force operates in line with its Terms of Reference and that there is adequate participation 
and consultation with neutral, impartial and independent partners. 
 In country situations where there is a peacekeeping or political mission290 present, such as 
MONUSCO in the DRC, these missions, with their Child Protection Advisors taking the lead, work in 
partnership for monitoring and reporting and engaging in dialogue with the parties to the conflict. The 
SCWG is responsible for reviewing the annual country reports submitted by the OSRSG—CAAC, 
analyzing the findings and determining if any progress (or regression) has been made, finally issuing 
conclusions and recommendations for each country under review to the Security Council to better protect 
children291. At the top of the reporting ‘food chain’ rests the Security Council and the SRSG—CAAC, 
                                                 
288 Hodgson, Who’s Action Plan? 
289 United Nations, MRM Guidelines. 
290 Increasingly, these missions have a significant component of child protection in their mandate. For 
example, MONUSCO in the DRC is staffed with Child Protection Advisors (CPAs) that work with 
peacekeeping operations in the field.  
291 Such measures might include suggested changes in peacekeeping mandates, dialogue with national 
state carters or armed groups, forwarded to other UN decision-making bodies (e.g. the Human Rights 
Council, the Committee on the Rights of the Child) or legal bodies (e.g. the ICC) for ‘further destinations 
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which serves as “the primary interface with the Security Council”292; the chair of the SCWG reports to the 
Security Council after each of its meetings, submitting a written report to the Council annually for review. 
Other key operational actors involved in the implementation of the MRM include UNICEF, which has a 
presence in each country listed, and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) which is 
actively assisted by Child Protection Advisors (CPAs) deployed on the ground in peacekeeping missions. 
Additional groups that typically offer support include the following UN bodies: Department of Political 
Affairs (DPA), Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), OCHA, ILO, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNESCO, and UNHCR among others, depending on the 
country in question. 
 The MRM thus primarily consists of three activities: monitoring, reporting and responding to 
grave violations against children. Stated as the purpose in the MRM Guidelines, information collected 
through the MRM “should be used as a basis to foster the accountability and compliance of parties to 
conflict with international child protection standards and norms, and should lead to well informed, 
concerted and effective advocacy and response to protect and care for children.”293 Although it is 
emphasized that the MRM can go beyond being a mere ‘data collection tool’ and can be used to inform 
and trigger preventive and programmatic action, through linking monitoring to response,294 the language 
used in Resolution 1612 does not explicitly emphasize response or facilitating and improving the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, international development efforts or programming to children as the 
intended purpose of the MRM.295 However, several efforts have been made by Task Force members to 
advocate that the MRM can be advantageous for more effective prevention and response at multiple 
                                                 
for actions’ or punitive measures such as targeted sanctions (e.g. travel bans, asset freezes) against parties 
to the conflict, so long as there is an existing Sanctions Committee. 
292 United Nations, MRM Guidelines: 9. 
293 United Nations, MRM Guidelines: 4 (“Purpose”). 
294 This is especially highlighted in the UN MRM Global Good Practices Study (2013), and is captured in 
the following quote: “The MRM is not so much here to make a point, but to make a difference. We need 
to link the monitoring and reporting with the underlying response, presenting the MRM not so much as a 
blame and shame mechanism but as a tool to help people move into a better situation” (10). 
295 Security Council Resolution 1612. S/RES/1612. July 26 2005; Barnett and Jefferys, Full of Promise. 
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levels. Among existing monitoring and reporting systems, it has been argued that the MRM has the most 
explicit mandate for carrying out this arduous task.296 
 
II. Attacks on Schools in the DRC 
 It is pivotal that a review of recent research demonstrating the prevalence of attacks on schools in the 
DRC be included in order to better contextualize the analysis of the results of the field research 
conducted. This review of recent literature on the incidence of attacks on schools is not only 
complementary, but essential in filling key gaps in knowledge in this report, as field research did not 
attempt to measure the prevalence of this particular grave violation, but rather focused on the 
effectiveness of the MRM as a whole at the national level. In order to emphasize the ultimate key finding 
that attacks on schools is being under prioritized relative to other grave violations, particularly the 
recruitment of child soldiers and sexual violence, it is fundamentally necessary to demonstrate that attacks 
on schools is an unfortunately persistent and widespread grave violation in the DRC that equally warrants 
attention and resource investment.  
  To provide a maximally holistic account of attacks on schools in the DRC, a comparative review 
of two distinct types of reporting was included. At the UN level, the Report of the Secretary-General on 
Children and Armed Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2014/453) and the report of the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council (A/69/926–S/2015/409), presents the most recently published 
findings on the six grave violations against children using official data collected through the MRM. At the 
grassroots community level, a research team at Columbia University has developed an innovative 
community-based surveillance mechanism that monitors the incidence of attacks on schools in a way that 
can be better linked to responses to enhance the protection of children and their education in situations of 
armed conflict.  
                                                 
296 Coursen-Neff, Zama. “Attacks on Education: Monitoring and reporting for prevention, early warning, 
rapid response, and accountability” in UNESCO, Protecting Education from Attack: 111-125. 
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  Including all three types of reporting on the grave violation of attacks on schools not only 
provides a more holistic and comprehensive account, but also allows for their respective divergent 
approaches to data collection to be compared and contrasted. As all three reports document attacks on 
schools in the DRC during a common time period this enables a demonstration of  which method is better 
able to capture a more accurate depiction of reality. This is especially significant in gaining a better 
understanding of whether the MRM is the most effective mechanism for monitoring and reporting grave 
violations against children in conflict settings. From the minimal research conducted evaluating the 
effectiveness and impact of the MRM, critics have argued that the particularly stringent procedures 
governing the UN-verification process has severely diminished the actual number of alleged cases that get 
included in the MRM reports.297 As will be revealed in the section entitled ‘Objective II,’ my own 
research not only confirmed these findings, but noted that this flaw is especially challenging with respect 
to the grave violation of attacks on schools, as even less reported allegations of this violation get verified 
by UN staff for its inclusion in the MRM reports.  
 
A) UN Level—Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (S/2014/453, June 30 2014) 
 As the publicly available ‘finished product’ of the MRM, with all information in the report 
“gathered, verified and compiled by the country task force on monitoring and reporting within the 
framework of resolution 1612 (2005),”298 the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a valuable foundation for examining both the 
effectiveness of the Mechanism and the current situation of attacks on schools in the DRC. Issued on the 
                                                 
297 Alfaro, Stephanie, et al. "Estimating human rights violations in South Kivu Province, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo: A population-based survey." Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies 7.3 (2012): 
201-210.; Potts, Alina, Kathleen Myer, and Les Roberts. "Measuring human rights violations in a 
conflict-affected country: results from a nationwide cluster survey in Central African Republic." Conflict 
and health 5.4 (2011). 
298 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. S/2014/453: 2.  
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30th of June in 2014, the report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo is the fifth report of its kind on the situation of children in armed conflict in the 
DRC. This annual report releases information on the six grave violations experienced from January 2010 
to December 2013, as informed by official MRM data  
 The report focuses on grave violations occurring in four provinces, where the violence is most 
rampant: North Kivu, South Kivu, Katanga, and Orientale Province. However, the report highlights the 
challenge of limited access to these key areas due to “security and logistical constraints.”299 The report 
focuses on the following elements: 1) an overview of the current and evolving situation of armed conflict 
in the DRC, including both positive and negative developments, 2) new and recurring patterns or trends, 
3) listing all parties to the conflict responsible for grave violations against children, 4) progress made with 
previously listed parties, and 5) providing recommendations to overcome persisting challenges and 
improve the protection of children in the DRC.  
 The report concludes that “recruitment and use of children, killing and maiming of children, 
attacks on schools and sexual violence against children peaked in 2012 and numbers remained high 
throughout 2013,”300 providing the March 23 Movement (M23) insurgency and its concomitant hostilities 
as a possible explanation. Focusing on the information provided on the grave violation of attacks on 
schools, the Secretary-General report reveals that 180 schools were directly affected by the conflict 
occurring in the DRC, with 47 such schools having been destroyed, 82 looted and 51 used for military 
purposes. A significant portion of these cases (32) were reportedly committed by the Armed Forces of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo301 (FARDC). The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
(FDLR) was responsible for attacks against 31 schools in North and South Kivu, the Front for Patriotic 
Resistance in Ituri (FRPI) for 14 cases of attacks on schools in Irumu territory and nine cases of attacks 
were attributed to the M23. Between August 22nd and 30th, a school in Goma was shelled by M23 during 
                                                 
299 Ibid.: 1. 
300 Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. S/2014/453: 5. 
301 Or alternatively, the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo. 
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an attack. It is also reported that the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) committed systematic attacks 
against schools in Beni territory, attacking and looting health centres and a school between November 
2012 and May 2013 and ransacking 20 schools in the month of July alone. Beyond these direct attacks on 
schools, hundreds of schools were closed (some permanently and some temporarily) as an indirect result 
of the conflict, “affecting the right to education of tens of thousands of children.”302 
 In addition, a press release303 by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General for Children and Armed Conflict, whose information is based on a Report of the Secretary-
General to the Security Council (A/69/926-S/2015/409) issued on June 5th 2015, revealed that the trend of 
attacks on schools outlined in S/2014/453 continued to persist in 2015. The press release stated that 22 
schools were attacked and 12 used for military purposes, which has consequentially affected 31,000 
children. Ten schools have been used for military purposes in Shabunda Territory, with four schools used 
by the FARDC and six by Rayia Mutomboki, with their materials and infrastructure destroyed and looted 
as a result of clashes in April. The statement also adds that schools were attacked by ADF, FDLR, the 
Union des Patriotes Congolais pour la Paix (UPCP) and other armed groups. Lastly, two schools that had 
been previously occupied by FARDC to hold captured FDLR soldiers were vacated in September as a 
result of UN advocacy.  
 
B) Grassroots Level—Monitoring and Reporting to Enhance the Protection of Education in Situations of 
Insecurity and Conflict in South Kivu Province (2014)304 and North Kivu (2015)305 
                                                 
302 Ibid.: 10 
303 See (https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/).  
304 Bennouna, Cyril, et al. "Improving surveillance of attacks on children and education in South Kivu: a 
knowledge collection and sensitivity analysis in the DR Congo." Vulnerable Children and Youth Studies 
(2016): 1-9. 
305 Monitoring and Reporting to Enhance the Protection of Education in Situations of Insecurity and 
Conflict: North Kivu Province, DRC (Draft), Personal Communication. 
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 For two consecutive years, students from the Program on Forced Migration and Health at the 
Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University306 have been piloting an innovative community-
based approach to surveillance in the Provinces of North and South Kivu. Utilizing a community-based 
approach enables efforts to monitor and report to capitalize on existing capacities and foci of knowledge 
within the local affected community. This mechanism sought to improve the surveillance of incidents of 
attacks on schools through semi-structured interviews with a sample of key informants in order to provide 
a pattern of incidents in the region in the last year. This mechanism was piloted in South Kivu and then 
again the following year in North Kivu, as these regions are considered to be “the epicentre of 
violence.”307 These two studies demonstrate how surveillance systems can be more efficient and effective 
by identifying key knowledge holders within the community in different regions of the country and 
engaging with them regularly to document and monitor attacks on schools. 
 With over 50 organizations in the education and child protection sectors in the cities of Bukavu, 
Baraka, Shabunda, Uvira and Walungu in South Kivu and over 30 organizations interviewed in the city of 
Goma in North Kivu, these two studies were successful in surveilling disruptions in education caused by 
armed groups since December 2012. Interestingly, while the MRM distinguishes between ‘attacks on 
schools’ and the ‘military use of schools,’ with the latter not included in its definition and thus excluded 
from MRM reporting, these two studies considered both as disruptions in education by armed groups or 
alternatively, “attacks on education.” The studies’ inclusion criteria for reporting of cases was the 
following: (1) a description of the event that met the previous definition; (2) a date or period between 
December 25, 2012 and July 31, 2014 (in the South Kivu study) and between December 25, 2013 and 
                                                 
306 Specifically, this entailed a partnership between the Columbia Group for Children in Adversity 
(CGCA) and the Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) 
307 United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG). Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed 
conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. S/2014/453. June 30 2014: 5.   
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June 30, 2015 (in the North Kivu study); and (3) the school name.308 Reported cases were excluded if 
information proved to be incongruent or if the report was referring to a disruption due to general violence 
in the village rather than the schools themselves, as “these reports could not be classified as ‘attacks on 
education’ despite their undoubtedly having a deleterious effect on education.”309 Reports were cross-
referenced and redundancies were removed, giving priority to the report with greater detail and more 
reliability. After the interview process and once data on all events were collected, all reports were mapped 
digitally, with 10%310 of the school sites selected to confirm verification in the South Kivu study and 20% 
of sites visited for verification in the North Kivu study. 
  Using this surveillance technique, the 2014 South Kivu study found that between December 25th 
2012 and July 31st 2014, there were 238 attacks on education in the province of South Kivu, affecting 
217 schools (188 primary schools and 29 secondary schools)311 directly, spanning across seven of eight of 
the Province’s territories. This figure of 238 attacks in South Kivu alone is overwhelmingly higher (75% 
higher) than that found by the MRM as reported by the Secretary-General for the entire country.  
Additionally, only 49 individual cases (21%) overlapped with the UNICEF’s annual MRM database for 
South Kivu. It should be noted that the study did not report the suspected perpetrators of such attacks as 
several informants feared the security risk of naming specific armed groups and as a result named 
multiple groups. Additionally, several hundreds of additional cases were reported of schools disrupted 
both temporarily and permanently due to general insecurity or mass population displacement in the area, 
but were not included as they did not meet the designated criteria. Reported cases of attacks on education 
included physical attacks, the military use of schools, looting, extortion, sexual violence, torture and 
                                                 
308 Bennouna et al., Improving surveillance of attacks on children and education in South Kivu; 
Monitoring and Reporting to Enhance the Protection of Education in Situations of Insecurity and 
Conflict: North Kivu Province, DRC (Draft). 
309 Monitoring and Reporting to Enhance the Protection of Education in Situations of Insecurity and 
Conflict in South Kivu Province (Draft): iv. 
310 The selection of these sites was based on: reachability, security, and diversity of sources that provided 
the reports. (Bennouna et al., South Kivu study) 
311 To demonstrate a sense of the impact on children, the study also illustrates that from data on the 
national MoE database available for 172 of the 217 schools effected, there were 43,171 listed students for 
the 172 schools with data available.  
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abduction of children for forced labour. However, by the far the most frequent type of ‘attack’ was 
looting and the military use of schools and classrooms. After the verification process outlined above, only 
one report involved events that did not seem to have actually taken place, and a few other cases did not in 
fact meet the inclusion criteria (e.g. occurred outside of the recall period), therefore yielding a 
confirmation rate of 79% (or 22 out of 28). Generalizing this confirmation rate, assuming it remains 
relatively constant for all 238 reports, approximately 187 (or 79% of 238) attacks on schools occurred 
during the outlined time period in South Kivu.  
  The South Kivu study adds that of the 238 attacks, seven commenced in 2012 and continued into 
2013, 172 began in 2013 and 59 in 2014. A little over a third of the supplied information met the 
inclusion criteria. Interestingly, among the 54 organizations sampled, the study found that “local 
organizations had the greatest knowledge of attacks on education, with 121 reports, followed by learning 
institutions, such as the Ministry of Education (MoE), with 73 reports and finally international 
organizations, including INGOs and UN agencies, with 57 reports.”312 However, it was reported that of 
the cases reported by international organizations, a majority (49 of the 57 cases, or alternatively 86%) 
derived from UNICEF, which in turn had received the alerts and corresponding information from local 
organizations and learning institutions.  
  This community-based approach to monitoring attacks on schools was in fact comprehensive 
enough to discern a pattern in attacks. When examining the Ministry of Education’s list of qualified 
teachers per school and analyzed according to frequency of attacks reported by territory, a negative 
relationship between qualified teachers and the frequency of attacks was revealed. Territories with 
schools with a lower proportion of qualified teachers experienced greater reports of attacks on education. 
Other additional findings, although not a primary objective of the research study,313 included a greater 
awareness of possible motivations for attacking education, including the following suspected reasons: 
                                                 
312 Bennouna et al., Monitoring and Reporting to Enhance the Protection of Education in Situations of 
Insecurity and Conflict: South Kivu Province, DRC (Draft), Personal Communication. 
313 Even though informants were not specifically questioned on suspected motivations for attacks on 
education, several informants voluntarily offered possible explanations. 
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reprisals against rival groups, reprisals against populations and villages for their alleged support of a rival 
group, material need, shelter, as well as the overt demonstration of local power and authority.   
  The second study of its kind taking place the following year in North Kivu revealed similarly 
distressing findings of attacks on schools in the neighbouring province. North Kivu represented an 
interesting area of focus for comparison, as it has the largest proportion314 of out-of-school children aged 
5-17 and a majority (1,588 of the 2,214 schools in North Kivu) of its schools have a religious affiliation. 
The study found that between the time period of December 25th 2013 until June 30th 2015, 142 attacks 
on education occurred in North Kivu, taking place in five of its seven territories. These documented 
attacks affected 126 schools (100 primary schools, 26 secondary schools315). With records available for 
only 87 of these schools, the MoE reports 25,642 students listed in these 87 schools affected. Similar to 
the previous study’s findings, reported attacks on education included the occupation of schools, the 
destruction of school infrastructure and materials, sexual and physical violence, intimidation, kidnapping, 
and the recruitment of children into armed forces, with a combination of different types of attack 
occurring in several instances. Interestingly, the study confirms that “none of the reported attacks 
overlapped with the MONUSCO’s database containing verified attacks on education for the period under 
study,”316 which is deeply problematic for the comprehensiveness of the final MRM reports, as much of 
their information is supplied by MONUSCO’s database. In addition, comparing the findings with that 
reported in the Secretary-General’s report (i.e. 35 attacks, including the military use of schools, in North 
Kivu) reveal a similar trend of underreporting of the grave violation in the MRM.  
  Of the 142 attacks, six began in December 2013, continuing into 2014, eighty-one began in 2014, 
55 in 2015, and one was ongoing at the time of the studies’ writing. Information on potential cases of 
attacks on schools were collected from 35 Goma-based organizations in the education and child 
                                                 
314 The study adds that  recent statistics available dating from 2012 report that 43.9% (or 994,366 
children) of all school-aged children, 42% of boys and 46% of girls, were not attending school. 
315 The study highlights that “no attacks on higher education institutions, including universities, were 
reported” (North Kivu Study (Draft): 21).  
316 North Kivu Study (Draft): 21. 
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protection sector, however the authors note that using key informants exclusively based in Goma is a 
significant limitation that may result in an underestimation of attacks. Twenty-eight of the 142 attacks 
were reported by multiple organizations. Approximately a third of the 35 organizations provided at least 
one report of an attack on education that met the studies’ inclusion criteria. The main reason for exclusion 
was typically due to the lack of name of schools affected provided by key informants, among other 
deficits in the specificity of information provided by interviewees. Interestingly, in contrast to the 
previous study in South Kivu, this study found that “education institutions such as the MoE, the EPSP, 
religious school administrators, school directors and teachers had the greatest knowledge of attacks on 
education,”317 with this group reporting 99 cases. These numbers were drastically reduced in other groups, 
such as international NGOs (reported six cases), local NGOs (reported five cases), and UN agencies 
(reported four cases).  
  Using similar methodology to the previous study in South Kivu, 23 of the 126 schools were 
selected for on-site verification with key informants such as school directors, teachers, leaders and chiefs. 
On-site verifications actually lead to the awareness of 29 additional attacks affecting 21 schools, two 
already included in the verification sample for another attack and 27 other nearby schools.318 Only four 
incidents originally reported by key informants were not confirmed with these on-site verifications, two 
of which did not occur and the other two were clouded by uncertainty of whether they met the definition 
for an attack on education319. 
  For both studies, what is interesting to note is that despite the studies’ narrow inclusion criteria 
which naturally results in an underestimation of the total number of attacks in the respective regions, they 
both found considerably higher frequencies of attacks than that reported in the Secretary-General’s Report 
on Children and Armed Conflict. Both studies are examples of how community-based surveillance 
                                                 
317 North Kivu Study (Draft): 21. 
318 Of the 29 additional attacks, 15 took place in Walikale territory and the remaining 14 occurred in 
Masisi and Rutshuru territory.  
319 For example, a teacher or school director was kidnapped from their home, but it was not known 
whether this was due to their profession.  
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systems using strategically-identified key local informants can be both an affordable and feasible option 
in monitoring and reporting the grave violation of attacks on schools in armed conflict settings. This 
further demonstrates the need for the UN MRM to be a part of a broader effort to document, monitor and 
report grave violations against children in situations of armed conflict. 
 
B. Objective II: Results from Data Analysis  
I. Sample Characteristics: 
 Eleven participants were included in the sample used for data analysis, representing a range of 
organization ‘types,’ which can be defined under the following schema: Intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) or UN bodies, International NGOs (INGOs), and local NGOs. Five individuals represented a UN 
organization, two INGOs, and four represented the perspectives of local NGOs. Initially, during the 
interview process in the field, another individual representing donor governments was consulted, 
however, this interview was not included in data analysis as it was concluded that the informant and the 
knowledge generated by the interview was not pertinent to the research topic, but instead provided a 
general overview of the contextual situation in the DRC. The organizations that participated in this study 
were as follows: 
• UN bodies: UNICEF and MONUSCO (both from the Human Rights and Child Protection 
divisions) 
• International NGOs: Save the Children and World Vision 
• Local NGOs: Soprop, Afia Mama, and Ordre des Avocats 
Once in the field, inclusion criteria had to be expanded to include organizations that do not directly 
participate in the MRM Task Force, as it was discovered in the field that several informants had 
insufficient knowledge on the MRM and its use, were highly inactive in the MRM in the DRC, and had a 
lack of knowledge of attacks on schools occurring in the DRC. Expanding criteria resulted in including 
partnering organizations that work on monitoring, reporting and documenting grave violations against 
 82 
  
children in the DRC and other organizations whose work is key in linking monitoring to response. Please 
refer to Table 3.1 for a breakdown of the participants and the sample characteristics, however, please note 
that participants’ names have been replaced with numerical identifiers so as to better protect their 
individual identities. In addition, it should be noted prior to revealing the content of interviews, that the 
results do not reflect individual or personal opinions, but rather the organizations’ experience on the topic 
through the lens of an individual member of that particular organization.  
 When possible, multiple participants were included from the same organization to reflect a 
greater diversity of perspectives and experiences that may vary between different positions within an 
organization. The diversity in participants included the following attributes and work efforts: Child 
protection, education, human rights, gender, executive director, chief of party for project, and coordinator. 
It should also be noted that efforts were made to include both male (three participants total) and female 
(eight total) participants, as well as both local (five total) and international perspectives (six total). 
However, an important limitation in seeking greater diversity in the sample was that the majority of the 
organizations consulted with in the field were small in size and understaffed. This excessive workload 
posed a problem in availability and scheduling when seeking interview informants in the DRC.  
 Every effort was made to include as many organizations as possible that are members of the 
MRM Country Task Force (CTFMR) in the DRC, however several organization’s monitoring and 
reporting units had been deployed to work on the ground in eastern Congo, particularly in Goma, North 
Kivu. This limitation was the case for securing an interview with an individual knowledgeable on the 
topic from OCHA and UNHCR. However, one informant who was unable to be interviewed in person, as 
they were in Goma at the time of field research, was successfully included in data analysis at a later date 
by completing the interview guide (with follow-up questions added) as a written questionnaire via direct 
email correspondence. In addition, although an individual was included from the Child Protection 
Advisor (CPA) unit from MONSUCO, several participants highly recommended that I talk to one 
particular individual from the CPA unit who had specialized knowledge and experience with the MRM 
(in both the DRC and in another country), however, a completed ‘questionnaire’ was not successfully 
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achieved in time for inclusion in the current data analysis but has since influenced general knowledge and 
discussion. 
Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics 
 
II. Thematic Analysis 
i. Challenges: 
 The node ‘challenges’ represents all of the challenges various stakeholders experienced in either 
using the MRM or in regular monitoring and reporting efforts as part of programming. Furthermore, it 
provides potential points for later intervention, as the challenges identified reveal current pitfalls in the 
existing system that undermine its effectiveness as well as potential areas for strengthening. Although 
there was a specific question in the interview guide on the topic of challenges, ‘challenges’ was a 
pervasive node that emerged unprompted in the responses to various questions and across various 
organization ‘types.’ The theme of ‘challenges’ frequently overlapped with other nodes used in Nvivo, 
which further reveals the specific challenges experienced.  
A) Access:  
 Several informants cited access as a key challenge in monitoring and reporting. This challenge 
additionally overlaps with other nodes, such that areas where violations are occurring are difficult to 
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access either due to security concerns, mobility issues resulting from lack of public roads (especially in 
rural pockets), which is exacerbated by the added challenge of the vast expansiveness of the DRC. In 
fact, several informants cited the expansiveness of the country as an especially difficult challenge in 
monitoring and reporting violations committed against children. The overwhelming size of the country 
challenges organizations’ ability to access all areas where violations are occurring. This coupled with the 
lack of public infrastructure to reach vast rural areas, in conjunction with the centralization of services, 
presented a major challenge to several organizations in monitoring and reporting grave violations and 
delivering services and programs. 
 Paradoxically, while UN staff, such as those working with MONUSCO or UNICEF, experience 
greater difficulty in accessing certain areas due to centralization and security concerns, it is UN staff who 
have the greatest access to high-level security personnel and protocols, as well as the greatest supply of 
resources (e.g. private chartered flights, helicopters, highly trained pilots, security escorts) that enable 
them to access areas that lack basic public infrastructure (e.g. roads). Local NGOs simply do not have 
access to these same resources that better secure their safety and enable reaching otherwise inaccessible 
rural communities. For example, an informant revealed that without the use of costly private flight 
companies it took two days for field workers to travel from Lubumbashi (Southeast DRC) to Kinshasa, 
which is normally a 2-3 hour direct flight, as they had to fly first to Addis Ababa to get to Kinshasa. This 
similarly encumbered a high administrative and financial cost. 
 As a result, UN bodies and International NGOs do not have as much of a presence in rural areas, 
either because they “[don’t] have time to get in or [don’t] have the ability to go in.” As a result, without 
UN bodies able to access remote or insecure areas, allegations of grave violations against children are not 
able to be UN verified and thus do not successfully get included in the MRM reports. Additionally, the 
mere ‘foreign presence’ of the UN challenges their ability to effectively access areas where violations are 




“Sending white people into conflict zones attracts much more 
questioning than local NGOs that are already there. It is an automatic 
red flag of an investigation occurring if there is a foreign presence”  
—UNICEF 
Consequentially, with field offices located in the capitals of each province, there is a heavy reliance on 
teams deployed ‘on the ground’ in the hard-to-reach areas where violations are occurring, however, 
challenges remain with these key partnerships. It was noted that limited access to conflict zones is a 
particularly salient issue for the grave violation of attacks on schools, especially in the province of 
Katanga, as there is a high level of volatility with access restrictions constantly changing. Ultimately the 
challenges highlighted above regarding access significantly undermine an organization’s capacity for 
rapid response and local monitoring and reporting. 
 Issues of access are particularly challenging for the task of MRM or data collection on grave 
violations as areas that are difficult to access are the precise areas where rebel or insurrectional groups or 
movements are located. Due to these logistical issues in accessing areas to collect information on 
violations against children, an informant admits that: 
“…in terms of MRM recording in general, it would be so difficult in a 
country like this to really access people that have the information and 
I think that’s why the numbers are so low because it does take a long 
time.” –Save the Children 
An additional challenge with access that does not directly relate to the MRM or monitoring and reporting, 
but is indirectly related as it pertains to seeking support after a child has experienced a grave violation, is 
the pervasiveness of poverty and the corresponding lack of access to basic health services (e.g. 
reproductive health after incidences of sexual violence) and the lack of access to education, especially in 
rural areas. Coupled with this issue is the limited accessibility of children’s tribunals, with an informant 
stating that “accessibility to the legal system is a problem” (World Vision); there are very few child-
focused tribunals, most of which are centralized in the capital city, so if a child is seeking redress or 
reparations, or even to have their case be heard by a children’s judge, the individual must travel quite a far 
distance, while incurring the cost of transportation themselves which is especially challenging for these 
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most vulnerable and destitute families. This is further challenged by the corruption that occurs in the 
justice system, with an informant providing the example that: 
 “the victim needs to pay for the police to issue an arrest warrant, and 
pay again a transport fare to the police or to the people that are going 
to go arrest him. And if they don’t [arrest] the person the first day, 
then the victim needs to pay for their transport the second 
day…again.” —Afia Mama 
 
B) Awareness:  
 A significant result from data collection was the general lack of awareness of the MRM itself and 
on the occurrence of attacks on schools in the DRC. This was an issue even for members of the MRM 
Country Taskforce, as evidenced by statements such as “staff don’t really know what the MRM is” (Save 
the Children). For Save the Children, which was considered by other informants as not an active member, 
their current albeit limited involvement in the MRM is purely a result of an individual employee’s 
personal interest. Only one of the local NGOs interviewed was aware of the MRM, and again this was out 
of personal interest rather than CTFMR members encouraging partnership in its implementation. What 
was particularly striking was that an active MRM task force member, in fact one of the Co-Chairs of the 
Mechanism in the DRC, with the position title of Human Rights Officer in the Reporting and 
Investigation Unit, admitted that: “So as such we are not part of this, what is the name, the MRM. To be 
honest, I have never read about it before” (MONUSCO-JHRO). 
 Regarding the lack of awareness on attacks on schools, several key informants were not aware 
that attacks on schools were occurring in the DRC. Despite the fact that many of the organizations 
included had a mandated specific focus on children’s rights or child protection, many added that they 
don’t hear much about attacks on schools in their work. In the monthly briefs sent out by MONUSCO 
CPAs in the field, an informant revealed that the most recent report was the first time they had included 
information regarding attacks on schools. It was asserted by a participant in response to the occurrence of 
attacks on schools in the DRC that: 
 87 
  
“Not till now, no. I do not think schools have been attacked. Even in 
the East, there was never any schools attacked. Except that there is 
the problem sometimes that the children cannot go to the school. But 
attacks against a school, no. Not to my knowledge…I do not know 
how but normally, maybe I was on a trip, but normally we are 
supposed to have that kind of information.” —World Vision 
 
 An informant attests that “attacks on schools is a very complicated concept” (UNICEF) with 
military occupation or military use of schools not included as a criteria for listing. Additionally, it was 
highlighted that the Congolese government has not issued a clear directive on attacks on schools, with one 
organization concluding that “I’m not sure everybody knows it’s so bad” (UNICEF). However, in the 
same interview, an informant of a different position disagreed that it was not an issue of awareness, as 
there are several advocacy efforts that have made armed groups and soldiers more aware, but rather “it is 
the government and Ministries that don’t take it seriously that is the problem, or they are willing but they 
are stuck” (UNICEF). This implies that the government needs to be more proactive in taking action 
against attacks on education.   
 A contributing factor to the challenge of awareness identified in data analysis was language, 
which was its own thematic code but overlapped significantly with awareness. Books and information 
packets that are distributed on the topic of attacks on schools or on the MRM are usually exclusively 
offered in English, which consequentially results in confusion and misunderstanding. This challenge 
similarly exists with sensitization or advocacy efforts that are only conducted in French. Although the 
official language of the DRC is indeed French, there are at least 4 other major local languages (Lingala, 
Swahili, Tshiluba, and Kikongo) that are recognized in the country: 
“when they come, they do sensitization in French. Not everyone 
speaks French. When they come, there are local structures that exist 
and could be reinforced to accomplish the work.” —Soprop 
 An additional theme that often intersected with the challenge of awareness was regarding the fact 
that existing legal instruments, such as specific policies, laws, international human rights instruments, and 
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programs designed to protect children, are not known, even among those that work in the judicial system. 
This challenge gravely undermines the effectiveness of existing instruments, as “for our laws and policies 
to be implemented, they need to be disseminated, they need to raise awareness about it…train public 
agents about it” (Afia Mama) Specifically, nearly all organizations unanimously agreed that this 
challenge is especially difficult with a particular law established in 2009 on the Protection of Children 
(i.e. Law No. 09-001). Connected with these challenges is the lack of awareness on human rights in 
general, particularly among traditional leaders, including an awareness of existing international human 
rights conventions, covenants and declarations that the DRC has signed or ratified. It was pointed out that 
if the population does not know what rights they are entitled to, how are they to know when their rights 
are being violated? It was noted that these issues of awareness are especially prevalent in the rural 
hinterlands, aggravated by the thematic challenge of the expansiveness of the country, with an informant 
exclaiming that “so imagine, if that is the case in the large cities, what do you think happens in the small 
villages?”  (Ordre des Avocats) and another adding that “there are still areas in Congo, I do not know how 
we will manage because the country is too large. The sensitization of the laws should go all the way 
there” (Soprop). Awareness of human rights instruments is of particular importance to exert population 
pressure on the legislative level for implementation and protection. However, it was identified that even 
within Parliament, a lack of awareness is pervasive. This is evidenced in the following example provided: 
“we had another morning session with the Parliament, and some of 
them are even in the bureau in a commission for social and cultural 
commission of Parliament, and one of them said ‘I have been 
examining laws and policies that are dealing with women’s rights but 
I have never heard of the Convention…when did [the DRC] ratify it?’ 
We ratified that convention in 1985…and this is someone who is 
sitting in Parliament…who’s decision is crucial for women’s 
rights…but he has never even read that convention.” —Afia Mama  
 
 Lastly, a persistent theme that was apparent across several interviews was the lack of awareness 
of other organization’ s programs and mandates and how they might overlap with their own. This 
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confusion remains despite several informants citing the recurrent use of workshops, trainings and 
meetings (e.g. cluster meetings) where all the organizations meet to collaborate and coordinate their work.  
C) Corruption & Conflicts of Interest 
 Several informants cited examples of corruption within the judicial system or among 
governmental employees, which have impacted both the ability to effectively prosecute perpetrators of 
grave violations against children and the ability to offer supportive services for children. It was also 
apparent through data analysis that corruption becomes especially prevalent for those of lower ranks in 
the hierarchy, with a lower ranking official coerced into corruption by order of their supervisor. It was 
reported that people in positions of power use their influence to exert pressure on others to discourage the 
reporting of an allegation. For example,  
“There are influences, people who have resources—how do we say 
this—people who have resources and influence on 
decisions…creat[ing] fears in people who would report the 
events…So there are people who are reserved, who keep quiet 
because of this”—World Vision.  
 It was also revealed in data analysis that civil servants or those working in a public function have 
at times vested interests in not charging perpetrators of violations. This is especially prevalent for 
perpetrators that work for the government, police or judiciary. For example “when a policeman commits a 
crime, we tell you he will get arrested, yet a few days later, you see him [freely] walking the streets” 
(Sorprop). These forms of corruption and conflicts of interest have taken the form of “exemplary 
sanctions” (Soprop), biased procedures, or “immunity regimes.” For example: 
“The second challenge is that there are exemplary sanctions…the 
deputies, the militaries…they sometimes are under protection, 
immunity regimes, they can’t do anything.” —Soprop 
Corruption is further exacerbated by grave inequality or unequal distributions of wealth, power and other 
resources, with bribery serving as a potent influence in the reporting of incidences: 
“There is bribery…and bribery has a strong influence. Someone who 
has money and who commits an offence may be arrested today but 
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after a few days, he is out. He is free to roam the area [while] 
constitut[ing] a threat or danger to the people who reported.” —World 
Vision  
Another issue of corruption that ultimately challenges organizations’ ability to effectively monitor and 
report on grave violations against children and deliver effective remedial solutions through programming 
concerns the corruption that occurs in authorities administering salaries for their employees and in the 
theft that occurs, such as: 
“You find out that the money you had in the bank was hijacked. 
Someone took the money. The civil servant who went to get the 
money somewhere for the state, he took it. He is gone and we will not 
see him again.” —Soprop  
 The corruption that exists within the judiciary, the police, the government and other partnering 
authorities ultimately challenges organizations’ ability to ethically collaborate with these groups. For 
example, “authorities completely shut down their doors” (MONUSCO) or demand special authorization 
from the Ministry or police when sought out for collaboration on a case. Additionally, as one informant 
attests: 
“If we know such a policemen went against his rights, we do not 
accept to collaborate with him. Because accepting such a collaboration 
is accepting injustice and making the violation more credible” —
Soprop 
In addition, due to the major expenses involved in attending university, examples were provided whereby 
female students have engaged in sexual relations with teachers and teacher assistants in exchange for 
grades or tuition. Furthermore, corruption has affected violence that occurs in schools, with an informant 
contending that; “there is a great deal of violence in the schools because there is no control, there is 
corruption coming from the authorities” (Sorprop). Ultimately, with corruption and conflicts of interest 
continuing to exist within the judicial, criminal, and governmental systems, grave violations committed 
against children are enabled to continue to persist without impunity, failing to create an effective 
deterrence for future perpetrators.  
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D) Ethical Concerns 
 Ethical concerns presented themselves in different forms across a number of interviews. Perhaps 
the most common thematic ethical concern, especially among UN associated organizations, was the 
humanitarian principle of ‘do no harm’ regarding the involvement of NGOs in the monitoring, reporting 
and documenting of grave violations against children. It was highlighted that there are risk of ‘doing 
harm’ at two levels: 1) discussing the allegations with the victims can expose them to a risk or even result 
in psychological harm or trauma, and 2) in verifying reported cases. Concerns arose regarding whether 
the security risks that are involved in collecting information on violations that concern the government 
and/or armed groups outweighed the benefits.  
 For UNICEF, the principle of “do no harm” serves as one of the two conditions for engagement 
in the MRM. UNICEF elaborated that rather than this being merely a “strategy in terms of ticking boxes” 
it is encouraged that field staff explain how the information will be used and the potential risks involved 
by emphasizing “there is no guarantee of protection”; thus their participation and consequential implicit 
exposure to possible security risks is not obliged. MONUSCO reported that they have encountered a “few 
instances where those people receive threats and they had to hide for a while” but in terms of responding 
to these security risks they “are limited by our mandate.” One organization in particular (Afia Mama) 
works in partnership with other organizations that can physically remove informants and provide safe 
shelter for those that reported an abuse that puts their life in danger or are at an especially high risk. 
A second common thread that recurred within the theme of ethical concerns was regarding maintaining 
confidentiality when collecting information. It should be noted that there was a specific question 
concerning how information on grave violations against children was collected in the interview guide, and 
when informants required prompting, participants were probed about the ‘ethical collection of 
information.’  
 For many organizations, confidentiality (on the identity of their sources) was a specific part of 
their mandate or methodology; confidentiality and the ethical collection of information was a component 
of their training, to ensure that staff in the field physically secure the information on the victims and their 
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allegations, and systematically encrypt the data to ensure online security in the field offices. One 
organization, explained that within their organization “there is a security policy and then there is a 
protection policy,” (World Vision) and had even adapted their confidentiality policy for the entire diverse 
array of partners they engage with (e.g. communications, donors). However, others said that this was less 
of a tangible strategy or toolkit, but instead was “more of a personal responsibility.” In some 
organizations, “there is no specific training on how to manage security risks, it was put as a condition for 
engagement, but it’s not a part of training on how to take measures to mitigate or manage risks” 
(UNICEF).  
 It was noted as well that ethical concerns, and the security risks that are entailed in reporting an 
allegation, are a particularly discouraging factor for victims or NGOs to report the factual name of the 
perpetrator, or even from reporting a violation altogether. An informant disclosed that “we have a lot of 
challenges in that, some victims would just change their statement. We know that its’ because they’ve 
been threatened, but they won’t say it. So we have challenges” (Afia Mama). It was noted that at times 
two objectives, the fight against impunity and the ethical concern of protecting victims, come into conflict 
with each other, with an informant stating that: 
“We always try to unless it can be dangerous for the victim, we 
always try to inform the authorities from the beginning because the 
idea is to support the authorities in the fight against impunities” —
MONUSCO 
 It was expressed across a few interviews that a particular challenge was the need for more 
technical support for training staff on how to ethically engage with victims while collecting information 
on the allegations. One informant specified that she wished staff and volunteers could be trained on “how 
to talk to them, how to understand them, to make them feel dignified” (Afia Mama). In connection with 
this, one organization noted that there are challenges with ensuring that partners, especially the media, 




“We try to reinforce the capacity of the media also in cases of 
violations, because sometimes they expose the victim…We try to 
train the media who work with us on how you can report cases.”  
—World Vision 
 Despite the existence of robust confidentiality principles in their mandate or methodology, 
challenges still persist, especially in the field: “Confidentiality is always an issue…at the level of the 
capital, in Kinshasa, we try to manage this. But in the field, it is a problem.” The same informant reported 
a specific example of how ethical concerns may continue to arise, perhaps as a result of resource 
constraints: 
“A colleague printed the work from their mission [in the field]. We did 
not have a [private] printer. The printer was centralized somewhere. But 
the colleague had printed it in the office of another person not knowing 
that the message was concerning the cousin of the person who’s office 
the printer was in…We printed the message in the office of the cousin of 
the military [perpetrator]. And immediately, the message [leaked] to the 
city. We were really threatened. This is a confidentiality issue.”  
—MONUSCO 
E) False Expectations of the MRM 
 A few interviewees suggested that an additional challenge undermining the effectiveness of the 
MRM rests in the false expectations among MRM task force members, civil society and the general 
population of what the MRM is designed to do, as opposed to what a surveillance mechanism ought to do 
to better protect children.  
 In data analysis, this thematic code had a lot of overlap with that of awareness, suggesting that 
perhaps the confusion and uncertainty produced by a lack of awareness of the MRM has contributed to 
false expectations of what the Mechanism can achieve. In addition, lack of awareness of the existence of 
the grave violation of attacks on schools occurring in the DRC has contributed to a false depiction of 
which violations demand attention and resource allocation. 
 A task force member of the MRM discussed how engagement with local NGOs can be a tiring 
process as “the NGOs do a lot of work to provide information but then the mechanism isn’t able to get the 
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full picture; it creates a false picture. So there are issues with false expectations in working with NGOs” 
(UNICEF). This concept of a ‘false picture’ was further reinforced by another organization which 
remarked that: 
“I think it was three years ago, it was [something like] 500 sexual 
violence and rape cases [that] were reported [in the] MRM process, 
which is very few when you think about the numbers you hear 
unofficially in the DRC” —Save the Children 
Other issues of false expectations exist in the individual reporting of violations and what victims may 
expect as a result. Very few reported cases actually get resolved, as there are many challenges that persist 
in the application of the laws and the fight against immunity. In addition, in linking monitoring and 
reporting with response, very few victims receive the necessary remedial support (psychosocial, 
economic, legal or medical) or reparations due to challenges with financial support and limited resources. 
As one informant states: 
“We do not have money to help these individuals who help us. But 
with an organization, we can make a request. But individually, we 
cannot help someone.”—MONUSCO (BCNUDH) 
F) Laws and Policies 
 While a significant portion of this thematic challenge intersected with lack of awareness and has 
already been covered, major challenges were highlighted in the implementation of relevant existing laws 
and policies. Nearly all organizations voluntarily (i.e. without prompting) reported on challenges they've 
experienced within the existing legal framework and the implementation of existing specific laws and 
policies that pertain to the protection of children. For example: 
“Our legal framework in the DRC is also contributing to most of this 
abuse on girls and young women, even though we have some beautiful 
laws and policies, but the lack of implementation of these beautiful 
laws leaves the people to use old policies that are very discriminatory 
on girls and young women” —Afia Mama 
This excerpt highlighting the gap between the existing  the laws and their application was consistent with 
that of another organization who asserts that: 
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“There are challenges legally speaking in the justice system. We have 
good policies, but the enforcing of these laws, their practicability, 
causes problems. So with the justice system, its’ a domain we have to 
work really hard and needs a lot of improvement with the application 
of these laws…There are deviations between the laws and applying 
them. There is a gap between the laws that exist and the application of 
these laws” —World Vision 
 In particular, multiple organizations specifically cited Law No. 09-001 that was put in place in the 
DRC in January 2009 for the protection of children. One informant explained that the rationale for the 
establishment of this law was to harmonize internal legislation with some of the international human 
rights conventions that the DRC had ratified. One major challenge this law aimed to rectify were 
uncertainty with the age of legal majority as a way of addressing broader systemic issues like child 
marriage (considered a form of rape by many informants) and child recruitment. Establishing a clear age 
of legal majority is a necessary precursor in identifying vulnerable children and when there is a breach of 
a child’s rights and protections. As one informant put it: 
“We need to adopt the children’s protection law so it can be used 
when need be. It will allow us to avoid mutilations on children, 
aggressions on children and the kidnapping of children, violence 
against children.” —Soprop  
 It should be noted that despite the lack of general implementation and awareness laws by some 
groups, other local organizations were successfully using the laws, conventions and policies. For 
example, one organization in dealing with children in conflict with the law stated: “we make sure their 
rights are guaranteed as per the children’s rights convention and the 2009 law regarding children’s 
protection. For example, the parents absolutely have to attend the trial. We make sure of this” (Ordre des 
Avocats).  
 Issues within the judicial system were cited by several organizations as a major barrier in the 
protection of children and in fighting against impunity as many reported cases were not vigorously 
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pursued. This challenge is further exacerbated by extreme limited resources and poverty: “Another aspect 
that may hamper the efficacy of the law is the level of poverty” (Ordre des Avocats). 
G) UN and International Elitism & Western Imperialism 
 There were several instances across multiple interviews that exhibited language of UN exclusivity 
or UN elitism, and this was observed both in the language, tone and content of interviews with UN 
organizations and local NGOs. To begin with, a very clear, intentional and strategic exclusivity was 
encountered in the selection of MRM task force members. In discussing which organizations are invited 
to be members, one informant reveals that: “In general, the UN family is always open to join, but local 
NGOs or local governments are not…local NGOs are not partners in this but they do provide information 
on alerts” (UNICEF). It was also revealed that unsurprisingly UN organizations are equipped with the 
most and highest quality resources, such as private planes, helicopters, armoured cars, escorts and other 
heightened security measures. Despite a lack of privileged access to these resources, it is local NGOs that 
are collecting the information on alerts in areas that cannot be accessed by the UN due to security 
concerns.  
 Many local organizations attested to challenges they've encountered in trying to secure funding 
and financial support for their projects and programs in partnership with UN organizations or big 
international NGOs. Often these resources are out of reach for newer, smaller up-and-coming NGOs, as 
the financial support is tied to particular conditions that are next to impossible for these small NGOs to 
meet: “The requirements are just too much for small organizations” (Afia Mama). One informant 
articulated the disproportionate access to funds between local and international NGOS, such that: 
“Access to funds is also difficult because here local organizations do 
not access that much, it’s international organizations that have easy 
access to resources, but they're not always in charge of victims 
directly”—Afia Mama 
 Another informant highlighted the challenges in disproportionate access to funds among various 
organization types and how this may have an impact on the actual effectiveness of local NGOs in rapid 
response. It was revealed that at times local NGOs, such as those specializing in medical assistance, are 
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unable to access certain areas “unless MONUSCO or the army can get in” (Save the Children). Beyond 
securing access to physical resources, another organization discusses the exclusive access UN groups 
have to resources such as strategic partners: “But with the United Nations, we find that they are the only 
one who can reach future partners” (Soprop). 
 It was emphasized in interviews how at times the difference in ‘rank’ among different 
organization types can challenge the working effectiveness of their partnership. One organization had a 
particularly negative impression of international staff and international groups (such as INGOs and the 
UN) and this has consequentially resulted in a tenuous relationship clouded by skepticism regarding 
whether INGOs or the UN are truly best positioned to accomplish the arduous task of child protection: 
“[Some] international structures are only names. The international 
organizations, we know what they are but we have never seen their 
office. Never seen their staff either, never seen their work, we just 
know that it is an international organization. And when you get there, 
all is closed to you, you can only go by invitation” —Soprop 
Another striking example of challenges due to a hierarchical ‘rank’ in partnerships was captured in an 
informant’s account of how the UN and INGOs engage with civil society in a two-day workshop 
(whereby local NGOs provide their opinions, perspectives, reflections, innovations and feedback on 
current or future projects), but do so with their own strategic agendas in mind and undervalue the 
perspectives of civil society groups: 
“So while you think and reflect during a workshop, they have their own 
agenda behind all of it. The agenda is this: your thoughts and all that you 
are sharing are what allows them to do their project, but when they 
prepare it, they will indicate that they prepared the project without any 
help, denying your involvement…They feel they don’t owe it to you, 
because when you came to the meeting, they fed you and reimbursed you 
for your transport.” —Soprop 
 It was discussed that working in partnership with the UN can be challenging at times for local 
NGOs, as there is distrust between the UN and local NGOs, which ultimately undermines their 
effectiveness. For example:  
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“First when you start working with them, they will not show you the 
budgets for the project. Yet you are working on that project…they do not 
trust you and when there is no trust, you cannot manage or utilize human 
resources…So you have to act as a sub-contracted organizations yet it is 
you who has to do [the work].” —Soprop  
 
Finally, a particularly striking example was provided one organization, whose strategic choice of language 
clearly demonstrates a very concerning imperialistic tone to partnerships with UN bodies:  
“They can give you $10,000, but we may have a work volume of $100,000.  
Indeed they receive a great deal of money but they will give you the crumbs 
to do all of the work for them.  You see…it is just like colonization…and 
sometimes it is not easy to endure” —Soprop (emphasis added) 
H) Verification  
 Verification, a UN-standardized process required for inclusion in the MRM database, proved to 
be an additional challenge undermining the effectiveness of the MRM and whether it can truly portray an 
accurate depiction of on-the-ground reality. Verifying reported allegations of grave violations against 
children is a requirement for multiple reasons including, as one informant notes, that “those affected by 
conflict may be PTSD affected and may have a changed perception of reality” (UNICEF) and are 
therefore not a consistently reliable source. An additional justification for verification provided that “there 
are a lot of NGOs [and] they are not all very professional…so the information that they give us, you 
always have to be really careful and to double check” (MONUSCO). Verifying allegations of an incident 
requires “at least three sources with high level witnesses” (UNICEF) or as a MONUSCO staff puts it: “we 
follow a very straight methodology and we need to have a certain number of reliable sources. We need to 
be able to go to the field to check, to verify the information that we receive.”  One organization remarked 
how few incidents of grave violations actually reach the Special Representative on Children and Armed 
Conflict as only verified allegations are included in the MRM and challenges remain with the verification 
process, adding how this is especially problematic for the grave violation of attacks on schools: 
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“We report to the Special Representative on Children and Armed 
Conflict, but alerts are not reported unless there is a big massacre that 
has been verified. This is a big challenge, as only verified cases go up 
to the Special Representative. This is a challenge for all six grave 
violations, but this is especially problematic for attacks on schools 
because very few cases get verified.” —UNICEF 
 Verification demands additional technical resources and human capital, which becomes 
particularly challenging in an already limited resource setting. One informant comments on this constraint 
in verifying allegations by stating that they “receive many many alerts, and there are not enough people to 
verify [them all]. For example, in Katanga, there are only two MONUSCO Child Protection Staff” 
(UNICEF). Other organizations note additional challenges, overlapping with other themes such as access 
and security in verifying allegations: 
“it can be really tricky to confirm the information. We always have a 
lot of allegations and then when we go to the field [to verify], the 
victims are afraid to speak or we cannot go, we cannot access where 
they are because there is a conflict going on…because of security 
reasons” —MONUSCO 
ii. Limited Resources 
 Without a doubt the largest challenge of all, so large it warrants its own dedication thematic 
section, was the challenge of limited resources. Across the board, nearly all informants experienced 
particularly onerous resource constraints that challenged their ability to effectively monitor, report and 
respond to grave violations committed against children. ‘Limited resources’ pertained to a combination of 
financial, human and technical resources, however the particular amalgamation of these different types of 
resource constraints differed across organizations. It was expressed by UNICEF that there is the least 
funding made available for the grave violation of attacks on schools.  
 It was expressed by UNICEF, the Co-chair of the CTFMR, that as the UN does not allocate any 
funding specifically for the MRM, “it’s a challenge for all [members] to have enough resources to 
dedicate to the MRM.” In some cases, this challenge eclipsed an organization’s ability to actively 
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participate in the MRM task force; for example, Save the Children, experienced major cutbacks in child 
protection funding320 and as a result, their involvement was reported to be especially limited. It was 
reported that cutbacks in child protection funding were persistent across the board as child protection is 
“not something that’s really tangible. Donors like funding health services and education because you can 
say X amount of children have gone to school with this funding or X amount of children have received 
vaccinations from a health care project. For Save the Children, child protection is really the umbrella. 
Children are protected if they have access to health and education services, if they're living in safe 
environments, protected by their families and their communities. But that’s more difficult to measure” 
(Save the Children, emphasis added). Although Save the Children is a task force member, and one of two 
of the only NGOs (albeit both international NGOs) to sit on the MRM board, due to these financial 
cutbacks they reported that: 
“We aren’t working specifically on the MRM or with children 
associated with armed conflict in the DRC at this time, simply because 
we just don’t have the funding for projects that are focusing on this 
area” —Save the Children 
 Financial constraints limit an organization’s ability to provide adequate resources and deliver 
effective services to victims and partners. Naturally, this particular resource constraint overlaps with 
poverty, leaving impoverished victims unable to afford fees like transport fares for the police to arrest a 
perpetrator, thereby hindering the likelihood for victims to report violations experienced. For example: 
“So in the state of poverty that most of these victims live in, it’s just 
impossible for them to sustain that cost. Some of them really want to 
pursue them, to take them to court, they want justice to be done, but 
without means they can’t” —Afia Mama 
 With local organizations that assist victims severely underfunded, the implementation of the 
MRM and the response it hopes to generate are gravely undermined. This is captured in the following 
sentiment: “We are willing to do things but we do not have the means or resources” (Soprop) and as a 
                                                 
320 It was noted by an informant at Save the Children that one reason behind the cutbacks is that USAID, 
which funded a large proportion of their projects, has recently undergone a process of sequestration. 
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result, most local organizations heavily rely on their employees own savings. This is especially 
challenging for new organizations which are not able to yield sustainable funding by virtue of being 
newly established and not having yet managed a track record of fiscal probity. Some noted that this 
challenge for local organizations can be particularly difficult in a ‘top-down’ partnership with 
international organizations, such that “they offer help models but they do not offer useful help or financial 
help to do such a project or strategy” (Soprop). This acts as a form of imperialism as was stated above 
(i.e. in (G) of Challenges). However, limited financial resources was a challenge similarly expressed as 
being experienced at the state level; several informants recalled that there is simply not an adequate 
budgetary allocation to state institutions and public infrastructure that are responsible for responding to 
victims needs and reported cases.  
 With regards to human resources and staff presence, MRM Task Force members receive many 
alerts (i.e. reported allegations of a case) but there are not enough individuals available to verify the 
reports. It was reported that for example, in the province of Katanga, there were only two MONUSCO 
Child Protection Advisors to verify all the allegations for their inclusion in the MRM. This intersection 
with verification is “especially problematic for attacks on schools because very few cases get verified. 
This is a result of lack of resources, especially with regards to staff presence” (UNICEF). Another 
organization involved in providing legal assistance specifically to children demonstrates how this 
challenge undermines impact:  
“We cannot follow all the reports so we have to choose. However we 
would like to extend our intervention to many more children but for 
now it really is impossible. For example as I was telling you, we only 
have one lawyer who takes responsibility for these cases. We would 
like to have many lawyers so they can cover more cases”  
—Ordre des Avocats 
 Overlapping with the expansiveness of the DRC, limited human resources are stretched thin, as 
one informant stated; “they are just one or two people who are supposed to cover the whole province and 
then they don't have the car or the money or the facility to be able to do the work properly. So ideally, we 
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would need a lot more people and facilities to cover, because the DRC is such a big country” 
(MONUSCO-JHRO). Limited human resources are further challenged by high rates of staff turnover, 
which undermine consistency in implementation and awareness of context and persisting challenges. The 
impact of this challenge is simple, and was aptly put by one informant: “You need to have more people so 
the impact can be greater” (Afia Mama).  
 Lastly, several organizations attested to deficits in technical resources or highlighted the need for 
greater technical support. It was reported that technical limitations are further reinforced in the field. 
Additionally, some informants emphasized the need for staff and volunteers to be trained with specific 
skills, such as psychological counselling or psychosocial support to victims, as well as technical skills for 
documentation, analysis and reporting. One informant expressed the technical challenges involved in 
reporting grave violations against children and making these reports public, to be utilized to inform policy 
and programmatic response: “Because of our means, making a public report would be hard as you first 
have to produce the report, verify its quality and bring it to the media. We do not have the means to do so 
currently” (Ordre des Avocats). 
iii. Partnerships: 
 Interestingly, the theme of ‘partnerships’ was characterized by both challenges to, and 
opportunities for, the implementation of the MRM and its ability to inform programmatic response. With 
the six grave violations each intersecting different domains of child protection, the MRM and linking it to 
response demands a significant amount and a wide array of partnerships at multiple levels. However, in 
speaking with MRM task force members, which almost exclusively includes UN bodies (with the 
exception of two international NGOs that are both inactive), it became clear that local NGOs are not 
formal partners yet informally assist with providing information on alerts and responding locally to 
victims needs in the provision of supportive services.  
“For all victims we usually try to refer them to NGOs. Because part of 
the NGOs that are our partners, some of them have medical 
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clinics…or if they need legal assistance some NGOs can do this as 
well. We have a list of NGOs that we can [refer] them”       
—MONUSCO-JHRO 
 Despite the ‘vacuum’ of local contextualized expertise in the in-country Task Force, members 
urge that partnerships are absolutely vital towards the implementation of the MRM, especially in hard-to-
reach or inaccessible areas where there is no UN physical presence. One informant asserted that: “Yeah 
we totally rely on them [i.e. NGOs] to collect information. They always send us the raw information and 
then we verify the information. And I know that every field office has their group of NGOs that they meet 
regularly with and that’s how you get the information” (MONUSCO-JHRO). A pivotal partnership was 
expressed between MRM task force members and local NGOs that offer medical, legal or psychosocial 
support and are partners in a referral capacity. 
 However, several challenges at various levels existed in enabling and sustaining partnerships. 
Some informants expressed concerns over the safety of local NGOs collecting information on violations 
in conflict zones, as task force members are unable to protect them from the risks that might ensue. As 
was expressed in section (G) of ‘challenges,’ partnerships across different organization types (i.e. UN 
bodies, International NGOs and local NGOs) are often uneven, frequently approximating a hierarchical 
top-down ‘colonial’ approach. For example, one informant attested that “the rapport between the 
international and national organizations, there are always gaps and distances” (Soprop). This underscores 
another example previously cited, but is reiterated here as it truly captures the unevenness of partnerships 
between local NGOs and INGOs or the UN: 
“They will indicate they prepared the project without any help, 
denying your involvement…They feel that they don’t owe it to you, 
because when you came to the meeting, they fed you, [and] once done 
eating they reimbursed you for the transport.”—Soprop 
 Several local NGOs mentioned how UN or INGO partners remain enclaved in their thematic 
‘drawers,’ rigidly stuck to their own agenda’s lacking the flexibility to truly work in concerted partnership 
with local NGOs. Other local NGOs described experiences of inferiority, such as the following example: 
 104 
  
“The cooperation in reality…*sighs*…it is vey complicated. First 
when you start working with them, they will not show you the budgets 
for the project. Yet you are working on that project. Second, if they 
show you the budgets, they do not trust you.” —Soprop 
Other examples highlight the gap between ‘partnership on paper’ and partnership in practice: 
“It is rare that there are organizations that help the civil society 
organizations and their structure to advance themselves and their 
work…The international organizations, we know what they are but we 
have never seen their office. Never seen their staff either, never seen 
their work, we just know that it is an international organization. And 
when you get there, all is closed to you, you can only go by 
invitation”—Soprop 
Another challenge experienced in partnerships included maintaining independence and impartiality. This 
was especially problematic when organizations worked in partnership with police, military or government 
personnel, as corruption and conflicts of interest frequently occurred among these positions. From a Task 
Force member’s perspective, another challenge with partnerships was the lack of professionalism and 
sophistication among some local NGOs: 
“Here in Kinshasa the issue is that there are a lot of NGOs, they are 
not all very professional, so the information that they give us, you 
always have to be really careful and to double check. There is also a 
lot of competition among them, which could be really 
counterproductive for us…It’s difficult to know which NGO to use.” 
—MONUSCO-JHRO 
iv. Accountability: 
 Another emerging theme that became evident through data analysis was ‘accountability.’ 
Although accountability is a complex term to define, this theme persisted across a majority of interview 
sources with divergences in how the concept was used and understood. Some discussed accountability in 
terms of ‘responsibility,’ for example:  
“The Top Chairman, the UN SRSG of the DPKO Mission, is the 
highest level accountable and at the technical level it is the 
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responsibility of the protection section of UNICEF…UNICEF’s 
responsibility is stated in the resolution [i.e. UNSC Resolution 1612], 
so they are accountable for it and share it with the DPKO.”  
—UNICEF  
This held true with regards to what the government is responsible for implementing, such as human rights 
and taking action on violations and protection concerns, as well as what organizations were responsible 
for implementing, as defined in their mandate. Accountability as a form of responsibility was also 
discussed in terms of a ‘chain of command,’ whereby organizations were responsible to report to those 
higher up on the chain. For example, MONUSCO (JHRO) in discussing their mandate explained that: 
“our mandate is to monitor and report on the human rights situation in the whole country. So we are a 
joint office which means that we report to New York to the DPKO, so we are part of MONUSCO, but we 
are also part of Geneva, to the High Commission of Human Rights.” A conceptualization of 
accountability in terms of holding perpetrators accountable for their actions was clearly articulated by one 
informant as the purpose of the establishment of the MRM: “The MRM holds parties to the conflict who 
are responsible for committing grave violations against children accountable”  (MONUSCO-CPA). 
 At other times, informants discussed ideas of accountability, without an explicit mention of the 
term, such as not being answerable to those ‘below’ them in the chain of command (ie local organizations 
that conduct the monitoring in hard to access areas and report back to MRM task force members). For 
example, in UNICEF’s partnerships, local NGOs provide alerts but don’t receive any feedback or 
information on the results. Accountability as answerability to partners lower on the chain of command 
also emerged in reference to reviewing reports received from partners and providing feedback on how to 
improve their reporting. Sometimes, accountability to those higher up that an organization must report to 
was done blindly, without a real dialogue occurring. This is captured in the following statement regarding 
why the MRM in the DRC is more heavily focusing on the grave violation of sexual violence: “It’s 
something that comes from New York and we have to implement it” (MONUSCO-JHRO). Challenges 
with accountability (in terms of answerability) to local NGO partners was evidenced in the case of 
workshops, meetings or consultations, where local NGOs provided their input, reflections and 
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experiences on the ground to UN groups and International NGOs, but were not granted any credit in the 
final product for their involvement. Another example of accountability in terms of ‘answerability’ is as 
follows: “they remain enclaved in their thematic ‘drawers’ even when you come across them, they leave. 
Hello? Hello? They do not reply…everyone stays in their field” (Soprop), 
 Unfortunately, at the ‘lowest rung’ of the chain of command of answerability rests the victims 
and beneficiaries of support services. A few informants expressed concern of a lack of a mechanism in 
their organization to be effectively answerable to victims. One provided the following example: “We 
came back to the office to make our report, while at the time when we left some victims died over there as 
we offered no solution” (MONUSCO). In some instances, accountability conceptualized as answerability 
intersected with accountability as responsibility, such that informants highlighted the challenge that there 
was no follow-up mechanism to monitor whether there was “responsibility at the government level” for 
taking effective action or whether the government was meeting its obligations, with one informant 
asserting that: “if they do not have to answer to anyone, they can do what ever they want” (Soprop).  
Beyond the conceptualization of accountability, either as responsibility or answerability to those above 
and below in the ‘chain of command,’ in examining accountability in practice, a thematic bifurcation 
emerged between a perpetrator-focused approach to accountability and a victim-focused approach to 
accountability. In data analysis, two subcategories were created under ‘accountability,’ with themes 
centring on ‘impunity’ and the ‘ICC’ falling under ‘perpetrator-focused accountability’ and themes 
centring on ‘empowerment’ and ‘referral mechanisms’ under ‘victim-focused accountability.’  
A) Perpetrator-Focused Accountability 
 One form of accountability that was frequently discussed by informants was focused on the 
perpetrators of grave violations. In this approach the emphasis was more on holding perpetrators to 
account for the grave violations they committed rather than focusing on being accountable to those that 
had their rights violated. This method centred on engaging with parties or perpetrators listed for 
committing one or more grave violations against children as a means of halting or preventing these 
violations: “MONUSCO also advocates with parties to the conflict to vacate schools and stop the military 
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use of schools and prevent attacks against schools” (MONUSCO-CPA). Often, this approach to 
accountability resulted in a focus on punitive actions taken against perpetrators. For example: 
“Thanks to a closer collaboration between the OSRSG-CAAC and the 
Sanctions Committee, parties to the conflict and individuals who 
commit grave violations may be subjected to targeted and graduated 
measures, such as travel bans, assets freeze etc.” —MONUSCO-CPA 
 This approach to accountability focusing on perpetrators often assumed a legalistic-tone, 
emphasizing a legal or penal approach to justice. For example, many sources discussed the use of local 
legal procedures to foster accountability of perpetrators who commit violations against children, while 
others mentioned the use of international justice and the Rome Statute. For example, one organization 
was engaged with the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its proceedings on Germain Katanga in his 
trial for international crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
 Overwhelmingly, informants that utilized the perpetrator-focused approach to accountability in 
discussion emphasized the “fight against impunity” (UNICEF), as several cases go unreported or 
unresolved due to corruption, immunity regimes and conflicts of interest that exist in the legal system, as 
highlighted above in ‘challenges.’ This was especially prevalent for perpetrators that comprise the police 
force, military or judiciary as previously noted. Impunity with respect to action against perpetrators was 
stressed as a major problem by many, with one informant articulating in her recommendations that: “We 
would like them to be able to help our country to bring an end to impunity. That is really a big problem. 
We have a lot of impunity that still exists in our country” (World Vision). 
B) Victim-Focused Accountability 
 Alternatively, others emphasized an approach to accountability that focused more on victims. 
This either took the form of empowerment, capacity-strengthening, or tangible remedial support (medical, 
legal and psychosocial) offered to victims and their families.  
Several organizations, particularly local NGOs, incorporated themes of empowerment into their 
programming and for others, empowerment served more as an attitude or lens through which they 
envision the children they aim to serve, asserting that: “each child has his story, each child has a life 
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story” (Soprop). In terms of programming, one organization, which focused on the rights of the ‘girl 
child,’ conducted several programs that tried to better understand the social and economic environment of 
young women to foster female entrepreneurship, explaining how this serves as a potent mechanism of 
protection: 
“We know we can talk about women’s rights all day, but at the end of 
the day if they can’t sustain themselves, it will just be a cycle because 
they will still need men to take care of them. And when men give, 
they demand whatever and they victimize them again. So we try to 
refer them or reinforce their economic power, so at least they can 
sustain themselves with their basic needs. This is also another 
mechanism of protection.” —Afia Mama 
 Another form of victim-focused accountability took on the form of capacity-strengthening. This 
either entailed strengthening resilience in children, or strengthening capacities within the community and 
civil society to better serve children who’ve experienced grave violations. Overwhelmingly, capacity-
strengthening was most discussed in the context of social assistants or case workers, who are at present 
not adequately trained in supporting child victims. In terms of fostering resilience in children, several 
organizations mentioned the use of special clubs or programs that try to build capacities in children to 
monitor and report themselves on the violations they experience and come up with potential solutions. 
For example: 
“We select a ten member committee, and that committee does the 
monitoring of the difficulties the children encounter…and when they 
meet, they propose solutions. We share responsibilities and sometimes 
we have to intervene with a ‘thing’, an instrument, to fix the 
difficulties the children experience…We are training them to be the 
advocates and agents of their own path.” (emphasis added) —Soprop  
Capacity-strengthening among children may also take the form of human rights education in classrooms, 
as well as by producing ‘pictographics’ (i.e. info-graphics predominately using pictures and symbols) 
with minimal use of written text to overcome the pervasive challenges of illiteracy and out-of-school 
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youth. Other organizations emphasized efforts to maximize the victims’ autonomy by taking greater 
responsibility of their own lives.  
 Lastly, nearly all organizations interviewed discussed the accountability to victims in the form of 
medical, legal or psychosocial support, either in a referral or provider capacity. For medical support, 
organizations partnered with health centres that conduct the necessary procedures for victims of sexual 
violence, both in collecting evidence to convict their perpetrators and in providing medical assistance in 
recovery. For legal support, one organization offered the assistance with the legal procedures themselves, 
while others worked in a referral capacity with legal clinics. For psychosocial support, organizations 
encouraged the use of counsellors and psychologists especially in schools, however, most commented on 
how counsellors with adequate training were so few in number and not readily available in the DRC. For 
example: “There are psychologists that are not too trained for this. That represents a challenge. They are 
not too trained to talk to children. The child is traumatized and blocks the information. So they need to be 
trained and reinforced” (World Vision). 
 Other organizations tried indirect methods to promote a space of psyschosocial support, such as 
children’s clubs, which help civilly engage children in a way that: “encourage[s] them to advocate for 
their rights…to raise awareness on child protection issues and on child rights” (Save the Children). 
Additional psychosocial support included peer mentorship programs, group therapy (through dance and 
play), and child friendly spaces which help restore a sense of normalcy through routine recreational 
activities, as arguably “the biggest negative impact on psychology is the upheaval of normal activities” 
(Save the Children) which typically occurs in conflict settings.  
 Another form of support that was mentioned by some informants was financial support in the 
form of reparations or as one put it, “an indemnity fund” as a form of security or assurance to the victim 
and his/her family by a public power. With regards to the provision of all these various forms of support 




 Queries were performed using Nvivo in data analysis to produce cross-matrices of themes in 
order to examine the overlap and intersection between various themes, or how themes were expressed 
across organizations or organization types. The first query run examined the theme ‘challenges,’ which 
emerged in all sources and was coded 234 times, making it by far the theme with the highest number of 
references. A matrix was produced analyzing which themes overlapped with challenges and were then 
ranked in order to determine the most pressing challenges with the MRM and monitoring and reporting, 
as experienced and expressed by informants. The second matrix produced by Nvivo examined the 
differing weight of emerging themes across organization ‘types’ (i.e. UN, INGO, local NGO) in order to 
compare and contrast what themes were most relevant across organizations. This was further supported 
by a cluster analysis that was conducted both by word similarity and by themes, which demonstrated that 
in fact organizations typically clustered around other organizations of the same type. Ultimately, these 
two queries illustrate that experiences and challenges with the MRM, monitoring and reporting, and 
responding to grave violations against children varied according to organization type. The last significant 
relationship to emerge in data analysis is demonstrated by a simple quantitative comparison between the 
number of references in interview content to ‘attacks on schools’ versus the other five grave violations, 
evidencing a clear under-prioritization of attacks on schools, potentially as a result of a mandated over-
emphasis on sexual violence and child recruitment.  
A)  Matrix I—Challenges x Themes (Ranked): 
 Interview content regarding obstacles experienced by organizations with monitoring and 
reporting grave violations against children was coded separately as both ‘challenges’ and also as specific 
emerging themes (e.g. ‘limited resources,’ ‘awareness,’ ‘partnerships’) as described in the thematic 
analysis above. A query was run to analyze the overlap between ‘challenges’ and these emerging themes, 
producing a matrix to demonstrate which themes were discussed by informants as a significant challenge 
in monitoring and reporting. Themes overlapping with ‘challenges’ were then ranked in order to exhibit 
which particular challenges were most frequently mentioned. This matrix facilitated both identifying 
existing challenges as well as highlighting the most pressing barriers that warrant attention and resource 
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investment for further improvement of the MRM and monitoring and reporting violations against children 
in conflict settings more generally.  
 ‘Limited resources’ (i.e. financial, technical and human resources) was by far the most recurring 
challenge across all interview sources, referenced as a ‘challenge’ by informants 67 times. ‘Awareness’ 
of laws and policies on child protection or on the existence of attacks on schools was the next greatest 
challenge among informants. Various challenges occurred in engaging in partnerships between various 
organizational types to monitor and report grave violations against children and/or in partnering with 
organizations for referral mechanisms for victims.  It should be noted that the theme labeled ‘other 1612 
violations (sexual violence and child recruitment)’ was coded as a ‘challenge’ because these other grave 
violations were over-prioritized, thereby challenging the effectiveness of the MRM with reference to 
attacks on schools. It is important for this point to be clarified so that it is not misunderstood that ‘other 
1612 violations’ (i.e. not attacks on schools) are bigger challenges for child protection warranting greater 
attention and resource investment. The fifth most pressing challenge was regarding accountability to 
victims of grave violations and holding perpetrators who are responsible for committing grave violations 
against children accountable. Table 3.2 represents a visual representation of the ranking of themes when 







Table 3.2: Ranked Challenges 
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In order to better understand which themes were most discussed across different types of organizations 
(i.e. UN, local NGO, International NGO), a query was run in data analysis to produce a matrix of 
emerging themes (according to their frequency of occurrence in interviews) and organization type. As 
there were different sample sizes for each organization type (i.e. 5 UN participants, 4 Local NGOs, and 2 
International NGOs), a column was added to each type to produce a weighted score (i.e. frequency of 
occurrence of a theme divided by the number of informants of that organization type), so that 
comparisons could be made across groups.  
For a full summary of this matrix, please see Table 3.3 on the following page. It should be noted that 
while this matrix is helpful in producing a quick ‘snapshot’ of apparent content differences across 
organization type, the sample sizes of all three organizational types were small which consequentially 
leaves significant room for error due to possible outliers as participants. The most interesting 
discrepancies across organization type were as follows: 
• Challenges was consistently high among all groups, however was least frequently emphasized by 
UN groups; 
• Accountability was uniformly high, however, accountability was most discussed by local NGOs; 
• Similarly, limited resources was frequently mentioned by all, but was least often discussed by UN 
groups.  
• Dovetailing with the preceding point on accountability, empowerment was least discussed by UN 
groups; 
• Attacks on schools, although remarkably low across organization type, was most frequently 
discussed by UN groups; 
• Surprisingly, there was a large disparity in use of human rights language across groups, with more 
than a five-fold increase in frequency of use in interviews with local NGOs; 
• Compared to local NGOs and International NGOs who discussed Congolese laws and policies on 
child protection quite frequently, UN groups did not discuss this at all;  
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• Discussion of the Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism itself was notably absent (nearly zero) 
among local NGOs; 
• However, the action of monitoring and reporting was most frequently discussed by local NGOs 
and International NGOs, while minimally articulated by UN groups; 
• Advocacy was highlighted as an important attribute in the topic of monitoring and reporting grave 





Table 3.3: Challenges by Organization Type 
  



















1 : Access 15 3 14 3.5 13 6.5 
2 : Accountability 33 6.6 41 10.25 17 8.5 
3 : Awareness 19 3.8 28 7 18 9 
4 : Challenges 89 17.8 81 20.25 59 29.5 
5 : Children 2 0.4 32 8 11 5.5 
6 : Age 0 0 7 1.75 0 0 
7 : Child Marriage 0 0 7 1.75 0 0 
9 : Corruption-
Conflicts of Interest 
5 1 17 4.25 3 
1.5 
10 : Education 13 2.6 10 2.5 2 1 
11 : Attacks on 
schools 
26 5.2 3 0.75 9 
4.5 
12 : Military 
occupation of 
schools 
11 2.2 4 1 2 
1 
13 : Empowerment 4 0.8 12 3 15 7.5 
14 : Ethical 
Concerns 
25 5 9 3.25 9 
4.5 
15 : Examples 11 2.2 33 8.25 6 3 
16 : Expansiveness 
of the Country 
8 1.6 12 3 6 
3 
17 : False 
Expectations 
6 1.2 4 1 6 
3 
18 : Financial 
Support 





23 4.6 26 6.5 9 
4.5 
20 : Human Rights 7 1.4 29 7.25 1 0.5 
21 : Humanitarian 
Principles 




22 : ICC 1 0.2 4 1 0 0 
23 : Language 2 0.4 1 0.25 3 1.5 
24 : Laws/Policies/ 
Resolutions 
0 0 29 7.25 12 
6 
25 : Limited 
Resources 
30 6 36 9 22 
11 
26 : MRM/MRM 
Country Taskforce 
21 4.2 3 0.75 25 
12.5 
27 : Action Plan 3 0.6 2 0.5 2 1 








10 2 8 2 6 
3 




of Grave Violations 
22 4.4 2 0.5 2 
1 
33 : Other 1612 
Violations (Sex. 
violence and child 
recruitment) 
22 4.4 21 5.25 35 
17.5 
34 : Partnerships 48 9.6 39 9.75 26 13 
35 : 
Recommendations 
13 2.6 22 5.5 11 
5.5 
36 : Referral 
Mechanisms 





31 6.2 14 3.5 5 
2.5 
38 : Sensitization 
/Advocacy 
9 1.8 42 10.5 8 
4 
39 : Stigma 0 0 3 0.75 1 0.5 
40 : Training 17 3.4 22 5.5 14 7 
41 : 'UN Elitism'/ 
Western 
Imperialism 




42 : Verification 18 3.6 8 2 2 1 






Matrix III: Attacks on Schools x Other 1612 Grave Violations 
 Lastly, an interesting relationship emerged when comparing the number of references, or 
frequency of occurrence in discussion with informants, between the grave violation of attacks on schools 
and other grave violations listed in Security Council Resolution 1612. In data analysis, content discussing 
rape, sexual violence or the recruitment of children by armed forces was coded as ‘other 1612 violations’ 
and content discussing the grave violation of attacks on schools were coded separately as ‘attacks on 
schools.’ Separating the grave violations into two groups enabled a comparison to be conducted in their 
emphasis in discussion.  
 Interestingly, despite the fact that interview informants were each prompted to discuss attacks on 
schools in the DRC, both by specific interview questions in the interview guide as well as by the general 
introduction on the researcher and the research project, attacks on schools achieved a lower frequency 
(i.e. 38 references) of occurrence in discussion (indicated by the number of references coded) than ‘other 
1612 violations’ (i.e. 78 references) (that were not prompted by the researcher or by interview questions). 
It should be noted that ‘other 1612 violations’ predominantly included sexual violence and the 
recruitment of children by armed forces. Below is a frequency table (i.e “Table 3.4: Attacks on Schools 
vs. Other 1612 Violations” outlining this finding.  
Table 3.4: Comparative 
Under-Prioritization of 










C. Objective III: Recommendations 
 Research participants were prompted as part of the interview guide to reflect on possible 
recommendations, either general or specific, at various levels of implementation to address some of the 
challenges they brought forward during interview discussion. However, in addition, several informants 
discussed recommendations or the need for improvement in key areas at various points throughout the 
interview unprompted. In data analysis using Nvivo software, recommendations were coded as such, with 
significant overlap in other thematic areas. The thematic groupings of recommendations are as follows: 
A) Sensitization and Advocacy: A majority of participants expressed the need for greater sensitization 
and advocacy, particularly to encourage greater awareness of existing laws and policies concerning 
the protection of children and their rights. A significant portion of the recommendations on this topic 
were aimed at higher levels, urging that sensitization extend to public agents and political powers, as 
well as those at higher levels of the police and military. Ultimately, greater vulgarization of the laws 
is urgently needed in order for laws to be applied and implemented, as well as serve as a deterrent for 
violations. 
• By far the biggest need expressed was the need for stronger dissemination and vulgarization of 
the child protection law, Law 009. It was expressed that this will “give strength to the law…as 
people do not even know there are many laws to their advantage” (World Vision). There is 
significant need to raise greater awareness of the existence of the law, especially in rural areas 
and areas where there are rebel groups and insurrectional movements. 
• Specifically, some informants mentioned the need for dissemination and sensitization efforts be 
conducted in multiple languages, as at present they are mostly done in French despite the 
existence of at least five official languages. 
• Some informants suggested the need for greater awareness of the human rights violations that 
are continuing to occur against children. In particular, greater advocacy is needed on the 
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occurrence of attacks on schools and the military use of schools and how this grave violation 
impacts children, as well as the sustainable peace, justice, security and development of the 
nation. It was highlighted that while some NGOs are deeply engaged with advocacy on this 
issue, there is a need for a specific call from the government and for the government to better 
mobilize on taking proactive action on this issue. This recommendation was concurrent with 
the recognition of a need to change priorities, as “peace, security and education are all 
connected” and “education is key to building peace” (UNICEF).  
• A need was identified by some for greater sensitization at all levels (public agents, private 
agents, grassroots agents and individuals) on the human rights conventions, especially those 
that have ratified or signed by the DRC.  
• Linked with the above concerns, it was recommended that there be a system of information-
sharing made public to organizations, while protecting the identities of victims and 
perpetrators. This may assist with the challenge of the expansiveness of the country and the 
facilitation of coordination and partnership in organizations in disconnected and inaccessible 
areas of the country, especially in rural areas where traditional practices are more prevalent.  
• A specific proposal was offered by one informant to have a denunciation unit within the 
university that is partnered with a TV or radio station. This could facilitate greater awareness of 
the existence of violations occurring within and outside the school. It could also help ensure 
greater accountability in holding perpetrators responsible.  
• One informant provided that there is a need for a Parliament for Children as a specific 
accompanying measure; it was noted that this organization is currently in the process of an 
impending research project examining the accompanying measures of Law 009.  
B) Training: Intricately linked with the need for greater sensitization, was the need for better training of 
individuals and organizations at multiple levels. This frequently included varying levels  of public 
agents and officials, such as within government, the judiciary, the police, the military and armed 
groups, as these agents are the ones responsible for guaranteeing the laws are [in place and followed.] 
 122 
  
In addition, it was expressed that training needs to engage with traditional leaders so that “they can 
stop traditional practices that are not in conformity with our laws” (e.g. Law 009). 
C) Greater Access to Services for Victims: Multiple informants highlighted the inaccessibility to key 
services and resources that are needed by victims of grave violations. The additional costs that the 
families of victims must accrue are particularly burdensome when coupled with the high incidence of 
poverty.  
• It was recommended that there be greater investment of state resources to ensure that access to 
both the state institutions of the justice and health system be free for all victims. This includes 
the elimination of fees for police transport fares to arrest perpetrators  
• It was also suggested that there be more children's tribunals that are less centralized so that they 
can be accessible throughout the country, not just to those within proximity of the capital city. 
It was also proposed that all these courts be linked, as children may be transported to another 
area or juggled between the adult and juvenile justice systems, with information shared on an 
encrypted database so that full records of a child’s file can be easily entered and shared 
between courts across the country.  
D) Financial Support: Adequate financial support is a necessary prerequisite to implement almost all of 
the aforementioned recommendations, as they require resource investment of one form or another. It 
was evidenced through field research that the MRM, as well as other monitoring and reporting efforts 
documenting grave violations of children’s rights, does not receive any designated funding for the 
Mechanisms’ implementation. This was identified as a major concern and significant issue for 
effective action, and was similarly identified by all informants as an area much in need of further 
support. 
• As a means of assisting with and implementing the preceding recommendation, it was urged by 
many that there be greater financial support to local organizations and civil society members 
that do the bulk of the monitoring and reporting on the ground in difficult to access areas  
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• It was recommended that greater financial support be provided for organizations that work in a 
referral capacity with monitoring and reporting efforts to better support the beneficiaries of 
their services.  
• In addition, it was expressed that there is a need for adequate budget resources to be allocated 
to state institutions that work on child protection and children’s rights. 
• Specifically, it was proposed by one informant that an indemnity fund be set up by a public 
power for victims whose rights were violated. This can help ensure that victims and their 
families receive adequate security and assistance that can assure them sustainable reintegration 
and recovery and compensate with reparations for any financial losses incurred.  
• Another specific proposal that was recommended was that rewards or some form of 
compensation be offered for good examples, not as a form of corruption but to serve as positive 
models that may stimulate others to do better. 
• It was expressed that financial support was needed to hire additional staff to help ease the 
burden of overworked staff and understaffed missions, which are both exacerbated by the 
expansiveness of the country. This could ensure that there is a staff presence in small villages 
in rural areas, which are frequently underserved by monitoring and reporting efforts.  
• Some informants also recommended that there be greater financial support in order to improve 




Chapter 4: Discussion 
A. The Under-Prioritization of Attacks on Schools  
 While Security Council Resolution 1612 in theory emphasizes all six of the grave violations 
against children, in practice, efforts have predominately narrowly focused on the recruitment of children 
by armed forces since the Resolution’s onset. This is reflected in the slow expansion of the triggers listed 
in the Security Council’s Annexes. Initially, only child recruitment was a trigger for parties to a conflict 
to be listed, and it wasn’t until 2009 for sexual violence and killing and maiming to be added as triggers. 
Finally in 2011, several years after the establishment of the MRM, attacks on schools was added as a 
trigger. However, several studies that have evaluated the impact of the MRM in multiple country 
situations have noted that the same grave violations are continuing to receive over-prioritization at the 
cost of the relegation of other violations, particularly attacks on schools. These findings were further 
reaffirmed, perhaps even demonstrating an exacerbated effect, by this study in the DRC context as 
observed in the thematic analysis and analysis of relationships. Although attacks on schools was a 
purposefully probed topic in the interview guide, the topic was very minimally discussed by key 
informants, often demonstrating a lack of awareness of the violation existing in the DRC entirely. As 
demonstrated in the relationships section of the results, attacks on schools, although remarkably low 
across organization type, was most frequently discussed by UN groups, as it is a more explicit part of 
their mandate to have a dedicated focus on all six grave violations.  
 Although the recruitment of children by armed forces is an especially widespread violation, it is 
not the exclusive child protection concern in most countries wracked by armed conflict. In fact, the UN 
Secretary-General’s Study on Violence against Children states that the threats and vulnerabilities that 
children are exposed to in conflict settings are complex and manifold, often taking many forms ranging 
from physical and sexual abuse, torture, neglect, displacement, loss of education, forced labor, early 
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marriage to other forms of exploitation.321 Despite this reality, it has been evidenced that child protection 
efforts have overwhelmingly adopted a more blinkered approach, concentrating on recruitment and 
demobilization of child soldiers with the “broader impacts of war on children…seen as secondary issues. 
Too often these violations go undocumented and unacknowledged.”322 The Jeffereys study, among others, 
notes that although the OSRSG—CAAC publicly acknowledges and denounces all six grave violations, it 
is clear that on the ground the “Security Council’s focus lags behind” on the other violations.323 
Additionally, the Security Council’s most recent Cross Cutting Report on Children and Armed Conflict 
(June 2015) declared that “little attention has been paid to getting parties involved in other violations, 
such as sexual violence, killing and maiming or attacks on schools and hospitals, to sign action plans.”324 
 Of the studies that have conducted a critical appraisal of the MRM, Jefferys study evaluating the 
effectiveness of the Security Council in protecting children in conflict settings highlights the over-
emphasis on child soldiers and identifies it as one of the key shortfalls in the MRM’s implementation.325 
Jefferys suggests that the grave violation of child recruitment is favoured by the Security Council as it can 
be responded to with public naming and shaming of recruiters and can be more easily monitored and 
progress towards remediation more readily measured through concrete, time-bound Action Plans.326 
Happold’s examination of the Security Council’s involvement and use of “soft power” in the protection of 
children in armed conflict also remarks that more attention has been paid to the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers at the time of writing in 2010, adding that “this concentration on one violation has been the 
subject of considerable criticism.”327 Barnett and Jeffreys’ survey emphasizes the uneven progress that 
results from narrowly focusing on but one of the grave violations, asserting that “unfortunately, there 
                                                 
321 UN General Assembly, Rights of the child: The UN Secretary General’s Study on Violence. August 29 
2006. A/61/299. 
322 Jefferys: Can the Powerful Protect?: 13. 
323 Ibid.: 13. 
324 Security Council, Cross Cutting Report on Children and Armed Conflict. June 2015: 3. 
325 Jefferys, Can the Powerful Protect? 
326 Ibid. 
327 Happold, Matthew. "Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: Harnessing the Security Council's “Soft 
Power”." Israel Law Review 43.02 (2010): 367. 
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appears to be little evidence that inter-agency monitoring and reporting for grave violations under the 
MRM has had a direct impact on reducing the incidence of grave violations other than recruitment by 
armed force and groups.”328 Ultimately, substantive progress in the protection of children cannot truly be 
made if upon disarmament and demobilization a former child soldier cannot return to school due to 
violence or continues to be exposed to other forms of exploitation such as sexual abuse and forced labor. 
Other studies support this last statement of exclusive progress with child soldiers, noting that Barnett and 
Jeffrey’s study reveals that while there been some progress in the release of children by parties to the 
conflict and determent of recruitment of child soldiers, the MRM has “not reduced incidence of the other 
five grave violations defined under resolution 1612.329  
 Although previous studies evaluating the impact of the MRM have addressed the disproportionate 
emphasis on the recruitment of child soldiers, there is a knowledge gap in the available literature on 
whether these trends have persisted once all six grave violations were added as MRM listing triggers in 
2011. Research findings from this study not only reaffirmed that the past findings continue to hold despite 
the addition of all grave violations as triggers, but also demonstrates that the trend of over-emphasis has 
shifted to primarily sexual violence instead of the previous emphasis on child soldiers. As one key 
informant, a CPA for MONUSCO on the MRM task force, explains, sexual violence now receives more 
attention internationally, as it is a “more ‘sexy’” topic within the contemporary discourse on humanitarian 
affairs and human rights, whereas child soldiers was the ‘hot topic’ of the past. Another informant 
confessed that; “I’ll be honest with you, I think it’s one of the big topics of the moment. It’s something 
that comes from New York, and we have to implement it” (MONUSCO-JHRO). Perceptions of sexual 
violence as globally ‘currently a hot button issue’ were echoed by multiple participants, with one 
informant from Save the Children identifying the over-prioritization of sexual violence and gender-based 
violence as a plausible explanation for the under-prioritization of attacks on schools and the other 
                                                 
328 Barnett and Jeffreys, Full of Promise: 19, supra note 27. 
329 Hodgson, Who’s Action Plan?: 171; Barnett and Jefferys, Full of Promise: 9.  
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‘forgotten’ grave violations: “I think because [sexual violence has] received so much donor attention in 
funding…in the DRC it’s really got a lot of international focus.” 
 The focus on these two particular violations, albeit shifting from child soldiers to sexual violence, 
is reflected in the Action Plan that was put in place in the DRC, which only includes efforts directed at 
these two violations. There is some merit however in this narrow approach, as several informants asserted 
that child recruitment has “seen the most improvement and milestones” (UNICEF) with many informants 
citing progress in sexual violence advancing as well. However, the inverse is easily observed in the other 
grave violations, with participants emphasizing a lack of progress, and indeed stagnation, particularly 
apparent with attacks on schools and the denial of humanitarian assistance.  
 There are several reasons for the relative under-prioritization of attacks on schools, but “neither 
prevalence nor severity are plausible justifications for prioritizing recruitment over other violations.”330 In 
discussing why the grave violation of attacks on schools is being under prioritized as part of the MRM 
agenda in the DRC with two UNICEF staff, a vigorous disagreement ensued between an informant from 
the education sector and the child protection sector. There was staff discord on whether the government’s 
inaction reflected a lack of knowledge or a lack of capacity and will. The child protection representative 
suggested that “with attacks on schools, I’m not sure everybody knows it’s so bad” as there is no clear 
directive from the government on the matter in addition to a general lack of awareness that it is indeed a 
grave violation to be monitored by the MRM. However, the education staff adamantly asserted that; 
“there are plenty of advocacy efforts for not occupying schools. While armed groups and soldiers are 
aware of this, it is the government and Ministries that don’t take it seriously that is the problem, or they 
are willing but they are stuck.” In further exploring the latter challenge, it was revealed that attacks on 
schools is gravely underreported in the MRM as a majority of reported allegations do not get verified, and 
consequentially do not get included in the regular reports. This was further confirmed by a MONUSCO 
JHRO staff who remarked during our interview in discussing attacks on schools how the last monthly 
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report received from those on the ground in the East was “the first time that they have something in 
contribution of that [i.e. attacks on schools]…that’s the first time that they had something about it in their 
reports.” Another staff actively working in the field on MRM reporting disclosed that “it is true however 
that the number of documented cases of recruitment and SV [i.e. sexual violence] are higher than cases of 
attacks against schools”331 (MONUSCO-CPA).   
 Despite the disagreement described above, both staff members agreed that there was a 
fundamental disjuncture between peace objectives and justice objectives within the government, with 
peace and security ultimately prioritized at the cost of justice. This disjuncture has ultimately undermined 
several organizations’ ability to focus on violations against children that relate to justice and child 
protection more generally, such as those that violate a child’s right to education. However, this 
conundrum does not necessarily require it to be a ’catch-22,’ as one informant explained “peace and 
security always comes first, but the MRM says that you can’t have peace without addressing all six grave 
violations. So it’s a about recognizing a need to change priorities…as peace, security and justice are all 
connected” (UNICEF). In recognizing the ‘two faces of education,’ participants added that “we need to 
recognize the impact of conflict on education” (UNICEF) and inversely, the impact of education on 
conflict or peace, and appreciate that education can profoundly impact a nation’s propensity for peace or 
war. Nonetheless, popular conception remains of the grave violation of attacks on schools as prioritizing 
the protection of buildings, rather than the physical protection of children and the protection of their 
rights; to many, “education is less perceived as a critical thing…like rape or child soldiers, but education 
is the future of the nation” (UNICEF), and is therefore a critical factor for future national progress and 
stabilization. In fact, attacks on schools are particularly worth of national attention, as “school attacks 
may amount to a war crime—hence it is a very serious violation” (MONUSCO-CPA).  
 Lastly, the under-prioritization of attacks on schools can similarly be observed in the referral 
mechanisms set up and services offered to victims of grave violations. Multiple informants highlighted 
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the pitfall that referral mechanisms currently exist for most other violations with the exception of attacks 
on schools and the denial of humanitarian assistance. As referral mechanisms are intricately connected 
with the MRM’s potential to be downwardly accountable to victims (as will be discussed in the following 
discussion point), this deficiency is a critical flaw in the overall effectiveness of the MRM. Due to the 
international appeal and the earmarking of donor funding for sexual violence, referral mechanisms in the 
DRC are largely biased in favour of providing legal, medical and psychosocial services geared toward 
victims of sexual violence, while support services are lacking for children affected by attacks on schools.  
 
B. The Lack of Accountability in the MRM: 
i. The MRM’s Overwhelmingly Upward and Perpetrator-Focused Approach to Accountability 
 While most individuals across multiple disciplines would undoubtedly agree that ‘accountability’ 
is a valuable asset to any organization or system, it is often less clear what this ‘buzzword’ really means 
in its application. In the complex realm of human rights and humanitarianism, accountability is an even 
more difficult web to disentangle, proving to be an incredibly challenging term to define, implement and 
measure. Despite these issues, ‘accountability’ is an increasingly valued term in humanitarian 
programming and service delivery.  
 Monitoring and reporting grave human rights violations can serve as important tools in ensuring 
accountability in contexts characterized by armed conflict. Monitoring and reporting can address 
accountability by using the information it collects to: 1) directly feed into an effective and rapid response 
system; 2) systematically analyze documented data to identify trends to better target future preventative 
and programmatic efforts, 3) produce a better understanding of how to orient and implement remedial 
efforts for victims of grave violations and the broader community, and finally 4) be used as a body of 
evidence for holding perpetrators legally accountable. However, the present in-depth analysis drawn from 
field research reveals that the MRM is effectively only designed to address ‘upward’ accountability to 
trustees, such as the United Nations (UN) and the Security Council (UNSC). Indeed, as was articulated in 
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the thematic analysis section of results, several informants who sit on the CTFMR conceptualized 
accountability as a form of responsibility that flows upward to other UN bodies and entities higher up on 
the chain of command (such as the Special Representative on Children and Armed Conflict, the 
Secretary-General, the Security Council and its Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict).  
 Analysis conducted through a review of the existing literature on the role of the Security Council 
in holding violators of children’s rights to account reveals that the UNSC, the Working Group and the 
MRM fail at providing accountability, even in its selected upward, perpetrator-focused penal approach. 
Examining the available toolkit of the UNSC for action, with a specific focus on sanctions (arguably the 
Council’s strongest and most effective resource) reveals that the Security Council has very inconsistently 
and minimally authorized targeted sanctions against persistent violators using any of the six grave 
violations against children as a criteria for their designation. 
 Data analysis revealed a troubling bifurcation between accountability strategies used by MRM 
Task Force Members (which, due to local NGO exclusion is largely comprised of UN bodies and INGOs) 
and local NGOS and grassroots groups. Employing a nearly exclusively legal punitive approach, the 
MRM applies a disproportionate focus on the ‘big fish’ or high-level perpetrators. Additionally, as 
learned through field research, due to strict UN-set standards for the verification of reported allegations 
and the many challenges expressed with verifying cases, only a minority of grave violations occurring in 
the country are included in the MRM annual reports. As one informant admits, “alerts are not reported 
unless there is a big massacre that has been verified. This is a big challenge, as only verified cases go 
up332 to the Special Representative…this is especially problematic for attacks on schools because very 
few cases get verified” (UNICEF). Ultimately, this insular approach undermines the MRM’s ability to 
achieve all but the last objective of monitoring and reporting accountability outlined above. Alternatively, 
the strategy undertaken by local NGOs and civil society groups, places greater emphasis on ‘downward’ 
accountability to affected populations by focusing more on the victims of armed conflict through the 
                                                 
332 It interesting to note here the informant’s use of language, which further illustrates the prevailing 
conceptualization of upward accountability to those higher up, such as the Special Representative.  
 131 
  
provision of remedial services and programming aimed at local capacity-strengthening and 
empowerment.  
 By yielding a better sense of the ‘big picture’ or the overall context through less restricted and 
better positioned monitoring and reporting, one could make the case that local NGOs and civil society 
groups are perhaps better able to meet the first three objectives of monitoring and reporting 
accountability. In fact, the literature review provided in Objective I of the Results section further 
evidenced this divergence, by comparing the reporting of the UN-driven MRM annual reports and those 
that were community-driven; it is clear that the MRM is only capturing a fraction of the on-the-ground 
reality as the latter initiative captured dramatically higher prevalence rates in just two provinces than the 
MRM’s reported figures, which cover the entire country. While further research is needed to more 
rigorously examine whether NGOs are capable of achieving downward accountability if included in the 
MRM, as thematic analysis (particularly on partnerships) revealed both advantages and disadvantages of 
engaging local NGOs in monitoring and reporting, it is apparent through this research study that a more 
diverse set of actors are required for MRM engagement.  Furthermore, the UN MRM is but one piece of 
broader monitoring and reporting efforts to protect children.  
ii. Defining Accountability in Humanitarian Settings: 
 While there is a multitude of working definitions of accountability, a consensus definition has yet 
to emerge. This lack of clarity surrounding definition ultimately challenges the ability to implement and 
measure accountability in the field. In fact, the Humanitarian Accountability Report (HAP) acknowledges 
that; “accountability has now become part of our day-to-day jargon, but that’s a disadvantage in many 
ways. Once you start asking staff from humanitarian agencies what they understand by accountability you 
quickly discover that comprehension varies a lot depending on who you are talking to.”333 With this 
testimony in mind, it becomes readily apparent that there is a need to carefully unpack the discourse on 
accountability, by specifically analyzing the diverse components and elements that constitute the term.  
                                                 




 Ebrahim (2003), in his examination of accountability in practice, analyzes accountability along 
three dimensions: 1) upward-downward, 2) internal-external, and 3) functional-strategic. This first axis of 
upward versus downward accountability334 is of particular importance in the context of humanitarianism, 
with ‘upward accountability’ defined by Edwards and Hulme as entailing accountability to trustees (e.g. 
the Special Representative of Children and Armed Conflict, the UNSC, the Secretary-General), donors 
and host governments whereas, ‘downward accountability’ taps more into the relationship with grassroots 
partners, the beneficiaries of assistance and the victims of human rights violations.335 
 A watershed moment in the discourse on accountability within humanitarianism was with the 
Joint Evaluation on Emergency Assistance to Rwanda in 1996, which called accountability in 
humanitarianism into question and brought it to the forefront of international discussion.336 This report 
demonstrated the abject failure of the then humanitarian system to protect civilians, galvanizing greater 
scrutiny into humanitarian intervention and ultimately creating an impetus to move accountability beyond 
the merely financial dimension.337 This report, with the subsequent creation of a number of 
accountability-based initiatives,338 catalyzed the ‘accountability revolution,’ which reframed the 
humanitarian agenda to be defined more in ‘rights’ terms with crisis-affected communities or 
beneficiaries as rights claimants and humanitarian workers as their duty bearers.339 With this ‘revolution’ 
the focus clearly shifted from ‘upward accountability’ to ‘downward accountability’ to stakeholders.  
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 However, this valuable shift took longer to translate into UN partnerships, which although 
undergoing major reform in 2005, this reform predominately focused on accountability between cluster 
agencies and to host governments rather than to affected populations. This gap was explicitly 
acknowledged by the IASC Interim Self-Assessment of the Implementation of the Cluster Approach, 
which observed “there is concern among field staff that more needs to be done to ensure greater 
accountability to recipients of assistance and that this has not been adequately addressed within the cluster 
approach, to date.”340 Even in the follow-up report conducted in 2010, little evidence was found of 
participatory or community-based approaches among its members.341 
 Beyond the obvious moral imperative to be more accountable to affected populations, there is an 
operational utility as well that underscores the importance of ‘downward accountability;’ although 
admittedly there is thus far a very limited evidence-base to draw on, existing research342 has shown that 
greater downward accountability results in a greater quality343 of humanitarian intervention and 
assistance. However, much debate surrounds determining who is actually best positioned to accomplish 
these lofty goals of downward accountability: UN bodies, International NGOs, or local civil society 
groups? With this functional utility in mind, it is constructive to apply this framework of accountability to 
humanitarian operations, such as monitoring, documenting and reporting grave violations occurring in 
armed conflict settings, to produce more efficacious results and actions. Using this framework of 
accountability to better understand accountability in humanitarian initiatives is similarly helpful in 
analyzing whether the UN-led Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism achieves the oft-stated goal of 
accountability.  
iii. The MRM and Upward Accountability: Accountability to Whom? 
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 In conducting field research in the DRC to determine the local effectiveness of the MRM in 
practice, it became readily apparent through data analysis that a key issue surrounding the MRM’s failure 
in the DRC context deeply implicated the topic of accountability, as demonstrated in the results section. 
One of the major incentives for the establishment of the MRM by the Security Council was to “foster 
accountability and compliance with international law and child protection standards,”344 highlighting that 
“the MRM plays an important role in pushing for accountability of parties to a conflict,”345 with an entire 
section dedicated to accountability featuring in the UN MRM guidelines. However, challenges remain in 
its effective operational implementation. Despite the strong emphasis on accountability in the MRM’s 
rhetoric, in practice, as evidenced by this study, the MRM is predominately focused on upward 
accountability to the UNSC and other key UN bodies. As a result, the MRM completely relegates the 
importance of downward accountability to affected children, their families and communities.  
 Monitoring and reporting efforts are a pivotal component in ensuring accountability to 
communities affected by grave human rights violations. Building on the evolution of child protection in 
armed conflict settings as discussed in the background chapter of this study, Nylund and Hyllested (2010) 
emphasize monitoring, reporting and response mechanisms in describing accountability, specifically as a 
critical component of taking action against perpetrators, such that:  
“the framework developed through the Machel study provides a basis from 
which to demand accountability of United Nations’ members and 
specifically the [Security] Council. First, to address and take action against 
perpetrators of grave violations against children; secondly, to approach 
armed groups and forces to uphold obligations under international law; and, 
thirdly, to task humanitarian and human rights actors with the responsibility 
to put in place monitoring, reporting, and response mechanisms.”346 
Effective monitoring can be critical in ensuring downward accountability in the following ways: 1) for 
effective targeting of a rapid response, 2) to feed into the development of early warning systems that can 
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ultimately prevent violations from occurring, 3) to more efficaciously design and implement remedial 
efforts for victims of grave violations, and 4) for collecting evidence holding perpetrators accountable to 
deter future violations.347 Coursen-Neff notes that in order “for monitoring to assist these goals, it must be 
designed with them in mind;”348 however, an analysis of the MRM in the DRC context revealed that the 
Mechanism is not presently designed to achieve the first three goals for an effective and accountable 
monitoring or surveillance system and therefor necessarily must be a part of a broader effort that 
addresses the other neglected goals of monitoring and reporting accountability. In fact, while largely 
designed to enable the fourth objective, evidence reveals that the MRM fails at realizing even this final 
task.  
 In framing this discussion on monitoring and reporting mechanisms and accountability, it is 
important to stress that it is necessary to think about accountability beyond a mere penal or punitive 
perspective. Sheppard captures this frequent misconception in his statement that “at times, the term 
‘accountability’ is used in a manner that makes it seem synonymous with a rigid penal response,” which 
when situated in a local judiciary characterized by weakness and corruption “the term becomes 
amorphous, intangible, and entirely incapable of being acted upon.”349 It is important to acknowledge the 
other ways monitoring and reporting can be accountable, as listed above; by exclusively focusing on 
documenting violations for the purpose of holding perpetrators accountable using an approach reliant on 
the justice system, results in a more myopic focus as “evidence that is admissible in a court…must be of a 
higher quality and level of detail than, for example, that required for trend analysis, and may be harder to 
collect.”350 
 The MRM Guidelines are clear in recognizing the aspirational objective of accountability, stating 
that “ideally, the MRM should contribute to influencing actions and changing the behaviour of parties 
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who commit grave violations and should lead to informed programmatic response to prevent further 
violations and ensure care for victims of violations.”351 This imperative element of linking monitoring to 
response as a means of fostering accountability (as expressed in the goals listed above) is recognized in 
the MRM Global Good Practices Study by emphasizing that the main positive outcomes of the MRM in-
country include “link[ing] monitoring to response, thus building accountability for violations into 
programming.”352 However, the MRM’s ability to achieve this task of informing programmatic responses 
is gravely undermined by its inherent inability to more comprehensively capture the ‘big picture’. In 
conjunction with the findings of this study as demonstrated in the results section and the preceding 
section of the discussion, Barnett and Jefferys' report highlight under-reporting as a critical flaw in the 
current MRM system, stressing that “not all reports give extensive indicative information such as the 
number of reported violations (as well as those confirmed), and limitations in the monitoring and 
reporting process may result in under-reporting.”353  
Failure to accurately represent the scale and scope of the issue, and other extensive indicative 
details of violations, challenges the potential to effectively shape programming, as “accurate information 
about both individual attacks and national patterns is critical to providing effective protection.”354 If the 
data feeding into the MRM lacks the necessary information to recognize patterns, themes and persisting 
implementation challenges to appropriately trigger responses and better target prevention, remedial and 
programmatic efforts, then indeed it is not able to effectively accomplish the fundamental task of 
informing response and prevention. Similarly, the findings of this study revealed that a major challenge in 
effectively implementing the MRM in the DRC and achieving downward accountability to victims of 
grave violations was linking MRM monitoring, documentation and reporting to various legal, medical and 
psychosocial responses through referral mechanisms. As highlighted in data analysis, local NGOs and 
civil society groups made greater efforts to link monitoring to response through offering supportive, 
                                                 
351 UN, MRM Guidelines: 20. Emphasis added. 
352 UN, MRM Global Good Practices Study: 11. 
353 Barnett and Jefferys, Full of Promise: 5. 
354 Coursen-Neff, 2010, in UNESCO, Protecting Education from Attack: 112. 
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empowering and capacity-strengthening initiatives and services through their more victim-focused 
approach to accountability.  
iv. Two Possible Streams of Accountability: Upward (MRM) and Downward (local NGOs) 
 The MRM Country-Level Task Forces (i.e. CTFMR) are comprised almost exclusively of UN 
bodies,355 with the exception of a select few international NGOs.356 Information collected by the CTFMR 
on the ground report to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) on Children and 
Armed Conflict, who in turn reports to the UN Secretary-General, who then reports to the UNSC 
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict which is tasked with making recommendations to the 
Security Council. It is quite clear in outlining this ‘chain of command’ that information flows upwards, 
starting with the CTFMR, which does not include any local NGOs or local representation. Previous 
studies, such as Barnett and Jefferys’, cite the minimal engagement of local NGOs and civil society in the 
DRC’s Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism as “linked to limited funding for child protection 
programming”357, as well as “limited awareness of the mechanism” and “concerns about compromising 
humanitarian access.”358 Hodgson warns that “there is a danger that an overly Security Council-focused 
mechanism will distance the MRM from action on the ground and become a mere political instrument.”359 
                                                 
355 In general, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed 
Conflict defines “The Task Force [as] consist[ing] of UNICEF, the Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the Department for 
Disarmament Affairs, the Office of the Special Adviser on Africa, the Office of the Special Adviser on 
Gender Issues and Advancement of Women, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour 
Organization (ILO).” See https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/working-with-partners/  
356 In the DRC, only Save the Children and COOPI were members, although both were highly inactive 
members at that.  
357 It is suggested that this cut in child protection funding partially resulted from the phasing out of DDR 
activities. Nonetheless, it was clear across all organization types included in this study that lack of 
financial support for the MRM and other monitoring and reporting initiatives is critically lacking. Nearly 
all informants emphasized the need for greater financial commitment to the MRM and for other 
monitoring and reporting activities to be more strongly resourced. 
358 Barnett and Jefferys, Full of Promise: 8. 
359 Hodgson, Whose Action Plan?: 172.  
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Indeed it is acknowledged that a significant weakness of this exclusion of NGOs is that “the Office of the 
Special Representative does not have a field presence but [instead] promotes and supports the efforts of 
operational partners,” highlighting that “deepening such engagement between Member States and NGOs 
is also essential” and would be facilitated through the establishment of a structure for consultation with 
NGOs, albeit at the United Nations Headquarters level not on-the-ground. Despite this emphasis on 
partnerships, when examining the composition of this Advisory Group of NGOs, all are INGOs and 
absent are country-specific local civil society groups, who would have a more in-depth and contextualized 
knowledge of child protection issues than INGOs, who typically ‘parachute’ in for short fact-finding 
missions.360 
 Justifications for the purposeful exclusion of local NGOs and civil society groups in the MRM 
was expressed by several informants who comprise the CTFMR, and appears to be two-fold: 1) overtly, 
Task Force members attested in interview conversations that NGO exclusion, both as official members 
and as reporting partners, is predominately due to ethical concerns, such that implicating local NGOs in 
the MRM by actively participating in providing information on perpetrators of grave violations could 
entail security risks, which would ultimately compromise the core humanitarian principle of ‘do no harm,’ 
2) inadvertently, it was also revealed that local NGOs are effectively squeezed out of participation, even 
as informal partners, because they are unable to meet the high-level standards set by the MRM 
Guidelines361 for the verification of reported allegations. One could argue that a paradoxical internal 
contradiction arises here, with these two lines of reasoning pitting two key, yet diametrically opposed, 
humanitarian principles against each other: On the one hand, efforts are made to ‘do no harm’ in 
achieving a humanitarian agency’s objective by minimizing the security risks that local NGOs might be 
exposed to in monitoring and reporting grave violations. Yet on the other hand, by purposely excluding 
                                                 
360 For a list of the NGOs included in the Advisory Group of NGOs, please see the bottom of 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/working-with-partners/  
361 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General requires that all allegations be UN-verified in 
order to be listed (Alec Wargo, "Opportunities to Strengthen Monitoring and Reporting of Education-
Related Violations" (presentation, UNESCO International Expert Seminar Protecting Education from 
Attack, Paris, September 28, 2009).  
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local NGOs from participating in monitoring and reporting, one is perpetuating a ‘colonial-style’ system 
of dependence on external agencies that simultaneously fails to reinforce existing local capacities and 
resources. 
 This missed opportunity by intentionally excluding local NGOs, resulted in key questions to 
emerge during field research regarding when and where NGO participation is possible, appropriate and 
desirable in monitoring and reporting violations against children. It has become apparent that a ‘conscious 
uncoupling’ needs to take place between Monitoring and Reporting for the formal Mechanism (i.e. the 
MRM) and monitoring and reporting efforts regularly done by local NGOs as part of their programming. 
Without deconstructing monitoring and reporting in this way, grave misconceptions ensue with the MRM 
and what it seeks to achieve. The results were widespread false expectations on-the-ground, with 
dissonance between what the MRM is designed to do and what the Mechanism, or what monitoring and 
reporting or surveillance systems in general, ought to do. This emerging theme resulted in the exploration 
of whether there is a need for two channels of monitoring and reporting grave violations against children: 
one orchestrated by the formal UN-led MRM Task Force, and another conducted by local NGOs and civil 
society groups.  
 While the formal Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism takes an overtly individualized approach 
by focusing on the ‘big fish’ or the high-level perpetrators that can be brought to the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) and held accountable for their violations,362 the alternative channel of local NGO 
                                                 
362 For example, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of the DRC, who was the first to be convicted by the ICC, was 
tried for war crimes, including forcibly conscripting child soldiers (one of the six grave violations). 
Lubanga was allegedly responsible for founding two armed groups (the Union des Patriotes Congolais, 
UPC, and the Forces Patriotiques pour la Libération du Congo, FPLC), serving as the Commander-in-
Chief for the FPLC. Both armed groups have been listed in both annexes of the Secretary-General’s 
annual report. Interestingly, Lubanga was only sentenced to 14 years of imprisonment (which 
comparatively, is about as much as the penalty for grand larceny in the state of New York), but will serve 
even less time in jail because the Chamber ordered that the time spent since he surrendered in 2006 until 
tried in 2012 be deducted from his sentence. See,  http://allafrica.com/stories/201207100136.html. 
However, despite the Lubanga trial pegged as a ‘success’ story of the ICC, it does not actually evidence 
Security Council accountability, as “the Lubanga trial was not a result of referral from the Security 
Council.” Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict. UN Security Council Resolution 1612 and Beyond: 
Strengthening Protection for Children in Armed Conflict. Policy Paper. 2009: 12. 
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monitoring and reporting is characterized by a more ‘zoomed-out’ macro focus, capturing a more accurate 
depiction of reality and the daily life of a child in conflict, and is thus better able to demonstrate the ‘big 
picture’ to link monitoring to rapid response, remedial and preventative efforts. The divergence in this 
‘microscopic versus telescopic’ approach of each channel reveals that each method has divergent 
corresponding approaches to accountability (i.e. upward and downward, respectively) guiding their 
functioning. 
 Although the need for two streams of monitoring and reporting, each tapping into two 
complementary channels of accountability (upward versus downward), focus (perpetrator-centred versus 
victim-centred) and approaches (punitive versus remedial), has been established through this study, 
further research is needed to assess whether NGOs are capable of achieving this difficult task. It would be 
critical to examine both the advantages and disadvantages of NGOs conducting this work in order to 
determine if it is an endeavour that warrants greater resource investment and donor attention. However, it 
is worth emphasizing that both the North Kivu and South Kivu study conducted by Columbia 
University’s Program on Forced Migration and Health emphasized in Objective I of the Results section 
provide strong examples in favour of community and local NGO engagement in child protection, 
monitoring and reporting. Another innovative approach, also requiring additional follow-up research to 
comprehensively evaluate its effectiveness is the UNHCR’s relatively new protection monitoring system, 
which consists of a more active surveillance system collecting information on various protection issues 
and violations against children from field agents who pro-actively go to communities looking for 
violations. The increasing overlap between the UNHCR protection monitoring system and the MRM is 
noted, such that “since the beginning of 2014, the focus of the protection monitoring system has 
increasingly become violations of UN resolution 1612, including attacks on schools.”363.364 
                                                 
363 Monitoring and Reporting to Enhance the Protection of Education in Situations of Insecurity and 
Conflict: North Kivu Province, DRC (Draft), Personal Communication: 15. 
364 Research has begun to make headway here with the case of Nepal serving as a potent example piloting 
the use of NGOs in the MRM process, whereby an NGO network supplied info to the MRM Task Force. 
However, more research needs to be conducted across multiple contexts to further (expand) the evidence-
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 In examining the structure of the MRM and its system for functioning, it becomes apparent that 
the Mechanisms is clearly and purposely designed to be accountable upwards, or alternatively, to ensure 
that it demonstrates the responsible use of its powers to those that lie above them (i.e. the body who they 
must report to) in the hierarchy.  However, upon further analysis, one could argue that even though the 
MRM is designed to focus exclusively on upward accountability, it is not in fact successful in even 
meeting this level of accountability. Therefore, it is open to question whether the Mechanism is 
accountable at all, if accountability is not captured at this upper echelon. 
v. Problematizing the Security Council and its Capacity for Accountability: 
 As “one of the principal organs of the United Nations and the one with the principal responsibility 
for international peace and security,”365 it is critical to examine the Security Council and its capacity for 
accountability in situations of grave violations against children in conflict settings. The Security 
Council’s involvement, albeit quite limited at the time, on children in armed conflict settings arguably 
dates back to the 1990s with its work on the situation in Liberia,366 followed by Sierra Leone,367 as well as 
the topic beginning to feature into selected Presidential statements.368 However, it wasn’t until 1999 that 
the Security Council adopted its first thematic resolution on the issues relating to children in armed 
conflict (i.e. UNSC Resolution 1261),369 which called upon the Secretary-General to provide 
                                                 
base in support of NGO inclusion. For more information on the positive model of Nepal, please see Nepal 
Partnerships for Protecting Children in Armed Conflict (PPCC), Nepal Partnerships for Protecting 
Children in Armed Conflict (n.d.). 
365 Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: 371.  
366 Security Council Resolution 1071. S/RES/1071. August 30 1996, and Security Council Resolution 
1083. S/RES/1083. November 27 1996. 
367 Security Council Resolution 1181. S/RES/1181. July 13 1998, and Security Council Resolution 1231. 
S/RES/1231. March 11 1999. 
368 Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council. S/PRST/1999/18. June 29 1998; 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council. S/PRST/1999/6. February 12 1999; 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council. S/PRST/2000/10. March 23 2000; 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council S/PRST/2001/21. August 31 2001; 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council S/PRST/2002/6. March 15 2002; 
and Statement by the President of the Security Council, Security Council. S/PRST/2002/12. 
369 Security Council Resolution 1261. S/RES/1261. August 25 1999. 
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recommendations to the Council on the protection of children in armed conflict settings, and report on the 
implementation of protective measures.  
 The formal adoption of this thematic issue by the Security Council is significant, as it implicitly 
attests to the potential substantive effect of children and armed conflict on international peace and 
security. Happold emphasizes that “it should be noted that the 1612 process has had effects internal, as 
well as external, to the United Nations. The MRM and the engagement of the Security Council has 
contributed to the further entrenchment and mainstreaming of [the] issue [of] children and armed conflict 
within the United Nations system.”370 For example, the emergence of DDR programs and the increasing 
importance of child protection featuring itself in the peacekeeping mandates, including relevant personnel 
positions (i.e. Child Protection Advisors).  Security Council Resolution 1379 (2001) marked the first 
Security Council resolution to specifically call for the inclusion of child protection efforts addressing 
particular associated needs and risks in peacekeeping missions. Since then, “in Africa, almost all of the 
peacekeeping mandates have included a mention of protection for women and children, with the 
exception of the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) (Ethiopia/Eritrea, 2000).”371 In contrast, 
none of the 11 peacekeeping operations mandates before 1999 made reference to children. A more recent 
2015 report by the independent research organization Security Council Report, stresses that “in the last 
three years, about 70 percent of relevant country-specific resolutions have had some language on children 
and armed conflict” with the incorporation of child protection mandates into peacekeeping missions 
becoming “common practice.”372 However, the report documents the continued difficulties encountered in 
implementing these more robust child protection mandates on the ground.  
                                                 
370 Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: 377.  
371 Jefferys, Can the Powerful Protect?: 12. 




 The Security Council’s relatively recent thematic focus on children and armed conflict reflects a 
call for “an era of application”373 that moves beyond “the juridicial task of the elaboration of norms to the 
political project of ensuring their application and respect on the ground.”374 Specifically, this call for 
greater application entails: 1) increasing international criminalization through the punitive use of targeted 
sanctions, and 2) increasing involvement of the Security Council, as initiated by UNSC Resolution 
1612.375 The Security Council has a number of instruments in its ‘toolkit’ to draw upon in taking action 
against parties and perpetrators committing grave violations against children, including: 1) the threat or 
actual use of targeted sanctions, 2) the inclusion of child protection-specific objectives into UN 
peacekeeping operations and its mandates, 3) the provision of payoffs for good behaviour (e.g. granting 
access to financial aid or technical assistance), and 4) the referral of situations and individual perpetrators 
to international criminal bodies, such as the ICC.376 It is interesting to note that 50 percent of these 
outlined tools undertake a penal approach to accountability and all four focus on the perpetrator (rather 
than the victim), including the child protection mandate in UN peacekeeping, which claims that “child 
protection advisers play a key role in establishing dialogue with perpetrators to end the gravest violations 
against children”377 with the aim of producing Action Plans with armed groups. Furthermore, Watchlist’s 
analysis of 20 of the Working Group’s conclusions on situations of concern between 2006 and 2008 
revealed that this Toolkit is severely under-utilized in practice; furthermore, the report notes that “the 
Working Group has not used the full range of available tools that it set out for itself in the Toolkit” using 
at its maximum only 50 percent of the tools in the Toolkit (in only two cases), and on average only a 
                                                 
373 See Protection of Children in Armed Conflict; Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on Children and Armed Conflict, paras. 29-30, delivered to the General Assembly, A/54/430.Oct. 
1, 1999. 
374 Ibid., para. 30. 
375 Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict. 
376 Gerard Mc Hugh. “Strengthening Protecting of Children Through Accountability: The Role of the UN 
Security Council in Holding to Account Persistent Violators of Children’s Rights and Protections in 
Situations of Armed Conflict. Conflict Dynamics International 13 (2009). 




third.378,379 It is worth noting that in documenting the frequency each tool has been used, Working Group 
field visits and Security Council field visits rank last as never having been used; this serves as additional 
justification for the inclusion of local NGOs and civil society groups in the MRM process, in order to 
obtain on-the-ground knowledge that is evidently not currently obtained by the Working Group or the 
Security Council.  
  In addition, in the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and 
Armed Conflict’s (SRSG-CAAC) description of the role of the Security Council in strengthening 
compliance for the protection of children in conflict settings, it identifies the following tools: 1) 
identifying and naming parties who’ve committed grave violations against children to the MRM annexes, 
2) developing action plans380 to be signed by both the United Nations and the listed parties, 3) the 
establishment and implementation of the MRM, 4) the establishment of the Working Group as a 
subsidiary body and its continual review of and provision of guidance for specific situations, and lastly 5) 
the punitive use of sanctions (such as arms embargoes, the freezing of economic assets and travel bans) 
against parties and perpetrators.381 Again, these tools are in line with the observation previously made that 
the Security Council and its efforts for accountability are overwhelmingly focused on the ‘big fish’ and 
the penal approach to accountability. This finding is further reinforced by the SRSG-CAAC’s 
statement,382 which emphasizes ending impunity through the use of the ICC, International Tribunals and 
sanctions, as opposed to the other ways monitoring and reporting can contribute to accountability as was 
listed above. Lastly, the Working Group has developed a toolkit for action under the following five 
                                                 
378 Watchlist, Security Council Resolution 1612 and Beyond: 14. 
379 For a full list of actions most often used, sometimes used, least often used, and never used, please see 
Watchlist’s 2009 study “UN Security Council Resolution 1612 and Beyond.”  
380 For more on the use of Action Plans with Armed Forces and armed Groups, please see 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/action-plans/  
381 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Role 
of the Security Council. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/mandate/engagement-of-the-security-
council/  
382 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. 
Ending Impunity. https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/working-to-end-impunity/  
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categories: assistance, demarchés, enhanced monitoring, improvement of mandate,383 and ‘other 
measures,’ with Happold arguing that this list is “perhaps indicative of its approach that there is no 
mention that it might recommend new sanctions regimes.”384 However, the SRSG-CAAC portrays the 
role of the Working Group as less robust, outlining its possible tools as primarily including “the 
possibility of members of the Working Group to undertake a field trip, to hold emergency meetings 
and/or to issue a media statement.”385 
 The toolkit of possible recourses for action outlined above demonstrates the various instruments 
the Security Council can draw upon for accountability, or alternatively, the responsible use of its power 
and authority. It is imperative that these tools be examined in practice to determine the effectiveness of 
the Security Council as a ‘vital organ’ of UN accountability, as informants in this study and in the 
Watchlist’s 2009 study expressed considerable concern over the “atmosphere of impunity and lack of 
accountability for perpetrators of egregious violations against children in armed conflict.”386 Conflict 
Dynamics’ study, funded by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada (DFAIT), examined the role 
of the UNSC and its actions (using various measures within its ‘toolkit’) in multiple country situations on 
the protection of children, analyzing whether UNSC engagement has been effective in enforcing 
accountability. Ultimately, this study determined that despite the major role the UNSC has played in 
advancing the protection of children in conflict settings, “there exists an ‘accountability gap’ in the 
Security Council’s response to grave violations against children.”387  
                                                 
383 For example, McHugh’s report illustrates that “the United Nations Mission in DR Congo (MONUC) 
provides an example of a situation where the UNSC included tasks pertaining to protection of children in 
armed conflict in the Mission’s mandate.” (McHugh, Strengthening Protection of Children Through 
Accountability: ii) It should be noted however that MONUC changed it’s name to MONUSCO (the UN 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC) on July 1st 2010.  
384 McHugh, Strengthening Protection of Children Through Accountability; Happold, Protection of 
Children in Armed Conflict: 369-370.   
385 Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. Role 
of the Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict. 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/our-work/security-council-working-group/  
386 Watchlist, UN Security Council Resolution 1612 and Beyond: 11. 
387 McHugh, Strengthening Protection of Children Through Accountability: iv. 
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 A chief indicator for UNSC’s, as well as its Working Group for Children and Armed Conflict’s, 
upward accountability is the use of targeted sanctions, as the HPN’s Full of Promise study notes that  
“many of those consulted in New York believed that the threat of sanctions is the Working Group’s 
strongest tool;”388 however the report adds that “in the DRC, few commentators believe the threat of 
sanctions has had much traction, since a number of armed groups are unaware that they have been 
threatened.”389 Conflict Dynamics’ analysis of the UNSC’s role in holding persistent violators to account 
report that in only 16% of situations (three cases in total) that were listed in the annexes of the Secretary-
General’s reports on Children and Armed Conflict between 1999 and 2007 had targeted sanctions 
imposed. Furthermore, only one of those three cases (the DRC) cited the six grave violations explicitly in 
the criteria for identifying and subjecting perpetrators or parties to the targeted sanctions. However, of the 
22390 individuals and entities designated for targeted sanctions in UNSC Resolution 1698 and 1596, “none 
were specifically designated based on acts of recruiting, using or targeting children or committing other 
grave violations against children.”391 In addition, Watchlist’s study revealed that in the case of the DRC, 
“sanctions were already imposed on the parties, but the recruitment and use of children was added to the 
preexisting sanctions as additional criteria.” It wasn’t until 2009 that individuals were sanctioned solely 
for grave violations committed against children, whereby the Sanctions Committee for the DRC subjected 
three commanders of the FDLR to asset freezes and travel bans for the abduction and sexual abuse of girls 
and the recruitment and use of boys as soldiers.392 However, Hodgson notes that “there are signs that this 
approach is changing” as the Security Council has more recently added the recruitment and use of 
                                                 
388 Barnett and Jefferys, Full of Promise: 11. 
389 Ibid. 
390 The author notes that this figure is as of early March 2009. 
391 McHugh, Strengthening Protection of Children Through Accountability: ii. 
392 United Nations, Sanctions Committee Concerning Democratic Republic of Congo Adds Four 
Individuals to Asset Freeze, Travel Ban List (March 2009), available at http://un.org/News/Press/ 
docs/2009/sc9608.doc.htm., in Watchlist, Security Council Resolution 1612 and Beyond. 
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children to criteria for sanctions in the mandate of the Somalia Sanctions Committee.393 Although this is 
just one of the six grave violations, this does mark an important step in the right direction. 
 Noting the overt reluctance to issue sanctions, Happold argues that this largely reflects divisions 
that exist within the Security Council,394 with the situations that are granted attention and placed on the 
Council’s agenda determined not merely by the severity of the grave violations “but also by whether the 
Council has decided that the situation, as a whole, is a threat to international peace and security.”395 While 
the lawful use of sanctions, as stipulated in article 39 of the U.N. Charter, requires that they be imposed 
only in cases with the purpose of restoring international peace and security in the face of an act of 
aggression, or a threat to or breach of the peace, an objection by the Security Council using this specific 
rationale has never been raised. In fact, Resolution 1698 (2006) reporting on the situation in the DRC 
includes “political and military leaders recruiting or using children in armed conflict in violation of 
applicable international law”396 as liable to designation for targeted sanctions.397 Further counter-
arguments to the claim that the six grave violations are not marked as criteria for sanctions because they 
do not constitute a significant threat to international peace and security include the observation that “the 
Council has been willing to state that the harmful impact of conflict on children has implications for 
peace and security” with Happold asserting that “rather, the difficulty appears to be [the] lack of political 
will.”398 This major weakness is further exacerbated by the conflation and entanglement of political 
                                                 
393 Hodsgon, Whose Action Plan?: 171. 
394 For example, the U.S., Belgium and the U.K. were open to using sanctions in 2008, however China 
was “firmly opposed.”  
395 Happold, Protecting Children in Armed Conflict: 377-378. 
396 Security Council Resolution 1698. S/RES/1698. July 31 2006: para. 13. 
397 However, despite this added criteria, no one had yet been subject to sanctions for this specified reason 
until Innocent Zimurinda in December 2010. This refers to the case of Innocent Zimurinda, the Colonel of 
Forces Armées République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC), who was added “for four of the six grave 
violations against children, including recruitment and use of child soldiers, killing and maiming of 
children, sexual violence and denial of humanitarian access” at 
https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/press-release/2Dec10/  
398 Happold, Children in Armed Conflict: 70, supra note 43.  
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interests and humanitarian objectives within the Security Council,399 ultimately creating additional 
sources of political division and uneven application. In addition to these explanations cited for why the 
UNSC and its Working Group have consistently failed to be accountable and take action against 
persistent perpetrators of grave violations against children, Conflict Dynamics’ report highlights the 
following reasons: 1) ‘general reluctance’ to authorize targeted sanctions towards certain member states 
or situations, 2) limited possible options, especially when a situation is not on the UNSC agenda, 3) 
greater inclination towards other tools in the toolkit that are easier to achieve consensus for, 4) over-
emphasis on child recruitment (rather than all six grave violations) as a trigger for listing or de-listing in 
the annexes, and 5) limited coordination, especially between the UNSC and its Sanctions Committees.400  
 While it has been illustrated that the MRM is designed for upward, rather than downward, 
accountability, this paper has equally demonstrated through careful analysis of the UNSC’s toolkit, that 
the MRM fails at achieving accountability even at this upward level by focusing on punitive measures 
against perpetrators. By examining the UNSC’s use of targeted sanctions as a proxy indicator for holding 
perpetrators of grave violations against children to account, it becomes readily apparent that the UNSC 
has not been effective in ensuring upward accountability. Ultimately, the UNSC’s inconsistent and 
inadequate use of targeted sanctions in country situations listed in the Secretary-General’s annexes does 
not set a strong precedent or serve as a strong deterrent to future perpetrators, as ultimately “without real 
repercussions for violations against children, armed forces or groups will not have incentives to halt 
violations, and the threat of targeted measures will become empty over time.”401 Consequentially, 
continued use of the existing system without any improvements to accountability will continue to fail at 
protecting children from grave violations in armed conflict settings.  
  
                                                 
399 The case of the Working Group in Myanmar in 2008 is a prime example of this. 
400 McHugh, Strengthening Protection of Children Through Accountability: iii. 





 The aim of this research study was to evaluate the effectiveness of the UN-led Monitoring and 
Reporting Mechanism as implemented at the national level in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
with a particular emphasis on the grave violation of attacks on schools. A brief literature review on the 
evolution of the UN Security Council’s agenda on children and armed conflict, Security Council 
Resolution 1612, the MRM, and existing studies evaluating the impact of the MRM revealed that a 
significant knowledge gap persists in the literature; while many of the existing studies are robust, they are 
quite outdated and have not been replicated to re-evaluate the MRM’s effectiveness after several more 
recent significant changes, including the expansion of the triggers to include attacks on schools.  
Additionally, no empirical study to date has evaluated the effectiveness of the MRM in specifically 
addressing attacks on schools, a grave violation frequently overshadowed by other UNSC Resolution 
1612 violations, such as the recruitment of child soldiers and sexual violence.  
 More specifically, the research questions that this study sought to address were the following: 1) 
what are the current challenges in effectively implementing the MRM at the national level in the DRC?; 
2) is the MRM effective in linking monitoring to response for the grave violation of attacks on schools? 
and finally; 3) is the MRM accountable to children in situations of armed conflict? In answering these 
questions, the key results that emerged from data analysis were that several challenges exist in 
implementing the MRM effectively on-the-ground. Challenges to effective monitoring and reporting 
grave violations against children were expressed by key informants as including the following: a) limited 
access to areas where violations are occurring, either due to security concerns, the expansiveness of the 
country, or the lack of public infrastructure to reach rural pockets; b) a lack of awareness of the MRM 
itself and on the specific occurrence of attacks on schools in the DRC; c) corruption or conflicts of 
interest within the judicial, enforcement and governmental system; d) ethical concerns in partnering with 
grassroots organizations and civil society groups in collecting sensitive information on children; e) false 
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expectations of what the MRM ought to do and what the MRM is designed to do; f) weaknesses in the 
national legal framework; g) UN and international elitism and imperialism as biases that impact 
partnerships; h) challenges with the UN-imposed verification requirements for reported allegations, 
particularly in verifying reports of attacks on schools; and finally, the most pressing and pervasive 
challenge across all sectors and organizations; i) limited financial, human, and technical resources.  
 Two key findings emerged from the research conducted that warranted further discussion and a 
deeper examination of their implications on children in armed conflict settings. Interviews with a diverse 
set of organizations’ representatives in the field of child protection, children’s rights and monitoring and 
reporting revealed both a general lack of awareness of attacks on schools occurring in the DRC and a 
profound under-prioritization of this grave violation. The under-prioritization of attacks on schools is 
particularly observable when compared to the over-emphasis on the recruitment and use of children by 
armed groups, which has been evidenced since the onset of the MRM’s implementation. This study also 
evidenced that sexual violence has more recently increasingly become prioritized. This prioritization of 
child soldiers, and then more recently of sexual violence, reflects a shift in what is globally perceived as a 
‘hot button’ issue in the field of humanitarianism and human rights, as well as among popular mainstream 
media.  
 Main findings from this study also exposed a bifurcation in accountability approaches in 
monitoring and reporting activities. A majority of local NGOs appeared to demonstrate a more victim-
focused approach to accountability or ‘downward’ accountability to affected children by linking 
monitoring to responses in efforts to provide psychosocial, legal and medical support in a way that serves 
to foster empowerment and build capacity. Whereas in contrast, INGOs and UN bodies formally engaged 
in the MRM seemed to favour a more perpetrator-focused approach reliant on punitive or penal measures, 
with accountability flowing upwards to those higher up on the ‘chain of command,’ culminating in the 
UN Security Council. While local grassroots organizations were better able to achieve a more factual 
appraisal of children’s lived experiences in the DRC by embracing a more macro approach capturing the 
‘big picture,’ UN bodies and INGOs adopted a more micro approach by mostly focusing on holding the 
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‘big fish’ perpetrators to account for their violations. A deeper examination of MRM accountability by 
examining sanctions and other punitive actions taken against perpetuators revealed that it is failing to 
achieve accountability, even at this upward level.  
 Ultimately, these major findings revealed that a blinkered approach to monitoring and reporting 
grave violations against children have significant implications for the protection of children and their 
rights in armed conflict settings. If the MRM is ineffective in collecting large-scale data on the true scope 
and scale of the issue due to the challenges highlighted in this study, the result is an inability to produce a 
trend analysis that can be used to both prevent future violations and inform effective programmatic 
responses on-the-ground. Therefore, the MRM is not meeting its intended purpose to ensure that children 
are safe and protected in such vulnerable contexts such as armed conflict. By not effectively linking 
monitoring to response, children remain at risk and will continue to be exposed to grave human rights 
violations and will continue to be unsupported by the necessary psychosocial, medical and legal 
assistance required for their protection, rehabilitation, and reintegration. Additionally, if the MRM is 
failing to be accountable using its current punitive perpetrator-focused approach, then such targeted 
measures (such as sanctions) will increasingly become ‘empty’ and will not set a strong precedent to deter 
future perpetrators of grave violations against children.  
 Ultimately, it is clear through this study’s results that greater financial commitment is urgently 
required for the MRM and other monitoring and reporting initiatives as all informants uniformly attested 
to the lack of financial support and the need for such initiatives to be more strongly resourced. 
Additionally, major pitfalls in the MRM revealed in this study highlight the need for a more diverse set of 
actors to engage in the MRM, including local representation, and greater coordination for the Mechanism 
to be a piece of a broader effort to protect children from the impacts of armed conflict. 
 Despite these research findings, lots of questions remain on how to most efficaciously improve 
monitoring and reporting efforts in order to best protect children in conflict settings. As part of filling this 
critical knowledge gap, envisioned next steps include examining the advantages and disadvantages of 
engaging local actors in the MRM. While it is certainly a missed opportunity for the MRM to not be 
 152 
  
engaging more with existing local capacities, as grassroots groups may be better positioned to monitor 
and report on grave violations against children for trend analysis and programmatic response, further 
research is needed to better explore the possible weaknesses in this approach so as to produce an effective 
surveillance system that maximally protects children. 
